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Event Notification Report for March 5, 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
03/04/2008 - 03/05/2008

** EVENT NUMBERS **


43884 44014 44015 44018 44019 44022 44027 44028

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 43884
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TONY SPRING
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 01/06/2008
Notification Time: 15:22 [ET]
Event Date: 01/06/2008
Event Time: 11:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/04/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO FAILED SURVEILLANCE TEST

"During HPCI pump operability surveillance in preparation for a system outage, the system failed to achieve rated flow and pressure in the time required by procedure and Tech Specs. The procedural requirement is <49 seconds and the Tech Spec requirement is < 50 seconds. The system achieved rated flow and pressure in 54 seconds. The system outage has been delayed until troubleshooting plans can be developed and implemented."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION BY K. LONG TO R. ALEXANDER AT 1109 EST ON 03/04/2008 * * *

"The initial notification was made as a result of the failure of HPCI to meet its response time of 50 seconds as defined in the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) due to a degraded component. Failure to meet the operability procedure requirements resulted in the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system being considered inoperable. Since HPCl is a single train system, its inoperability was the event that warranted a notification to meet the following reporting requirement:

"10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(v) Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems needed to: (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"An additional review and evaluation of the licensing basis was performed and demonstrated that the procedural required response time was set conservatively. As expected, the licensing basis does not require or assume any specific start time and HPCl is not credited in the accident analyses. The acceptance criterion contained in the TRM is within licensee control via the 10 CFR 50.59 process. Consequently, the TRM criterion was revised to 75 seconds to retain a value to assure continued monitoring and trending of HPCl performance in order to recognize and prevent continued performance degradation. Additionally, it is reasonable to conclude that HPCl would have completed its mission time of 4 hours despite the degraded condition of the EGR [Electronic Governor Remote] that caused the initial slower response time. This is based on the fact that HPCl started and ran at rated flow and pressure for approximately 39 minutes prior to shutdown with no problems identified. This removes any questions regarding its ability to restart and run based on demand during its mission time of 4 hours. An industry expert on this system and the engineer from the vendor that supports this system concurred with that conclusion.

"Since this subsequent review and evaluation determined that the slower response time did not render HPCl inoperable, no single train failure of HPCl occurred. The system was fully capable of performing its intended safety functions during the event timeline. Based on this information this notification serves to retract notification # 43884 made on 1/06/08."

The licensee notified the Resident Inspector of this retraction.

Notified the R2DO (Musser).

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44014
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: BIOLA UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: LA MIRANDA State: CA
County: LOS ANGELES
License #: N/A
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 02/28/2008
Notification Time: 14:05 [ET]
Event Date: 02/28/2008
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4)
CYNTHIA FLANNERY (FSME)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING / BROKEN TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

"On January 30, 2008, the RHB South ICE office received information regarding a broken exit sign containing approximately 11 Ci of H-3 (as of 2006). The sign was broken in a dormitory room at Biola University in La Mirada, California (later discovered to have occurred around December 13, 2007). This is a generally licensed device. This incident was investigated and handled under the 011308 Investigation by this office. On February 13, 2008 we were notified of a second H-3 exit sign that had been found broken (3 tubes of approximately 1 Ci each) on February 8, 2008. This broken H-3 sign was found during the inventory process of H-3 signs possessed by Biola requested by this office. Biola had never registered these GL devices to the State. During the inventory process Biola discovered that several of these H-3 exit signs were missing. For several weeks Biola searched dormitory rooms and other campus locations in performing the inventory of these devices. On February 27, 2008, I received an email from [a lady] stating that of they could only account for 79 of the 83 signs originally received for installation in Horton Hall, meaning that they do not know the location of four of the signs (77 physically present and 2 disposed account for the 79). The total remaining H-3 activity of the four signs is approximately 44 Curies.

"Biola will register the remaining signs with the State, and send a copy to this office."

CA Number: 022708

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44015
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ
Region: 4
City: SANTA CRUZ State: CA
County: SANTA CRUZ
License #: 1337
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 02/28/2008
Notification Time: 19:16 [ET]
Event Date: 02/28/2008
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4)
PATRICE BUBAR (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE DISCOVERED

The State provided the following information via email:

"The Licensee reports that they have 'discovered' residual radiation left in a Nuclear Systems irradiator model 'U' following the removal of the original 5000 Ci of Co-60 by a contractor of the OSRP last summer. The licensee thinks that one of the original 40 capsules that comprised the 8 rods (5 sources/rod) that contained the original 5000 Ci of cobalt 60 in 1958 may have remained in the device following source removal. The sources were removed for disposal last summer as part of the OSRP program to remove old unneeded sources of radiation."

