| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/29/2008 - 04/30/2008 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 44164 | Rep Org: SC DIV OF HEALTH & ENV CONTROL
Licensee: F&ME CONSULTANTS
Region: 1
City: NORTH AUGUSTA State: SC
County:
License #: 293
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK WINDHAM
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 04/25/2008
Notification Time: 10:03 [ET]
Event Date: 04/24/2008
Event Time: 13:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
RON ZELAC (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
"The SC Department of Health and Environmental was notified on Thursday, April 24, 2008, at 1425 hrs, that a Humboldt Model EZ 5001, s/n 1931, containing 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241:Be, had been damaged at 1345 hrs on April 24, 2008. The Construction Services Manger [licensee] stated that a gauge had been damaged by the authorized user's vehicle. [State] Duty Officer responded to the scene and arrived at 1611 hrs. The area around the gauge had been properly roped off and the source rod was locked in its shielded position. The gauge handle and rod had been snapped off at the top of the gauge. The gauge was secured in the transport container and the inspector advised licensee to return the gauge to the permanent storage location, secure it from further use, and to contact the gauge manufacturer for further instruction regarding disposal.
"Licensee was advised by state Duty Officer to submit a written report detailing this event to the Department within 30 days. The event is open and pending the licensee's investigation and report to the Department, updates will be made through the national NMED system." |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 44167 | Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: APPLIED TESTING AND GEOTESTING
Region: 1
City: BRIDGEPORT State: PA
County:
License #: 37-30701-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 04/25/2008
Notification Time: 10:55 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2008
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
RON ZELAC (FSME)
ILTAB via email ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text PENNSYLVANIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The State provided the following information via email:
"The RSO for Applied Testing and Authorities (37-30701-01), Bridgeport, [PA] reported [to the State of PA] that their Troxler Model 3411 portable moisture-density gauge, containing about Cs-137 (44mCi) and Am-241 (9 mCi), was stolen from a street outside an employee's home at 502 Dickinson Street in Philadelphia. It was stolen between 8:30 last night and 6:45 this morning. The RSO indicated that the gauge was stolen from a locked box which was double-chained to a flat-bed truck. It was noticed that the gauge was missing this morning.
"The Philadelphia Police Department was notified of the incident by the licensee and has responded to the area.
"[State of PA] will be doing an inspection of the licensee this afternoon."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 44174 | Rep Org: CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST LDS
Licensee: CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST LDS
Region: 3
City: Liberty State: MO
County:
License #: GENERAL
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL REDDEN
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 04/29/2008
Notification Time: 09:18 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2008
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
| Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
ILTAB VIA EMAIL ()
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text STOLEN TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS
The licensee reported that on the night of 3/7/08 the church was broken into and vandalized. As part of the vandalism, 2 self-illuminating exit signs were stolen. The signs were not recovered. The licensee did not discover that the theft of the signs was reportable until 4/29/08. It is not known if the signs were broken during the vandalism. The areas around both signs have been cleaned since the theft.
The manufacturer is SRB Technologies (Canada), Inc.
Model: BetaLux-E/Luminexit, Activity: 20 Ci each, the serial numbers are not known.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44175 | Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JONATHON JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH | Notification Date: 04/29/2008
Notification Time: 12:38 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2008
Event Time: 07:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF TSC VENTILLATION DURING SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE
"This notification is to report a Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"At 0750 CDT on 4/29/08, the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System was removed from service for a scheduled surveillance procedure (SP 1738) to replace charcoal filters and measure the cleanup efficiency. It is scheduled to be returned to service on 5/1/08 [at approximately 1500 CST]. The TCS ventilation system is now considered non-functional. The TSC will be staffed in the event it is needed and radiological conditions monitored. If radiological conditions require actions, procedure F3-6, 'Activation and operation of the TSC,' Section 7.6 directs the TSC management to relocate TSC activities to a radiological safe area if necessary."
Alternate facilities are available.
