United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Reports Associated with Events > Event Notification Reports > 2008 > January 2

Event Notification Report for January 2, 2008

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
12/31/2007 - 01/02/2008

** EVENT NUMBERS **


43869 43876 43877 43878

To top of page
General Information or Other Event Number: 43869
Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: DIGIRAD MOBILE NUCLEAR MEDICINE SERVICES
Region: 1
City:  State: MD
County:
License #: MD03-107-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY MANLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 12/27/2007
Notification Time: 19:23 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2007
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/28/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
NEIL PERRY (R1)
EDWIN HACKETT (FSME)
TROY PRUETT (R4)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MARYLAND - MISSING COBALT-57 CALIBRATION SOURCES

The State of Maryland was notified on 12/27/07 by one of its licensees that two Co-57 calibration sources were missing. The two sources were 0.9 mCi and 1.3 mCi (2.2 mCi total) and were used by a mobile nuclear medicine service licensee, DigiRad, to calibrate nuclear imaging cameras before use. The sources were lost in the process of returning them to the manufacturer, International Isotopes, in International Falls, Idaho.

The DigiRad RSO stated that the two Co-57 sources were packaged and shipped via FedEx ground out of Linthicum Heights, Maryland on December 6, 2007. The package arrived at International Isotopes on December 10. For reasons unknown at this time, the package was not opened at International Isotopes until December 21. It was reported by DigiRad that when the package was opened at International Isotopes, the shielded shipping container was inside but no sources were found. Again, for reasons unknown at this time, International Isotopes did not contact DigiRad to report that there were no sources in the shipping container. DigiRad contacted International Isotopes to follow-up on the shipment on December 26 and was informed that the sources were not in the shipping container when it was opened at International Isotopes. The shipping package was reported to have been intact and undamaged and there was no evidence that the package had been opened or tampered with during shipment.

DigiRad informed the State that it has interviewed the individual who packaged the sources and there is no indication that he may have inadvertently left them out of the shipping container. A search of the area at DigiRad has not turned up the sources. DigiRad has no information on what International Isotopes has done to confirm that the sources were not actually in the container at the receiving end.

* * *UPDATE FROM THE STATE (MANLEY) TO HUFFMAN AT 1320 EST ON 12/28/07 * * *

The RSO from DigiRad notified the State of Maryland that the sources have been located at International Isotopes and confirmed by serial numbers. It appears that the sources were actually shipped to DigiRad in November of 2007. The employee that shipped the sources in November is no longer employed at DigiRad and has not been interviewed. It is suspected that the DigiRad employee that shipped what he thought were the sources on December 6 did not actually open the shielded source container to confirm that the sources were present. The DigiRad RSO now believes that the source container shipped to International Isotopes on December 6 was empty.

Therefore, based on confirmation between DigiRad and International Isotopes, the two Co-57 calibration sources are no longer missing and have been confirmed (via serial number) to be present at International Isotopes. Investigation into the source tracking and accountability issues will be followed up on by the State.

Notified R1DO (Perry), R4DO (Pruett), and FSME (Wastler) have been notified.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 43876
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: RAY BUZARD
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 12/31/2007
Notification Time: 13:38 [ET]
Event Date: 12/31/2007
Event Time: 08:40 [MST]
Last Update Date: 12/31/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

DEATH OF AN EMPLOYEE OUTSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA

"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.

"At approximately 06:40 MST on December 31, 2007, at the water reclamation facility for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, an employee died. The death was not related to activities impacting or related to the safety of the public or other onsite personnel. Specifically, an individual collapsed and was promptly examined by a Palo Verde Emergency Medical Technician (EMT). An air evacuation was ordered however, prior to air evacuation the individual expired. The death does not appear to be work-related nor the result of an accident.

"The individual was outside of the Radiological Controlled Area and no radioactive material or contamination was involved.

"Palo Verde has not observed any heightened public or media concern as a result of the death. Since the death is apparently unrelated to Palo Verde's industrial or radiological health and safety, no news release is planned.

"The individual's name has not yet been released, pending notification of next-of-kin.

"The Arizona Division of Occupational Safety and Health was notified of the death at 0840 MST.

"The Maricopa County Sheriff's Office is conducting a routine investigation into the death."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 43877
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [ ] [4] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL COEN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 01/01/2008
Notification Time: 01:15 [ET]
Event Date: 12/31/2007
Event Time: 21:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/01/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
4 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

ERDADS FAILURE FOR SEVENTY MINUTES

"This is an eight hour non-emergency notification to the NRCOC due to a major loss of emergency assessment capability (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)).

"At approximately 2110 on 12/31/07 it was discovered that the Unit 4 ERDADS [Emergency Response Data Acquisition Display System] failed. This impacted the ability of the ERDS link to transmit valid data. The U4 ERDADS was restored at 2220 on 12/31/07. The system was unavailable for 70 minutes. The ERDS link to the NRC and U4 ERDADS are now fully Operable.

"U4 ERDADS failed due to corrupted shared memory on both PEDS (Plant and Environmental Data System). The PEDS units were de-energized to clear the corrupted shared memory and then reset successfully."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 43878
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOE BENNETT
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 01/01/2008
Notification Time: 01:58 [ET]
Event Date: 12/31/2007
Event Time: 21:40 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/01/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

UNIT 3 AUTOMATIC SCRAM DUE TO MAIN GENERATOR LOAD REJECT SIGNAL

"On 12/31/07 at 2140 the Unit 3 reactor scrammed due to turbine generator load reject signal on the Main Generator. The cause of the load reject signal is unknown and the investigation is continuing. All systems responded as expected to the load reject signal. Six Main Steam Relief valves (MSRVs) opened momentarily and then reclosed. Subsequently, reactor pressure was automatically controlled by the Main Turbine Bypass valves. No Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), nor Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) reactor water level initiation setpoints were reached, and reactor water level is being automatically controlled by the Feedwater system. This report is being made as required by 10CFR 50.72(b)(2) due to the actuation of the Reactor protection System.

"Refer to BFN PER number 135878."

All control rods fully inserted into the core, and all safety systems are operable. PCIS group isolations were received for groups 2, 3, 6, and 8. There were no grid abnormalities at the time of the load reject, and the event had no effect on Unit 1 or 2.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012
Thursday, March 29, 2012