Event Notification Report for June 14, 2007

UNABLE TO PERFORM SAFE SHUTDOWN AS A RESULT OF APPENDIX R FIRE AFFECTING HPCI

"During verification of plant procedures associated with achieving safe shutdown during and after an Appendix R fire, it was determined that there was no readily available success path to secure HPCI when required. The scenario in question involves a fire-induced spurious HPCI initiation that must be terminated within 10 minutes to prevent flooding main steam lines and disabling both available methods of hot shutdown. For this event, RCIC is one defined method of temperature and pressure control to achieve hot shutdown. The other defined method requires ADS valves to lower pressure to allow CS to provide makeup water. As written, the procedure steps provided to Operations personnel would not have been sufficient to isolate steam to the HPCI turbine. All other methods to secure HPCI that would have been reasonably available required operation of components that could have been affected by the same fire that caused the spurious initiation of HPCI.

"The procedures have been changed to provide Operations personnel adequate and effective instructions to isolate HPCI when required after a spurious initiation during an Appendix R fire.

"This is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) as a condition that could have prevented the plant from achieving safe shutdown.

"The Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL PERSONNEL OVEREXPOSURE

The licensee's RSO received a phone call from Landauer at 1030 this morning to report a badge which had a deep dose reading of 6437 milliRem, an eye dose reading of 6437 milliRem, and a shallow dose reading of 6400 milliRem. The badge was assigned to the Chief of Surgery for the licensee for the month of January 2006. The RSO is investigating the cause for the fifteen month delay (January 2006 till June 2007) in processing the badge. Landauer told the RSO that this was a "dynamic" exposure to the badge meaning that the badge was moving during the time period of exposure.

Iowa Item Number IA-070001.

* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY RANDY DAHLIN TO KOZAL ON 6/28/07 AT 0847 * * *

Upon further investigation of it was determined that the exposure is solely due to fluoroscopic procedures. Radiation generated from fluoroscopic equipment is not regulated by the NRC. Due to this fact the event should not have been reported to the NRC and is retracted. The State of Iowa will continue to investigate this matter with its licensee.

Notified R3DO (Louden) and FSME EO (Flannery).

FIXED GAUGE FOUND WITH SHUTTER OPEN WHILE IN STORAGE

The licensee was evaluating a fixed gauge in storage for possibly returning it to service when they discovered that the gauge's shutter was stuck open. Temporary lead shielding was installed and the licensee is in the process of contacting the manufacturer in order to have the device repaired and/or the source removed.

The device is an Ohmart SHRM L-200, S/N 3269, containing 35 milliCuries of Cs-137. It was removed from service and has been in storage since 1994. The gauge was positioned face down such that radiation surveys did not detect that the shutter was open. The licensee does not believe that any personnel received any significant exposure since the storage area is ground level (no basement) and has limited access (locked).

TECH SPEC. REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO 72 HOUR COMPLETION TIME NOT MET

"At 1819 hours, an orderly shutdown on Unit 1 commenced as the result of Technical Specification Action Condition (TSAC) 3.7.5.B.1 completion time of 72 hours not being met for the 1P-29 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The pump was declared inoperable on June 12, 2007, at 0131 hours as a result of high pump bearing temperatures. Repairs and testing performed to date have not satisfactorily resolved the problem.

"This non-emergency notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i). The PBNP resident inspector has been notified."

The licensee plans to conduct an extended duration test of the 1P-29 AFW pump. This test is scheduled to commence shortly and will last approximately 4 to 6 hours. The licensee will have two different hold points in the test to take pump bearing temperature data. The licensee has one emergency diesel generator (EDG) out of service (OOS), but an alternate EDG is aligned to ensure all four vital buses have vital power in the event of an loss of offsite power. No other safety related systems are OOS at this time.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM RICK ROBBINS TO JOE O'HARA AT 2006 ON 06/15/07 * * *

"This is an update to EN#43424: Regarding Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump inoperability and Technical Specification required shutdown.

"PBNP Unit 1 entered MODE 3 on 6/15/07 at 0407.

"PBNP Unit 1 entered MODE 4 on 6/15/07 at 1712.

"Technical Specification Action Condition 3.7.5.D.1 required Unit 1 to be in MODE 3 by 0731 and MODE 4 by 1931 on 6/15/07. All Technical Specification Required Actions for the AFW pump OOS have been met within the required times."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO(Stone).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The State provided the following information via email:

"The Licensee reported this event in June and filed a report in a letter that was misfiled causing a delay in this notification.

"A gauge user in the employ of the licensee was using a Troxler model 3440 moisture density gauge serial number 31185 at a temporary jobsite in Issaquah. The employee placed the gauge in an area staked to exclude construction traffic. The employee left the gauge unattended to retrieve an item from the user's vehicle. While away from the gauge, a pickup backed towards the gauge in the staked area. Workers in the area attempted to get the driver's attention and stop the pickup but failed. The pickup struck the gauge and caught the handle under the hitch of the truck, breaking the stationary rod and bending the source rod. The source appeared to have remained in its shielded position. The gauge was dislodged from the pickup by moving the pickup forward. The gauge user cleared personnel within a 50 foot area around the gauge and contacted the RSO. The RSO went to the jobsite with a survey meter and performed surveys. Survey readings indicated the source had remained in its shielded position. The damaged gauge rods were secured with cloth tape. The gauge was place in the transport box and returned to its licensed storage location. A leak test was taken at that time and the results returned were normal.

"The gauge user's employment with the licensee was terminated for violating the licensee's Operating and Emergency Procedures by leaving the gauge unattended at the jobsite.

"The licensee currently reports they are still in possession of the damaged gauge and presently storing it in that condition. The licensee is working with a carrier to get it shipped properly to Troxler in North Carolina.

"Notification Reporting Criteria: WAC 246-221-250 Notification of Incidents.

"Isotope and Activity involved: 8 mCi of Cesium 137, and 40 mCi of Americium 241 Beryllium.

"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): None known.

"Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number): Damaged Troxler, model 3440, Serial Number 31185.

"Disposition/recovery: The damaged gauge was placed in the manufactures transport, stored at the licensed storage location and held for pick up and repair or disposal by the manufacturer.

"Leak test? Results of the leak test taken at time of the incident were normal."

Washington Event #WA-07-059