CA Report: 022808

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44018
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: LOUISIANA DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION & DEVELOPMENT
Region: 4
City: LAKE CHARLES State: LA
County:
License #: LA-2467-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICHARD PENROD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 02/29/2008
Notification Time: 10:39 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2008
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/29/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4)
GREG MORELL (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO A MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following report was received via email:

"A Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD) van was involved, in an accident while carrying a Humboldt 5001 soil moisture density gauge. The gauge contained 10 mCi of Cs-137 (s/n9733GQ) and 40 mCi of Am-241 (s/nNJ03934). The Louisiana State Police notified LA DEQ of the accident and stated that the overpack was not breached and that readings at the surface were 0.9 mR/hr. The gauge and overpack were inspected at the DOTD district laboratory that was 0.5 miles from the accident. The overpack was in overall excellent condition except for a small hole (approximately 1 inch in circumference) which had been punched through the exterior wall but did not puncture the interior wall of the overpack. The overpack and gauge were surveyed by a DEQ inspector and recorded readings of 0.2 mR/hr at 1 meter which, correspond to the transportation index. A leak test has been sent off for the gauge and the results are pending. Will update with further information when it becomes available."

LA Event Report ID No.: LA080005

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44019
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES
Region: 4
City:  State: LA
County: ASCENSION PARISH
License #: LA-9098-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICHARD PENROD
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 02/29/2008
Notification Time: 11:09 [ET]
Event Date: 02/28/2008
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/29/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4)
GREG MORELL (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - OVEREXPOSED PERSONNEL MONITORING BADGE

The following information was received from the State of Louisiana via fax:

"On February 28, 2008, TEAM Industrial Services reported that an industrial radiographer's personnel monitoring badge received an excessive exposure of 10 rem. The industrial radiographer left his badge in the work truck while he was not performing radiography for a few days. The truck was parked next to a tank that was being x-rayed. According to TEAM, this exposure was just to the badge and not to the radiographer. According to TEAM, the actual exposure to the radiographer is 67 mrem. This incident is under investigation and further information will be forwarded once available."

LA Event Report ID: LA 080006

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General Information or Other Event Number: 44022
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: AVERY DENNISON
Region: 1
City: CHICOPEE State: MA
County:
License #: G0342
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSH DAEHLER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 02/29/2008
Notification Time: 16:39 [ET]
Event Date: 07/01/2007
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/29/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
PATRICE BUBAR (FSME)
ILTAB via email ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

"Avery Dennison, a General Licensee, reported to the Agency [MA Bureau of Environmental Health] via telephone at 10:15 a.m. on February 26, 2008 that two static eliminator devices are believed to be missing. Avery Dennison reported that one device was sent to the manufacturer in July, 2007 but that the manufacturer never received it. Avery Dennison reported that another device was in a box and it was tossed.

"The Agency followed up with the Licensee and the Manufacturer (NRD, LLC) of the devices and confirmed that the following two devices are believed to be missing:

"Device 1: NRD, LLC Model P-2001-080, s/n A2EV025, containing 181.1 millicuries of Po-210
"Device 2: NRD, LLC Model P-2001-080, s/n A2FM086, containing 181.1 millicuries of Po-210

"Device 1 has an approximate assay date of January 3, 2006.
"Device 2 has an approximate assay date of January 12, 2007.

"The Agency has scheduled a site visit with cognizant individuals to investigate the matter."

Notified R1DO (Doerflein), FSME EO (Bubar) and ILTAB via email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44027
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: ANDREW SMOLINSKI
HQ OPS Officer: RYAN ALEXANDER
Notification Date: 03/04/2008
Notification Time: 02:16 [ET]
Event Date: 03/04/2008
Event Time: 01:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/04/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

PLANNED MAINTENANCE ON MlSHlCOT SUBSTATION BY WPS RESULTS IN GREATER THAN 50% SIREN COVERAGE LOSS

"On March 4, 2008, at 0100 CST, ten emergency notification system sirens in the Kewaunee Power Station Emergency Planning Zone (one in Kewaunee County, nine in Manitowoc County) were de-energized due to a planned power outage. The loss of power to these emergency notification sirens resulted in a lost population coverage of 51.2%. As a result, this event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) and guidance in NUREG-1022 as a major loss of off-site communications capability.

"The expected duration of the planned power outage is 2 hours. Kewaunee and Manitowoc County Emergency Management agencies have already established appropriate contingency measures for the planned loss of the emergency notification system. Contingency measures include route alerting and an available plane with loud speaker for the areas affected by the power outage. The State of Wisconsin and the Federal Emergency Management Agency were previously informed of this planned outage.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 44028
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [ ] [4] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM RUSSELL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/04/2008
Notification Time: 11:19 [ET]
Event Date: 03/04/2008
Event Time: 08:16 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/04/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
4 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

ERDS LINK DETERMINED INOPERABLE FOR 3 HOUR PERIOD

"On 3/04/08 at 0816 EST, the Control Room was notified that the ERDS Link was inoperable from 1815 to 2115 EST on 3/03/08.

"During the troubleshooting it was discovered that a fuse was blown on the ERDADS I/O Subsystem Chassis. The ability to activate the ERDS Link is done by the Tesselators which were locked up due to the blown fuse. Removing power fuse for inspection and replacing was completed, chassis resumed normal functions. The ERDS link was returned to operable 3/03/08 at 2115 EST.

"Initial determination did not correctly identify the loss of ERDS Link functions. Upon later review by Engineering, it was determined that the link was inoperable during the 3 hour period."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012
Thursday, March 29, 2012