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Event Notification Report for January 31, 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
01/30/2008 - 01/31/2008

** EVENT NUMBERS **


43711 43930 43937 43938 43939 43943 43944 43945 43946

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 43711
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TOM HACKLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 10/11/2007
Notification Time: 05:20 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2007
Event Time: 22:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BEINOY DESAI (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNIT 2 HPCI PUMP SEAL FAILURE

"On 10/10/2007 a 2245, the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Pump developed a leak of approximately 5 gpm due to a suspected pump seal failure.

"HPCI was in service for a scheduled surveillance test per plant procedure OPT-09.2, HPCI System Operability Test.

"When the leak was identified, operators secured HPCI. The leak was isolated by securing the pump, closing the pump suction isolation valves, isolating the keep fill supply valves. Operators declared the Unit 2 HPCI System inoperable when the keep fill system was isolated.

"No automatic system isolation or actuation set points were reached.

"Safety significance is minimal due to the operability and availability of redundant systems. If a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) were to occur the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System would automatically inject and if necessary the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) would depressurize the reactor pressure vessel allowing low pressure Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) to inject. All low pressure ECCS are operable.

"Plant risk has been evaluated and remains 'Green'.

"The Unit 2 HPCI system has been removed from service. The pump suction isolation valves have been closed. Injection piping keep fill connections have been isolated. These actions were taken to stop the leakage of system water out of the failed pump seal.

"Actions have been taken to protect redundant safety systems, including the RCIC System and ADS.

"In accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.1 Required Actions: RCIC has been verified to be operable, and HPCI must be restored to operable status within 14 days.

"HPCI pump seal replacement is being planned in accordance with the site's Work Management process. This event has been entered into the sites Corrective Action Program and an investigation into the cause of the seal failure will be performed."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION RECEIVED FROM LEE GRZEK TO JOE O'HARA AT 1045 EST ON 1/30/08 * * *

"On October 11, 2007, at 0520 hours, the control room Supervisor made a notification (Event Number 43711) to the NRC Operations Center in accordance with. 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) (i.e., any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident). The notification was made as a result of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system being declared inoperable due to indications of a main pump seal leak. Specifically, water was discovered leaking an approximate five gallons per minute from the main pump turbine side seal during performance of OPT-09.2, 'HPCI System Operability Test.'

"Basis for Retraction

"Unit 2 HPCI was declared inoperable when the main pump seal leak was first identified. Upon further detailed engineering evaluation, it has been determined that the HPCI system was not rendered inoperable as a result of the condition identified on October 10, 2007, and was able to fulfill its safety functions in the degraded condition.

"The HPCI pump uses seal purge water piping in combination with mechanical seals to limit shaft leakage. The investigation found debris blocking the seal purge piping, which led to the seal faces overheating and subsequent failure. Water intrusion into the oil system was determined to be the limiting impact of the seal failure. The limiting event for HPCI was determined to be 4.1 hours of operation during a loss of Feedwater event with HPCI only, due to the short runtimes followed by long idle times which maximize water intrusion. The evaluation concluded that the HPCI pump would be able to operate for 4.1 hours, as required for the limiting event, and would be available for 8 hours. Thus, Unit 2 HPCI was degraded but able to meet all required safety functions.

"On this basis, the HPCI system was capable of performing its safety functions to mitigate the consequences of an accident and the issue is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"The NRC Resident was notified of this retraction."

Notified R2DO(Bonner)

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43930
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: SOUTHERN BAPTIST HOSPITAL OF FLORIDA
Region: 1
City: JACKSONVILLE State: FL
County: DUVAL
License #: 2213-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE FURNACE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/24/2008
Notification Time: 15:29 [ET]
Event Date: 01/24/2008
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/24/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1)
GREG MORELL (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - WRONG ISOTOPE ADMINISTERED

"On January 14, [2008], a physician gave a verbal order for a I-123 [Iodine-123] uptake scan. But instead, the patient was given a I-131 uptake scan. On January 16, the physician reviewed the results and realized the wrong isotope had been used. The patient has been notified. No adverse health effects are expected. Florida is investigating."

The amount of I-131 delivered to the patient was 4.7 milliCuries.

This event was assigned Incident Number FL08-012 by the State of Florida.

A 'medical event' indicates potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not result in harm to the patient.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 43937
Facility: NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES INC.
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
                   NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
                   LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
Region: 2
City: ERWIN State: TN
County: UNICOI
License #: SNM-124
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07000143
NRC Notified By: RANDY SHAKELFORD
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 01/28/2008
Notification Time: 15:15 [ET]
Event Date: 01/15/2008
Event Time: 16:21 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/28/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
BINOY DESAI (R2)
MIKE TSCHILTZ (NMSS)
FUELS OUO GROUP (E-MA)

Event Text

INADEQUATE INSPECTIONS ON THRU-WALL PIPING PENETRATION SLEEVES

"The issue is associated with sleeved line penetrations thru walls [in the 300 Complex]. The documented periodic inspection was not adequate to verify the continued reliability and availability of the sleeve. In addition, the discussion in the supporting safety analysis was insufficient.

