Event Notification Report for January 28, 2008
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/27/2008 - 01/28/2008
EVENT NUMBERS
43938439394394044959
General Information or Other
Event Number: 43938
Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: ECS CAROLINAS, LLP
Region: 1
City: CHARLOTTE State: NC
County: WAKE
License #: 060-0253-3
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: J. MARION EADDY III
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: ECS CAROLINAS, LLP
Region: 1
City: CHARLOTTE State: NC
County: WAKE
License #: 060-0253-3
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: J. MARION EADDY III
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/28/2008
Notification Time: 15:09 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2008
Event Time: 12:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/28/2008
Notification Time: 15:09 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2008
Event Time: 12:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/28/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (FSME)
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
"N.C. Radiation Protection Section was notified on 28 January 2008 by the RSO for ECS Carolinas, LLP Charlotte office that one of their portable moisture/density gauges (Humboldt Model 5001) was damaged at a construction site in Charlotte, NC. The gauge contains two sealed sources: (1) Cesium-137, 10 milliCuries (nominal) and (2) Americium-241:Beryllium, 50 milliCuries (nominal). Serial numbers for the gauge and the sources were not immediately available.
"The RSO responded and performed confirmatory measurements on the device using a hand-held GM survey instrument. The gauge handle was detached from the source rod and index rod and the case has some minor damage. The index remained attached to the gauge and the source rod remained within the shield. The RSO's survey confirmed that the Cesium-137 source is still contained within the shield. The licensee also performed a survey of the area where the gauge was initially struck and readings were at background levels (approx. 0.05 mR/hr). The readings at one meter from the gauge were approx. 0.4 mR/hr (consistent with the TI [Transportation Index]) and at one foot were approx. 2-3 mR/hr.
"The licensee has been in contact with the manufacturer and has received instructions on packaging and returning the device to Humboldt Scientific (Raleigh, NC). The device has been transported back to the licensee's storage facility and will be returned to Humboldt's Raleigh facility later this week."
North Carolina has assigned Event Report ID No. NC-08-03.
"N.C. Radiation Protection Section was notified on 28 January 2008 by the RSO for ECS Carolinas, LLP Charlotte office that one of their portable moisture/density gauges (Humboldt Model 5001) was damaged at a construction site in Charlotte, NC. The gauge contains two sealed sources: (1) Cesium-137, 10 milliCuries (nominal) and (2) Americium-241:Beryllium, 50 milliCuries (nominal). Serial numbers for the gauge and the sources were not immediately available.
"The RSO responded and performed confirmatory measurements on the device using a hand-held GM survey instrument. The gauge handle was detached from the source rod and index rod and the case has some minor damage. The index remained attached to the gauge and the source rod remained within the shield. The RSO's survey confirmed that the Cesium-137 source is still contained within the shield. The licensee also performed a survey of the area where the gauge was initially struck and readings were at background levels (approx. 0.05 mR/hr). The readings at one meter from the gauge were approx. 0.4 mR/hr (consistent with the TI [Transportation Index]) and at one foot were approx. 2-3 mR/hr.
"The licensee has been in contact with the manufacturer and has received instructions on packaging and returning the device to Humboldt Scientific (Raleigh, NC). The device has been transported back to the licensee's storage facility and will be returned to Humboldt's Raleigh facility later this week."
