Event Notification Report for April 14, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/13/2008 - 04/14/2008
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44141
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDALL CRANE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDALL CRANE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/15/2008
Notification Time: 14:46 [ET]
Event Date: 04/14/2008
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2008
Notification Time: 14:46 [ET]
Event Date: 04/14/2008
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3)
LAURA KOZAK (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF SIREN ALERT NOTIFICATION SYSTEM DUE TO SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS
"On April 14, 2008 during activities being performed by a Berrien County (BC) vendor associated with relocation of the BC 911 Dispatch Center, a microwave line was wired in parallel with the transceiver used to activate the Alert and Notification System (ANS) sirens. Following completion of the installation of the parallel microwave circuit, station personnel were informed and a poll was conducted at approximately 1633 hours on April 14, 2008, to verify no loss of capability of the ANS. This poll was unsuccessful. Immediate corrective actions included removal of the parallel microwave circuit and performance of an additional siren poll. The subsequent siren poll was completed successfully at approximately 1739 hours on April 14, 2008. A silent testing performed at 1000 hours on April 15, 2008, confirmed that all sirens are operational. An investigation has been initiated to evaluate the exact nature of the intended change, and to examine the processes used to control activities that may impact ANS operation. The ANS may not have been available on April 14, 2008, from approximately 1200 hours when the parallel circuit was installed, until the configuration was restored and successfully polled at 1739 hours."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. They are working with Berrien County during the investigation.
"On April 14, 2008 during activities being performed by a Berrien County (BC) vendor associated with relocation of the BC 911 Dispatch Center, a microwave line was wired in parallel with the transceiver used to activate the Alert and Notification System (ANS) sirens. Following completion of the installation of the parallel microwave circuit, station personnel were informed and a poll was conducted at approximately 1633 hours on April 14, 2008, to verify no loss of capability of the ANS. This poll was unsuccessful. Immediate corrective actions included removal of the parallel microwave circuit and performance of an additional siren poll. The subsequent siren poll was completed successfully at approximately 1739 hours on April 14, 2008. A silent testing performed at 1000 hours on April 15, 2008, confirmed that all sirens are operational. An investigation has been initiated to evaluate the exact nature of the intended change, and to examine the processes used to control activities that may impact ANS operation. The ANS may not have been available on April 14, 2008, from approximately 1200 hours when the parallel circuit was installed, until the configuration was restored and successfully polled at 1739 hours."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. They are working with Berrien County during the investigation.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44138
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: ERICK MATZKE
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: ERICK MATZKE
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 04/14/2008
Notification Time: 16:05 [ET]
Event Date: 04/14/2008
Event Time: 12:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/05/2008
Notification Time: 16:05 [ET]
Event Date: 04/14/2008
Event Time: 12:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/05/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK ANALYSIS REVEALED POTENTIAL ACCIDENT MITIGATION DEFICIENCY
"During review of a High Energy Line Break (HELB) analysis a condition was discovered where a break in the auxiliary steam system could result in a loss of all the containment fans and coolers, which are required to be maintained operable due to procedural restrictions to mitigate a design basis accident.
"The plant entered Technical Specification (T.S.) 2.0.1 at 1245 CDT. This specification requires a plant shutdown within 6 hours. Operations personnel isolated auxiliary steam to the affected areas of the Auxiliary Building at 1305 CDT. With auxiliary steam isolated to the Auxiliary Building, containment fans and associated coolers were restored to an operable status. Plant exited T.S. 2.0.1 at 1305 CDT."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1224 EDT ON 5/5/08 FROM MATZKE TO HUFFMAN * * *
"An exhaustive review of the high energy line break licensing and design basis for the auxiliary steam system as it impacts the safety functions or the containment coolers has determined that the required safety functions are met for the licensed and designed basis of the plant. Therefore the previous notification (EN 44138) of April 14 is being withdrawn."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R4DO (Pick) notified.
"During review of a High Energy Line Break (HELB) analysis a condition was discovered where a break in the auxiliary steam system could result in a loss of all the containment fans and coolers, which are required to be maintained operable due to procedural restrictions to mitigate a design basis accident.
"The plant entered Technical Specification (T.S.) 2.0.1 at 1245 CDT. This specification requires a plant shutdown within 6 hours. Operations personnel isolated auxiliary steam to the affected areas of the Auxiliary Building at 1305 CDT. With auxiliary steam isolated to the Auxiliary Building, containment fans and associated coolers were restored to an operable status. Plant exited T.S. 2.0.1 at 1305 CDT."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1224 EDT ON 5/5/08 FROM MATZKE TO HUFFMAN * * *
"An exhaustive review of the high energy line break licensing and design basis for the auxiliary steam system as it impacts the safety functions or the containment coolers has determined that the required safety functions are met for the licensed and designed basis of the plant. Therefore the previous notification (EN 44138) of April 14 is being withdrawn."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R4DO (Pick) notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 44294
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 06/13/2008
Notification Time: 11:01 [ET]
Event Date: 04/14/2008
Event Time: 13:08 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2008
Notification Time: 11:01 [ET]
Event Date: 04/14/2008
Event Time: 13:08 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
INADVERTANT DEENERGIZATION OF GROUP SIX LOGIC CIRCUIT
"This is a 60 day telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) describing an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signal (Group 6) affecting more than one system.
"On April 14, 2008 at 1308 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT), with Unit 3 in mode 4, an unanticipated Group 6 primary containment isolation signal (PCIS) was generated during the placement of a clearance. During the placement of the clearance, plant personnel removed a fuse which deenergized Group 6 PCIS logic. This resulted in the auto start of train A of the control room ventilation system, auto start of trains A and C of the standby gas treatment (SGT) systems, and the isolation of the reactor zone and refuel zone normal ventilation systems.
"All systems responded according to plant design. Train B of the SGT system did not auto start because only the A channel PCIS was affected during the implementation of the clearance. Train B of SGT is only affected by the B channel PCIS logic. By 1444 hours CDT, the fuse was reinstalled, the affected systems were returned to standby readiness.
There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety to the public. The event was entered into TVA's corrective action program. The reference corrective action document is PER 142243.
"The Senior Resident inspector had been notified of this report."
"This is a 60 day telephone notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) describing an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signal (Group 6) affecting more than one system.
"On April 14, 2008 at 1308 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT), with Unit 3 in mode 4, an unanticipated Group 6 primary containment isolation signal (PCIS) was generated during the placement of a clearance. During the placement of the clearance, plant personnel removed a fuse which deenergized Group 6 PCIS logic. This resulted in the auto start of train A of the control room ventilation system, auto start of trains A and C of the standby gas treatment (SGT) systems, and the isolation of the reactor zone and refuel zone normal ventilation systems.
"All systems responded according to plant design. Train B of the SGT system did not auto start because only the A channel PCIS was affected during the implementation of the clearance. Train B of SGT is only affected by the B channel PCIS logic. By 1444 hours CDT, the fuse was reinstalled, the affected systems were returned to standby readiness.
There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety to the public. The event was entered into TVA's corrective action program. The reference corrective action document is PER 142243.
"The Senior Resident inspector had been notified of this report."