"During the two (2) year review of the safely-related equipment (SRE) test, it was determined that the test could not be performed as written and that the test did not verify the continued reliability and availability of the sleeve. In addition, after a review of the discussion in the supporting safety analysis, the discussion was determined to be insufficient.

"There were no actual safety consequences to workers, the public, or the environment. Although determined to be extremely remote because of the nature of the pipe and sleeve, the potential criticality consequences include a leak of uranium-bearing solution from the pipe and sleeve and into the wall.

"The safety significance is determined to be low due to the following:
- the solution lines and sleeves are compatible with the associated uranium-bearing solutions (stainless steel);
- the sections of lines and sleeves thru the walls are straight pipe with no connections; and,
- leaks have not been observed in straight pipe and sleeve sections.

"Additional actions taken in response to the event:

"The number and locations of the sleeved line penetrations are being investigated. The grout/caulk may be removed to facilitate inspections of the sleeves. Safety-related equipment (SRE) tests and safety analyses are being revised to better describe the accident sequence/barriers and periodic inspections."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43938
Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: ECS CAROLINAS, LLP
Region: 1
City: CHARLOTTE State: NC
County: WAKE
License #: 060-0253-3
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: J. MARION EADDY III
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/28/2008
Notification Time: 15:09 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2008
Event Time: 12:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/28/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

"N.C. Radiation Protection Section was notified on 28 January 2008 by the RSO for ECS Carolinas, LLP Charlotte office that one of their portable moisture/density gauges (Humboldt Model 5001) was damaged at a construction site in Charlotte, NC. The gauge contains two sealed sources: (1) Cesium-137, 10 milliCuries (nominal) and (2) Americium-241:Beryllium, 50 milliCuries (nominal). Serial numbers for the gauge and the sources were not immediately available.

"The RSO responded and performed confirmatory measurements on the device using a hand-held GM survey instrument. The gauge handle was detached from the source rod and index rod and the case has some minor damage. The index remained attached to the gauge and the source rod remained within the shield. The RSO's survey confirmed that the Cesium-137 source is still contained within the shield. The licensee also performed a survey of the area where the gauge was initially struck and readings were at background levels (approx. 0.05 mR/hr). The readings at one meter from the gauge were approx. 0.4 mR/hr (consistent with the TI [Transportation Index]) and at one foot were approx. 2-3 mR/hr.

"The licensee has been in contact with the manufacturer and has received instructions on packaging and returning the device to Humboldt Scientific (Raleigh, NC). The device has been transported back to the licensee's storage facility and will be returned to Humboldt's Raleigh facility later this week."

North Carolina has assigned Event Report ID No. NC-08-03.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43939
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: SLADDEN ENGINEERING
Region: 4
City: PALM DESERT State: CA
County:
License #: 6318-33
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONELLE KRAJEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/28/2008
Notification Time: 15:53 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2008
Event Time: 06:51 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/28/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (FSME)
GONZALEZ (EMAIL) (CNSN)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE NOTIFICATION - STOLEN MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE

"At 0651 on January 28, 2008, the licensee contacted the State of California Warning Center /OES to report that a nuclear density gauge (CPN, model MC1, serial number MD40807529 - containing [10] milliCuries Cesium 137 and [50] milliCuries Americium 241:Beryllium) was stolen along with the company vehicle that the gauge was secured within (2005 Toyota Tacoma - Ca license 7W04195). The gauge was inside the locked transport case. The transportation case was locked and secured to the bed of the vehicle with chains and two independent locks. The gauge handle was also locked. This was reported to the Palm Desert Police Department (T08028025). The last leak test was performed on December 17, 2007 and was negative for removable contamination."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43943
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: ERICK MATZKE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/30/2008
Notification Time: 12:20 [ET]
Event Date: 01/30/2008
Event Time: 03:35 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

MULTIPLE EMERGENCY SIRENS LOST POWER DUE TO SEVERE WEATHER

"Due to severe weather (wind storm) in the area, a total of 8 of 78 sirens were reported out of service (loss of power) in Washington County, NE. An additional 6 sirens were running on their battery backup power supplies. The sirens have been returned to service. A large segment of the population was NOT affected."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43944
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DAN DEAN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/30/2008
Notification Time: 13:22 [ET]
Event Date: 01/30/2008
Event Time: 12:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2008
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
JEFFREY CRUZ (IRD)
MARY JANE ROSS-LEE (NRR)
JIM DYER (NRR)
MARC DAPAS (R1)
CASSANDRA MCKENTRY (DHS)
DAN SULLIVAN (FEMA)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE NOTIFICATION CAPABILITIES

At 1230 hrs. EST, the licensee discovered that offsite notification capabilities were lost. Upon discovery, they declared a Notification Of Unusual Event (NOUE) under EAL 7.3.2.