North Carolina has assigned Event Report ID No. NC-08-03.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 43939
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: SLADDEN ENGINEERING
Region: 4
City: PALM DESERT State: CA
County:
License #: 6318-33
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONELLE KRAJEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: SLADDEN ENGINEERING
Region: 4
City: PALM DESERT State: CA
County:
License #: 6318-33
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONELLE KRAJEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/28/2008
Notification Time: 15:53 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2008
Event Time: 06:51 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/28/2008
Notification Time: 15:53 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2008
Event Time: 06:51 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/28/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (FSME)
GONZALEZ (EMAIL) (CNSN)
MICHAEL HAY (R4)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (FSME)
GONZALEZ (EMAIL) (CNSN)
AGREEMENT STATE NOTIFICATION - STOLEN MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE
"At 0651 on January 28, 2008, the licensee contacted the State of California Warning Center /OES to report that a nuclear density gauge (CPN, model MC1, serial number MD40807529 - containing [10] milliCuries Cesium 137 and [50] milliCuries Americium 241:Beryllium) was stolen along with the company vehicle that the gauge was secured within (2005 Toyota Tacoma - CA license 7W04195). The gauge was inside the locked transport case. The transportation case was locked and secured to the bed of the vehicle with chains and two independent locks. The gauge handle was also locked. This was reported to the Palm Desert Police Department (T08028025). The last leak test was performed on December 17, 2007 and was negative for removable contamination."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
"At 0651 on January 28, 2008, the licensee contacted the State of California Warning Center /OES to report that a nuclear density gauge (CPN, model MC1, serial number MD40807529 - containing [10] milliCuries Cesium 137 and [50] milliCuries Americium 241:Beryllium) was stolen along with the company vehicle that the gauge was secured within (2005 Toyota Tacoma - CA license 7W04195). The gauge was inside the locked transport case. The transportation case was locked and secured to the bed of the vehicle with chains and two independent locks. The gauge handle was also locked. This was reported to the Palm Desert Police Department (T08028025). The last leak test was performed on December 17, 2007 and was negative for removable contamination."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43940
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RICKY GIVENS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RICKY GIVENS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 01/29/2008
Notification Time: 00:51 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2008
Event Time: 18:43 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2008
Notification Time: 00:51 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2008
Event Time: 18:43 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BINOY DESAI (R2)
BINOY DESAI (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE CORE INJECTION (HPCI) INOPERABLE
"On 1/28/08 at 1843 CST, Browns Ferry Unit 1 was performing 1-SR-3.3.5.1.3(D) HPCI System Condensate Header Low Level Switch Calibration and Functional Test when 1-LS-73-56A failed to actuate. Per TS 3.3.5.1, 1-LS-73-56A is inoperable. 1-SR-3.3.5.1.3(D) defeats the logic relay normally actuated by 73-56A & B. This causes HPCI to be inoperable per TS 3.3.5.1.D if the relay is defeated for greater than 1 hour. Failure of the 73-56A switch prevented restoration of the relay within the 1 hour time frame.
"This event is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the Safety Function of structures or systems that are needed to: Remove Residual Heat' and 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the Safety Function of structures or systems that are needed to: mitigate the consequences of an accident.'
"This event also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) and 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).
"The defeated relay was restored to normal and the HPCI system returned to operable status at 2330 CST on 1/28/08."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1359 EDT ON 3/17/08 FROM RASMUSSEN TO HUFFMAN * * *
"On January 28, 2008, Browns Ferry Unit 1 entered an LCO to perform a planned maintenance activity, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Condensate Header Low Level Switch Calibration and Functional Test, 1-SR-3.5.5.1.3(D). During the calibration of 1-LS-073-0056A and 1-LS-073- 0056B, 1-LS-073-0056A was found inoperable. The removal of both level switches from service (and as a result the HPCI transfer on low condensate header level function) was a planned maintenance activity, performed in accordance with an approved procedure and in accordance with the plants TSs. During this time no condition was discovered that could have prevented HPCI from performing its intended function because 1-LS-073-056B was considered OPERABLE. Therefore, this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) or 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO(Lesser) notified.
"On 1/28/08 at 1843 CST, Browns Ferry Unit 1 was performing 1-SR-3.3.5.1.3(D) HPCI System Condensate Header Low Level Switch Calibration and Functional Test when 1-LS-73-56A failed to actuate. Per TS 3.3.5.1, 1-LS-73-56A is inoperable. 1-SR-3.3.5.1.3(D) defeats the logic relay normally actuated by 73-56A & B. This causes HPCI to be inoperable per TS 3.3.5.1.D if the relay is defeated for greater than 1 hour. Failure of the 73-56A switch prevented restoration of the relay within the 1 hour time frame.
"This event is reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the Safety Function of structures or systems that are needed to: Remove Residual Heat' and 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the Safety Function of structures or systems that are needed to: mitigate the consequences of an accident.'
"This event also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) and 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).
"The defeated relay was restored to normal and the HPCI system returned to operable status at 2330 CST on 1/28/08."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1359 EDT ON 3/17/08 FROM RASMUSSEN TO HUFFMAN * * *
"On January 28, 2008, Browns Ferry Unit 1 entered an LCO to perform a planned maintenance activity, High Pressure Coolant Injection System Condensate Header Low Level Switch Calibration and Functional Test, 1-SR-3.5.5.1.3(D). During the calibration of 1-LS-073-0056A and 1-LS-073- 0056B, 1-LS-073-0056A was found inoperable. The removal of both level switches from service (and as a result the HPCI transfer on low condensate header level function) was a planned maintenance activity, performed in accordance with an approved procedure and in accordance with the plants TSs. During this time no condition was discovered that could have prevented HPCI from performing its intended function because 1-LS-073-056B was considered OPERABLE. Therefore, this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) or 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO(Lesser) notified.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 44959
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: METCO
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 03018
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: METCO
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: 03018
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 04/02/2009
Notification Time: 17:50 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2009
Notification Time: 17:50 [ET]
Event Date: 01/28/2008
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4)
ROBERT LEWIS (FSME)
RICK DEESE (R4)
ROBERT LEWIS (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA MALFUNTION
The following information was received from the State of Texas via Email:
"On January 28, 2008, the Agency was notified by the licensee that a radiographer was doing work in one of their shooting bays when a 35.7 curie Iridium -192 source would not retract into the radiography camera. The radiographer used an installed video camera to look into the room and saw that the component he was working on had fallen and crimped the guide tube attached to the camera. The source was cranked to the end of the guide tube, and two attempts to straighten the guide tube and retract the source failed. A source retrieval supervisor then entered the room and placed lead bags over the end of the source guide tube and placed a lead sheet over the lead bags. The supervisor attempted to reshape the section of the guide tube that had been damaged using a hammer. This also did not work. Finally, the supervisor cut the damaged section of the guide tube out and the source was then retracted to the camera. The reported exposure for this event was 15 millirem. The radiographer received additional instruction on proper set up and operation of a radiography camera. This file is closed.
"This event was reported within 24 hours of the event using the NMED reporting system and not to the HOO [NRC Headquarters Operations Officer]. Failure to properly report this event was determined after a review was conducted of all radiography related events reported in the State of Texas from September 1, 2006 to March 31, 2009. This review was initiated in response to the State of Texas Incident Investigation Program (IIP) determining that they had failed to correctly interpret the requirements for reporting this type of event. The state used 10 CFR 34.101 to report these events, and not 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2), due to conflicting interpretations of NRC rules requiring reporting. In an effort to prevent a reoccurrence of this, each member of IIP was required to read Information Notice 2001-03, Incident Reporting Requirements for Radiography Licenses, dated April 6, 2001. In addition, the IIP database has been changed to clarify the reporting requirement and bring it in line with the NRC requirements."
Texas Incident Report: I - 8604
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED TO KOZAL FROM TUCKER AT 1735 ON 04/08/09 * * *
Upon request of the State the reference to 10 CFR 30.50(b)(a) was changed to 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2).
The following information was received from the State of Texas via Email:
"On January 28, 2008, the Agency was notified by the licensee that a radiographer was doing work in one of their shooting bays when a 35.7 curie Iridium -192 source would not retract into the radiography camera. The radiographer used an installed video camera to look into the room and saw that the component he was working on had fallen and crimped the guide tube attached to the camera. The source was cranked to the end of the guide tube, and two attempts to straighten the guide tube and retract the source failed. A source retrieval supervisor then entered the room and placed lead bags over the end of the source guide tube and placed a lead sheet over the lead bags. The supervisor attempted to reshape the section of the guide tube that had been damaged using a hammer. This also did not work. Finally, the supervisor cut the damaged section of the guide tube out and the source was then retracted to the camera. The reported exposure for this event was 15 millirem. The radiographer received additional instruction on proper set up and operation of a radiography camera. This file is closed.
"This event was reported within 24 hours of the event using the NMED reporting system and not to the HOO [NRC Headquarters Operations Officer]. Failure to properly report this event was determined after a review was conducted of all radiography related events reported in the State of Texas from September 1, 2006 to March 31, 2009. This review was initiated in response to the State of Texas Incident Investigation Program (IIP) determining that they had failed to correctly interpret the requirements for reporting this type of event. The state used 10 CFR 34.101 to report these events, and not 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2), due to conflicting interpretations of NRC rules requiring reporting. In an effort to prevent a reoccurrence of this, each member of IIP was required to read Information Notice 2001-03, Incident Reporting Requirements for Radiography Licenses, dated April 6, 2001. In addition, the IIP database has been changed to clarify the reporting requirement and bring it in line with the NRC requirements."
Texas Incident Report: I - 8604
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED TO KOZAL FROM TUCKER AT 1735 ON 04/08/09 * * *
Upon request of the State the reference to 10 CFR 30.50(b)(a) was changed to 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2).