Event Notification Report for April 30, 2008

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TWO ABANDONED ELECTRON CAPTURE DETECTORS

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"On April 19, 2008, Urban Ore picked up a load of material from 2151 Berkeley Way, which included a gas chromatograph with an ECD [Electron Capture Detector] containing 300 mCi of Tritium. Prior to this, 2151 Berkeley Way had been sold to the University of California at Berkeley (UCB). On April 26, 2008, Urban Ore returned the gas chromatograph to the loading dock of 2151 Berkeley Way.

"On April 28, 2008, the Richmond Regional Office of RHB [Radiological Health Branch] was notified. On April 28, 2008, at 1330 the UCB RSO, and other representatives from UCB met at 2151 Berkeley Way and identified a Largus Applied Technologies gas chromatograph, with an Electron Capture Detector (ECD), Model 200 within the loading dock containing approximately 150 mCi of Tritium. Smears were taken of this ECD and no contamination was found. The group inspected the parking garage inside the building and found another ECD unit, Valco containing approximately 500 mCi of Tritium and a 0.9 uCi Radium-226 button source. Smears of this ECD identified approximately 8000 dpm of contamination at the open end of small bore exhaust tubing. The ECD reportedly came from room 100C. The Largus unit was moved from the loading to the inside of the building and labeled 'do not remove.' At 1600 on April 28, 2008, the RSO asked that all recycling work be stopped in 2151 Berkeley Way.

"The RHB was informed of the events of April 28, 2008, at about 1140 on April 29, 2008, which was followed by an email to RHB detailing the above at 1830 on April 29, 2008. On April 30, 2008, RHB has taken custody of the 2 ECDs, and met with the RSOs of UCB and DOL [Department of Labor] and other representatives of CDPH [California Department of Public Health]. A strategy for resolving this incident was worked out, and RHB offered full assistance to DOL."

EIGHT LOST PALLADIUM - 103 SEEDS

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"[Florida Bureau of Radiation Control was] informed at 1600 hours that (8) Pd-103 seeds and (8) I-125 seeds, all in one box are lost. Box was labeled for a delivery to North American Scientific. Box was left in restricted area over night and was found missing the next day. Housekeeping was suspected of throwing box in the trash. Surveys were performed, dumpster was checked, and North American Scientific was contacted. No further action will be taken on this incident."

Activity of Pd-103 seeds 1.2 milliCuries per seed, I-125 seeds 0.381 microCuries per seed. Licensee is retraining staff on proper disposal procedures.

FL Incident Number: FL08-066

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

CALCIUM CHLORIDE SPILLED ON SITE

"Environmental received a call regarding an unknown substance spilled in the south east corner of the site. Environmental personnel responded and discovered approximately 300 pounds of calcium chloride, commonly known as 'Ice Melt.' The Ice Melt was on the side of the road with approximately 25% of the substance in the water of the wetlands. Clean up efforts are underway. The following local government agencies were notified: Michigan Department of Environmental Quality District Office (MDEQ), National Response Center, 911 Local Emergency Planning Committee, Pollution Emergency Alert System (PEAS)."

The Ice Melt had been emptied from a facility truck onto the side of the road. The wetland empties into Lake Erie.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

TWO EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS INOPERABLE

"Two emergency diesel generators found inoperable while two trains of residual heat removal are required to be Operable for core cooling.

"On 4/30 at 1600 it was discovered that the level in Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage tanks were not trending together. The two underground fuel oil tanks have a capacity of 35,000 gallons each (useable volume of 34,674 gallons). The tanks are connected with a siphon line between the tanks to ensure a passive means of transfer so one emergency diesel can use both tanks. The siphon line does not appear to be transferring fuel oil.

"KPS is in a refueling outage and in REFUELING SHUTDOWN mode with the vessel drained to 6" below the flange for reactor vessel reassembly. Both trains of RHR are required to be OPERABLE per TS 3.1.a.2.B.

"Technical Specification 3.7.c states that when its normal or emergency power source is inoperable, a system, train or component may be considered OPERABLE for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of its applicable LCO provided:
1. Its corresponding normal and emergency power source is OPERABLE; and
2. Its redundant system, train, or component is OPERABLE.

"Kewaunee Power Station (KPS) Technical Specifications Section 3.7.a.7 states that the reactor shall not be made critical unless both diesel generators are operable. The two underground storage tanks combine to supply at least 35000 gallons of fuel oil for either diesel generator and the day tanks for each diesel generator contain at least 1,000 gallons of fuel oil. The current volume is 29,700 gallons in Tank A and 21,500 gallons in Tank B.

Based on two trains found inoperable, this is reportable under:
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) (8-Hr)
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) (8-hr)

"Per TS 3.1.a.2.B the condition must be fixed immediately. Troubleshooting/investigation is in progress to determine repairs. Cause is being investigated."

Condition was found during engineering review of logs taken during operator rounds.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED AT 1641 EDT ON 05/14/08 FROM JACK GADZALA TO JEFF ROTTON * * *

"EN 44182 provided notification that the emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil tanks were not capable of supplying the combined volume of fuel oil (35,000 gallons) from two storage tanks to either EDG as required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.a.7 for EDG operability. That notification was based on a conservative determination that a siphon line, which connects the two fuel oil storage tanks, was nonfunctioning.

"TS 3.7.a.7 requires both EDGs to be operable when the reactor is critical. Although the reactor was in refueling shutdown mode at the time of this event (i.e., not critical, and therefore not in the mode of applicability for TS 3.7.a.7), the EDGs provide a support function (emergency power) for the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system; two trains of which were required to be operable for core cooling per TS 3.1.a.2.B.

"A subsequent review confirmed that the capability to transfer fuel from either storage tank to either EDG existed independent of the siphon line. The siphon line is not needed for transferring fuel oil from either tank to either EDG. There are alternate means available to transfer fuel oil to the EDGs; sufficient time is available to implement these alternate means of fuel oil transfer within the time available.

"Additional fuel oil supply margin existed due to the mode of operation at the time (refueling shutdown). The 35,000 gallon TS requirement is based on the expected fuel consumption of one EDG operating for seven days at continuous rated load, thus ensuring adequate time to restore off-site power or to replenish fuel. The amount of fuel in the storage tanks was sufficient for the EDGs to be capable of performing their support function for RHR in the refueling shutdown mode. As such, both RHR trains remained operable and TS 3.1 a.2.B was satisfied. Consequently, this condition did not meet the reportability criteria in 10 CFR 50.72.

"As a result, the notification made on 4/30/2008 (EN 44182) is hereby retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Peterson).