The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 44176 | Rep Org: WALMART
Licensee: WALMART
Region: 1
City: COLONIAL HEIGHTS State: VA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICH DAILEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 04/29/2008
Notification Time: 15:10 [ET]
Event Date: 04/25/2008
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
| Person (Organization):
MARIE MILLER (R1)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text TWO TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS CRUSHED IN TRASH COMPACTOR
The licensee reported that one of their employees placed two tritium exit signs in a trash compactor at one of their stores and compacted them. The licensee has tagged out the affected trash compactor and notified representatives of the Commonwealth of Virginia and Region I. The signs are approximately 11.5 Curies each. The Commonwealth is sending representatives to evaluate the radiological condition and assist in the removal and disposal of the devices.
The licensee notified Region 1(Joustra).
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 44178 | Rep Org: FAIRBANKS MORSE
Licensee: FAIRBANKS MORSE
Region: 3
City: BELOIT State: WI
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DOMINIC DEDOLPH
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 04/29/2008
Notification Time: 15:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2008
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
MARIE MILLER (R1)
JOHN THORP (NRR)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
OMID TABATABAI (NRO)
| Event Text PART 21 NOTIFICATION REGARDING IDENTIFICATION OF DEFECT ALCO SNUBBER VALVE MICRO-CRACKING
The reporting organization provided the following information via facsimile:
"Name and address the individual or individuals informing the Commission.
Mr. Dominic Dedolph, Manager, Quality Assurance, Fairbanks Morse Engine, 701 White Avenue, Beloit, WI 53511.
"Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect: Facility- Entergy (Indian Point).
"Basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect: ALCO Fuel Snubber Valve P/N 2402466-1. The snubber valves in the Emergency Diesel Generator are installed in the high pressure fuel line between the fuel injection pump and the injection nozzle and serve as a pulsation dampener.
"Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
Nature of defect: Fairbanks Morse Engine (FME) evaluation has determined that a potential safety hazard exists for ALCO fuel injection snubber valves due to micro-cracking in the tip of the snubber valve created during the material surface hardening process when the tips of the snubber valve were quenched in water.
"Safety hazard which could be created by such defect: Micro-cracking in the tip of the snubber valve could potentially lead to material flaking . It has been postulated that the flakes (or particles) could be flushed downstream and become lodged in the nozzle, causing excessive fuel to enter the combustion space and wash the cylinder liner dry and lead to a piston seizure.
"The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained. Deviation discovered on February 29, 2008. Evaluation completed on April 28, 2008.
"The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action. Root cause analysis was performed and found that water quenching during the heat treatment process resulted in approximately 40% of the tips of the snubber valves to have micro-cracking present. When oil was substituted for the quenching medium, no snubber valves showed any signs of micro-cracking. The heat treatment process documentation has been updated to specify the quenching medium as oil. Oil has been used exclusively in the heat treatment process of all snubber valves produced by FME since March 1, 2008.
"Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees. FME is notifying Entergy (Indian Point) of the twelve (12) suspect pieces." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 44179 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID JESTER
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 04/30/2008
Notification Time: 05:21 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2008
Event Time: 23:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2008 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
CAROLYN EVANS (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 32 | Power Operation | 32 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO SEAL LEAK
"On 04/29/08 at approximately 2313 during testing of the Unit 1 HPCI system, a main pump seal developed a leak requiring the HPCI system to be secured. HPCI testing was in progress per OPT 09.2, HPCI System Operability Test, following recent Unit 1 refueling outage. At the time of discovery, the Unit 1 HPCI system had been declared inoperable due to surveillance testing activities which removed HPCI from the standby lineup. When the pump seal leak developed, operators secured HPCI and isolated the leak by closing the pump suction isolation valves and the keep fill supply valves. Investigation into the cause of the pump seal leakage is underway and the Unit 1 HPCI system will be placed under clearance for repair.
"The initial safety significance of this condition is considered to be minimal. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system as well as the other Unit 1 ECCS systems are operable at this time. Actions have been taken to protect redundant safety systems.
"The Unit 1 HPCI system has been removed from service and secured. Investigation is underway to determine the cause of the HPCI main pump leakage. The HPCI system will be placed under clearance for repair."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |