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Event Notification Report for January 15, 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
01/14/2008 - 01/15/2008

** EVENT NUMBERS **


43794 43890 43895 43903 43904

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 43794
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOHN MACDONALD
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 11/20/2007
Notification Time: 14:15 [ET]
Event Date: 11/20/2007
Event Time: 06:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECT INOPERABLE

"On November 20, 2007 at 0630 hours, with the reactor at 100% core thermal power, a power supply failure was discovered in the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) flow controller circuitry that may have precluded the system from performing its design basis function. Therefore, in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.72(b)(3)(v) an eight-hour notification is being made.

"As background, on November 18, 2007, at 2145 hours, the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system was removed from service for planned maintenance. The required risk analysis was performed and the appropriate 14 day limiting condition for operation (LCO) was entered in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.C. Later on November 19, 2007 at approximately 2100 hours the planned maintenance had been completed and HPCI was restored to the normal standby line-up in preparation for post maintenance testing (PMT). The HPCI valve quarterly operability and HPCI pump and valve quarterly operability tests were performed as the prescribed PMT. Upon initiation, the HPCI turbine was observed to come up to expected rated speed (~4,200 rpm) and expected HPCI pump discharge pressure (~1,300 psig). However HPCI pump indicated discharge flow was observed to be ~2,300 gpm, which is less than the Technical Specification requirement of 4,250 gpm. The HPCI system was secured and remained in the original TS 3.5.C LCO and a troubleshooting plan was initiated.

"On November 20, 2007, at 0630 hours, troubleshooting identified a power supply failure in the HPCI flow control circuitry. A replacement flow controller was identified and installed and it is anticipated that appropriate PMT will be initiated by 1600 hours. The impact of the power supply failure for the design basis operability for HPCl could not be definitively established before the eight-hour notification requirement of 10 CFR Part 50.72(b)(3)(v) was exceeded."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

* * * RETRACTION FROM DAVE NOYES TO JOE O'HARA AT 1751 ON 1/14/08 * * *

"NRC Notification 43794 was conservatively made to ensure that the Eight-Hour Non-Emergency reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 were met pending the evaluation of an atypical condition (low reading) observed with the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Flow Controller while performing scheduled surveillance testing for the HPCI System.

"During surveillance testing on 11/18/07, the HPCI System was started and met or exceeded the Technical Specification minimum requirements designed to demonstrate HPCI System Operability. While testing the specific components of the system, the HPCI Flow Controller was observed to be behaving erratically. Although the HPCI System was still capable of performing its required design safety function, the Shift Manager declared the system inoperable since he did not have definitive indication that the turbine was providing the required flow.

"Troubleshooting of the flow controller determined that the low flow indication was due to a degraded transmitter power supply located internal to flow controller FIC-2340-1. FIC-2340-1 is located in the main control room and is used to control HPCI system flow rate, and provide power to flow transmitter FT-2358. Although indicated flow rate was only 2300 gpm due to the degraded power supply, actual flow rate was approximately 5400 gpm based on pump hydraulic curves.

"The power supply in question only supplies power to FT-2358. Normal required supply voltage from this power supply is 28VDC to 36VDC. The degraded power supply could only supply 22.4VDC at the transmitter FT-2358 terminals. The degraded power supply voltage caused transmitter to output a lower than normal current for the actual measured flow rate giving a false low flow rate to FIC-2340-1.

"An Apparent Cause Evaluation and Past Operability Evaluation were performed in response to this event. These evaluations concluded that HPCI System was capable of performing its intended safety functions with the transmitter power supply degraded. HPCI system was capable of performing its intended safety functions during the time when FIC-2340-1 transmitter power supply exhibited low output voltage. HPCI would have started and supplied design basis flow to reactor vessel under design basis conditions. Thus there would have no impact on nuclear safety. Therefore, this event was not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"ENS Event Number 43794, made on 11/20/2007, is being retracted."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and the Massachusetts Civil Defense Authority.

Notified R1DO(Cobey)

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43890
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: QUALITY SERVICES LABS / CONAM
Region: 4
City: BATON ROUGE State: LA
County:
License #: LA-10986-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICHARD PENROD
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 01/10/2008
Notification Time: 12:44 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2008
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/10/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL EXCESSIVE EXPOSURE

The agreement state submitted the following information via e-mail:

"On January 10, 2008, CONAM reported an accidental, excessive exposure to an industrial radiographers badge. The badge reading for the month of November 2007 was 11,592 millirem. At the end of his shift, the radiographer put his personnel monitor in his work bag. The shift that came in after him used his work bag and had the bag next to the radiography camera during exposures.

"The licensee believes that this exposure was to the badge and not to the radiographer. The licensee will be sending a written report within 30 days. [The State of Louisiana] will forward new information when it is received."

Louisiana Event Report ID: LA070032

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43895
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF ISCH
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 01/11/2008
Notification Time: 17:53 [ET]
Event Date: 01/11/2008
Event Time: 16:22 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 97 Power Operation

Event Text

TECH. SPEC. REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO GAS VOIDING IN DISCHARGE PIPING

"Gas intrusion into ECCS piping required entry into Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3.

"Wolf Creek was operating at 100% power when gas voiding was discovered in RHR discharge piping common to both trains of ECCS. Due to void reoccurring in excess of predetermined limits both trains of ECCS were declared inoperable at 1525 CST. A TS required shutdown was commenced at 1622.

"Engineering is researching the composition of the gas and possible sources."

The licensee must determine that the line is solid with fluid without any gas voiding before exiting the TS required shutdown. All normal and emergency power supplies are available. All EDG's are operable. Reactor power is being reduced one-half a percent per minute.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY DIANE HOOPER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1932 ON 01/14/08 * * *

"At 1550 [CST] on 1/14/2008, Engineering notified control room that the A RHR pump suction from the recirc sump has a void in excess of the allowable limit. Due to the isolation of the 'piggyback' line from the A RHR to the suction of the CCPs, [Wolf Creek] no longer has 'at least the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available.' [Wolf Creek] has already entered condition B of 3.5.2 and the cooldown requirement from action B of 3.5.2 is more restrictive than the cooldown requirement of 3.0.3. No additional actions need to be taken to comply with Tech Specs.

"At 1700 [CST] on 1/14, Engineering reports that the voids in the 'piggyback' line has been filled to within acceptable limits."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Spitzberg)

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 43903
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
                   6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
                   BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: TONY HUDSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 01/14/2008
Notification Time: 15:36 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2008
Event Time: 15:12 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)

Event Text

FAILURE OF UF6 RELEASE DETECTION SYSTEM

"At 1512 CST, on 01-13-08 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that the C-333 Unit 6 Cell 7 UF6 Release Detection (PGLD) System failed to function when performing the twice per shift test firing. Test firing of the PGLD detector heads is required per TSR SR 2.4.4.1-1. TSR 2.4.4.1 also requires that at least the minimum number (three) of detector heads in the cell and in each defined section of the cell bypass are operable where UF6 systems are above atmospheric pressure. The C-333 Unit 6 Cell 7 PGLD System contains detectors that covers the cell and Sections 3 and 4 of the cell bypass piping. At the time of this failure some areas of Section 3 of the cell bypass were operating above atmospheric pressure. Since Unit 6 Cell 7 was operating below atmosphere, the cell was not in an applicable TSR mode. However, Section 3 of the cell bypass was above atmosphere and in an applicable TSR mode which required at least three operable PGLD heads. With the Unit 6 Cell 7 PGLD system inoperable only two of the required three heads in Section 3 of the cell bypass were operable. This PGLD System was declared inoperable, and system pressure in the affected operating area was reduced to less than atmospheric pressure within one hour, thus placing the operating system in a non-applicable TSR mode. This event is being reported as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

"PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR-08-0122; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2008-01; Worksheet No. 43903

"Responsible Division: Operations"

The licensee is investigating the cause of the event, and will make appropriate notifications to the Department of Energy.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43904
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: GARY HUSTON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 01/14/2008
Notification Time: 17:05 [ET]
Event Date: 01/14/2008
Event Time: 16:10 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

PLANNED LOSS OF MAIN CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATOR SYSTEM

"At 1610 hours, on 1/14/2008, the Main Control Room annunciator system will be removed from service to support activities for a planned maintenance outage at River Bend Station. The duration of the work is expected to be completed in less than 1 hour.

"During this time, other Control Room indications and alternate methods will be available to implement the Emergency Plan. Since the Main Control Room annunciator System will be unavailable, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"A follow-up notification will be made to the NRC after the Main Control Room annunciator system is returned to service.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

No major systems in LCOs at this time and the only major ongoing activity is Fuel Handling.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY GARY HUSTON TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1809 ON 01/14/08 * * *

"Main control room annunciator system has been restored to service at 1708 CST."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Spitzberg).

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012
Thursday, March 29, 2012