At the time of discovery, the licensee was in their adverse weather procedure due to winds exceeding 55 mph on site. The high winds caused a loss of electrical power to non-vital power block facilities, including the site PBX (Private Branch Exchange). The backup diesel generator for PBX power initially failed to start but was manually started at 1300 hrs. and PBX functions were restored. No other vital equipment was adversely affected by the loss of non-vital power.

The licensee will remain in the NOUE until normal power is restored to the power block. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM HARDING TO HUFFMAN AT 2017 EST ON 1/30/08 * * *

The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 2015 EST on 1/30/08 based on restoration of normal offsite power to the PBX. In addition, the backup diesel power supply to the PBX has been verified to be functional and available. The licensee has also stationed a spare backup diesel if needed. All phone lines have been tested and confirmed to be back in service with the exception to the RECS line (dedicated line to State and County Officials). Backup commercial lines to the State and County Officials are available.

The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Perry), FEMA and DHS notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43945
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WALTER HUNNICUTT
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 01/30/2008
Notification Time: 17:52 [ET]
Event Date: 01/30/2008
Event Time: 12:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS DECLARED INOPERABLE BASED ON POSTULATED MAIN FEEDWATER LINE BREAK SCENARIO

"On 01/30/08, it was discovered that restrictor plates were not installed as required in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 interior doghouse floor drains. The restrictor plates are indicated as required on applicable flow diagrams. The purpose of the plates is to limit the amount of flow into the interior doghouse floor drains following a Main Feedwater (MFW) line break event in the doghouse. Without the restrictor plates installed, the amount of flow into the floor drains following a MFW line break could overwhelm the capability of the floor drain pump. Water could then flood into the AFW pump rooms and could render all three AFW pumps on the affected unit inoperable. Operations declared the 3 AFW pumps on both Units inoperable at 1220 today. TS 3.7.5.D states that with 3 AFW trains inoperable, LCO 3.0.3 and all other LCO required actions requiring Mode changes are suspended until on AFW train is restored to operable status. Both Units will remain at 100% power until repairs are complete. This condition does not prevent the AFW pumps from starting on an automatic or manual signal for any required plant events.

"An investigation into how this condition occurred is underway. As a result of this discovery, all three AFW pumps on each unit have been declared inoperable.

"Plant personnel are currently in the process of fabricating the required restrictor plates or blind flanges as necessary and installing them to conform to the drawing requirements. The restrictor plates/blind flanges are being installed and upon completion the affected AFW pumps will be considered operable."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. State and local government agencies will also be notified by the licensee.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 43946
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
                   LEU FABRICATION
                   LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
Region: 2
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County: NEW HANOVER
License #: SNM-1097
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001113
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 01/30/2008
Notification Time: 19:00 [ET]
Event Date: 01/30/2008
Event Time: 18:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2008
Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
NADER MAMISH (NMSS)
JEFFREY CRUZ (IRD)
VICTOR MCCREE (R2)
MIKE WEBER (NMSS)
TODD KUZIA (FEMA)
HASELTON (DHS)
DON YATES (DOE)
TIMMONS (USDA)
TURNER (HHS)

Event Text

ALERT DUE TO MOISTURE CONTACT WITH A URANIUM DIOXIDE MIXTURE OF UNFAVORABLE GEOMETRY

An uranium dioxide powder mixture was contained in a hopper of unfavorable geometry with moisture prevention criticality protection measures. After starting a process stream, moisture was unintentionally introduced into the hopper containing the uranium dioxide powder.

At 1840 Global Nuclear Fuels declared an Alert condition onsite as a result of this introduction of moisture to the uranium dioxide powder. The process stream was secured which stopped the introduction of moisture. No criticality occurred.

* * * UPDATE FROM S. MURRAY TO P. SNYDER AT 2110 ON 1/30/08 * * *

The uranium dioxide powder in the hopper was successfully discharged into a hybrid container of favorable geometry. At 2107 the licensee exited the Alert condition.

Notified R2DO (Bonser), NMSS (Weber, Mamish), IRD (Cruz), DHS (Haselton), FEMA (Sweetser), DOE (Smith), USDA (Timmons), HHS (Turner) and EPA (National Response Center) (Snowden).

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