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Event Notification Report for March 27, 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
03/26/2008 - 03/27/2008

** EVENT NUMBERS **


43871 44095 44096 44097 44099 44100

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 43871
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ALAN HALL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 12/28/2007
Notification Time: 06:46 [ET]
Event Date: 12/28/2007
Event Time: 04:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/26/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Startup 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN - DROPPED CEA

"At 0347 on 12/28/07, during plant start up from a refueling outage while In Mode 2, one control element assembly (CEA) dropped to the bottom of the core from the upper electrical limit. The reactor was not critical at the time. Technical Specification LCO 3.1.3.1 action (e) was initiated to proceed to Mode 3 at 0450 while actions are taken to repair and retrieve the CEA. This four hour non-emergency report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), the 'Initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications'."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * RETRACTED ON 03/26/2008 AT 1433 EDT BY JACK BREEN TO DAN LIVERMORE * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:

"At 03:47 on 12/28/07, during plant start up from a refueling outage while in Mode 2, one control element assembly (CEA) dropped to the bottom of the core from the upper electrical limit. The reactor was not critical at the time. Technical Specification LCO 3.1.3.1 [Action E] was initiated to proceed to Mode 3 at 0450 while actions were taken to repair and retrieve the CEA. This event was reported as a four hour non-emergency report pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), 'The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications.' Upon further review of the event, and since the Unit was not critical in mode 2 at the time of the event, this event is not considered reportable in accordance with the guidance provide in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2, 'Event Reporting Guidelines 10CFR50.72 and 50.73,' in which 'The initiation of any plant shutdown' does not include mode changes required by TS if initiated after the plant is already in a shutdown condition. As such this notification is being retracted. The Site Resident has been notified of this retraction."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44095
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM BODIN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 03/26/2008
Notification Time: 10:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/26/2008
Event Time: 07:58 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/26/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 76 Power Operation 76 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF EMERGENCY SIRENS

"At 0758 CDT, on March 26, 2008, the Goodhue County dispatcher inadvertently activated the Goodhue County sirens from the primary unit during the conduct of a silent siren test. As per procedure they were to send out two silent signals; however the first was the silent and the second signal was the activation. Upon selecting the alert, they immediately sent out a signal to cancel the activation. Thirty-two of the 117 sirens in the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) were activated for approximately 14 seconds. The licensee was notified of the siren activation by the activation signal received on the informer unit in the Technical Support Center (TSC) as well as hearing the sirens being activated. Goodhue County Emergency Management contacted the local radio station at 0805 [hrs. CDT] to notify the public of the false activation. No press release is planned by Xcel Energy. No other press release is planned by Goodhue County."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44096
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [3] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAN LYON
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE
Notification Date: 03/26/2008
Notification Time: 13:54 [ET]
Event Date: 03/26/2008
Event Time: 11:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/26/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO MINOR OIL SPILL

"On March 26, 2008, at approximately 11:07 hours, an oil sheen was discovered outside the Indian Point cooling water discharge canal in the Hudson River. In accordance with the Indian Point Spill/Release plan, a spill or leak causing a visible sheen in the river as a result of the release of a petroleum product requires a notification to the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYS DEC) and the National Response Center (U.S. Coast Guard). The National Response Center was notified at 11:16 hours and the NYS DEC was notified at 11:38 hours. The source and cause of the petroleum product spill/leak is under investigation. An environmental cleanup vendor was contacted and is scheduled to be on site the afternoon of March 26, 2008, for assessment and cleanup."

The licensee notified the site resident inspector. R1DO notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44097
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEN TIEFENTHAL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/26/2008
Notification Time: 14:30 [ET]
Event Date: 03/26/2008
Event Time: 07:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/26/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

FITNESS FOR DUTY - NON-LICENSED CONTRACT SUPERVISOR

"At 0722 on March 26, 2008 at the Beaver Valley Power Station, a contract non-licensed supervisor tested positive for a controlled substance during a pre-access test. This person's access authorization has been denied and is not currently on site. This is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 26.73(a)(2)(ii). The NRC resident inspector has been notified of the event."

Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional Information

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44099
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PATRICK FALLON
HQ OPS Officer: DAN LIVERMORE
Notification Date: 03/26/2008
Notification Time: 15:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/26/2008
Event Time: 10:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/26/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

CONTROL ROOM PRESSURE BOUNDARY DOOR BLOCKED OPEN

"At 1045 EDT, it was recognized that Auxiliary Building Door R5-6 is a Control Center Pressure Boundary door. The door was blocked open at approximately 1400 on 3/24/2008 to support draining for on going maintenance on Division 1 CCHVAC Chiller. Upon recognizing this condition, Tech Spec 3.7.3 Action B.1 was entered for an inoperable Control Center Pressure Boundary at 1045 EDT [03/26/2008], with a 24 hour action to restore the boundary to operable status. Actions were taken to close Door R5-6 at 1120 hours [03/26/2008], and Tech Spec 3.7.3 Action B.1 was exited. This event is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) system. The accident mitigation function of CREF could not be assured during the time Door R5-6 was open without administrative controls to close it, if necessary."

The licensee notified the site NRC Resident Inspector.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 44100
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
                   6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
                   BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: KEVIN BEASLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 03/26/2008
Notification Time: 23:04 [ET]
Event Date: 03/26/2008
Event Time: 14:57 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/26/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN
Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)

Event Text

24 HOUR REPORT OF DEGRADED CRITICALITY CONTROL

"At 1410, on 3/26/08 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that a violation of a nuclear criticality safety approval (NCSA) had occurred. During a review of pre-removal NDA [Non destructive assessment] inspection in C-337 for the unit 3 cell 10 stage 2 converter inspection port, it was discovered that the NDA was performed on the wrong side of the converter (measurement taken on the east side of the converter, and the access hole was cut in the west side). The pre-removal NDA inspection was improperly performed resulting in a violation of NCSA GEN-10. The purpose of the requirement is to determine the initial handling category of the equipment.

"Two independent post removal NDA measurements were performed on the adjacent system and two independent visual inspections were performed on the removed item that demonstrated the item and adjacent system were each UH [uncomplicated handling]. The results indicate the equipment was properly classified as UH based on the resulting mass.

"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Although a leg for double contingency was lost, the correct equipment handling category was used. Additionally, an independent verification of no visible uranium present on the removed item has been successfully performed in accordance with applicable procedures to NCS Exempt the item.

"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRIT!CALITY COULD OCCUR): The equipment contained less than a safe mass of uranium and the equipment was covered to prevent exposure to a moderator. The uranium mass would have had to exceed a critical mass. The equipment would then need to be exposed to sufficient moderator in order for a criticality to be possible.

"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY CONCENTRATION, ETC.): The process condition relied on for double contingency for this scenario is mass.

"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): The NDA measurement indicated less than 674 grams at 1.6679 wt% U-235.

"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The first leg of double contingency relies on mass. Prior to opening the system a pre-removal NDA is required to be performed to initially classify the handling category of the equipment. Since the pre-removal NDA was performed on the wrong side of the equipment potentially resulting in an improper handling categorization, this control was violated. The second leg of double contingency is based on mass by performing a post-removal NDA of the removed equipment and adjacent system within 24 hours to verify the handling category. This control was not violated.

"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: On 3/26/08, a second post removal NDA was completed on the adjacent system and a second visual inspection was performed on the removed item in order to verify the handling category is UH and re-establish double contingency.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-08-0906; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2008-08"

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012
Thursday, March 29, 2012