Event Notification Report for June 04, 2007

LOSS OF TONE ALERT SYSTEM

"At 0830 on June 4, 2007, with the James A. Fitzpatrick (JAF) Nuclear Power Plant operating at 100% reactor power, Oswego County Emergency Management notified JAF that the National Weather Service had notified them that the Tone Alert Radios had been out of service since 0655.

"This impacts the ability to readily notify a portion of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Population for the Nine Mile Point and JAF Nuclear Power Plants. This failure meets NRC 8 hour reporting criterion 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"The National Weather Service is currently working to determine the cause of the failure and time frame for system restoration.

"The loss of the Tone Alert Radios constitutes a significant loss of emergency off-site communications ability. Compensatory measures have been verified to be available should the Prompt Notification System be needed. This consists of utilizing Local Law Enforcement Personnel for 'Route Alerting' of the affected areas of the EPZ. Oswego County Emergency Management has verified that the Oswego County Sheriff's Department is on standby for Route Alerting.

"The event has been entered into the corrective action program and the resident inspector has been briefed and the state PSC will also be notified."

* * * UPDATE AT 14:57 ON 6/4/2007 FROM GENE DORMAN TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"Notified the NYS PSC at approximately 10:30 EDT [regarding original event notification].

"The failure of the Tone Alert Radios was determined to be a loss of telephone interconnection service between Binghamton and Syracuse. The Tone Alert Radios were restored to service at 14:05."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the NY PSC. Notified the R1DO (Barkley).

PARTIAL LOSS OF THE PUBLIC PROMPT NOTIFICATION SYSTEM

"The following event is reportable per 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to partial loss of the Public Prompt Notification System.

"On 6/4/07 at 06:55 the Tone Alert Radio System went out of service This was communicated by the Oswego County Emergency Operations Center at 08:30. The loss of the Tone Alert Radio System is a result of a loss of Verizon phone service in the Binghamton, NY area where the Tone Alert Radio System is controlled from. The cause of Verizon phone service being out of service is unknown. Preliminary information estimates several hours until restoration complete. The county alert sirens, which also function as part of the Public Prompt Notification System are operable."

The licensee notified State/local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM J. DRISCOLL TO P. SNYDER AT 1922 ON 6/4/07 * * *

"On 6/4/07 at 06:55, the Tone Alert Radio System was lost due to a loss of Verizon phone service in the Binghamton, NY area, which controls the Tone Alert Radio System. At 10:10, this event was reported by ENS communication in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) for a partial loss of the Public Prompt Notification System.

"On 6/4/07 at 14:05, the Oswego County EOC notified Nine Mile Point that the Tone Alert System was returned to service."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Barkley).

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO IDENTIFIED NON COMPLIANT FIRE PROTECTION MANUAL OPERATOR ACTIONS

"During performance of NFPA-805 Transition Project Task SUP-1, 'Manual Action Compliance,' it was determined there were 5 non-compliant manual operator actions that were being performed to achieve and maintain hot safe shutdown in Fire Area 29, Admin Building Electrical & Piping Room 1. These manual actions were being performed in an Appendix R Section III.G.1/G.2 fire area, however, they do not meet the criteria for allowable manual actions specified in RIS 2006-10, 'Regulatory Expectations with Appendix R Paragraph III.G.2 Operator Manual Actions.'

"The discovery of these non-compliant manual actions is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii). The alternate compensatory measure for Fire Area 29 is to perform the manual action. An extent of condition review has been initiated that will encompass the remainder of the safe shutdown areas in both Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) units. The results of the extent of condition will be documented in the site's corrective action program with compensatory measures being established as appropriate. The 60-day licensee event report, submitted to the Commission in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii), will provide the results of the manual action compliance review and follow-up corrective actions."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM W. BODIN TO P. SNYDER AT 1643 ON 6/5/07 * * *

"During performance of NFPA-805 Transition Project Task SUP-1, 'Manual Action Compliance,' it was determined that non compliant manual operator actions are credited to achieve and maintain hot safe shutdown for a fire. The following actions were identified during the extent of condition reviews conducted subsequent to EN 43404 report.

Numbers of Non-compliant Actions and Fire Areas Affected:
"2 actions for Fire Area 2, Ventilation Fan Room, Unit 1;
"2 actions for Fire Area 10, Train A Event Monitoring Equipment Room;
"6 actions for Fire Area 20, Unit 1 4.16 KV Safeguards Switchgear (Bus 16);
"2 actions for Fire Area 22, 480V Safeguards Switchgear (Bus 121);
"1 action for Fire Area 23, Unit 2, 4.16 KV Normal Switchgear (Bus 23, 24);
"2 actions for Fire Area 30, Administration Building Electrical & Piping Room #2;
"1 action for Fire Area 33, Battery Room 11;
"1 action for Fire Area 34, Battery Room 12;
"6 actions for Fire Area 37, Unit 1 480V Normal Switchgear Room;
"4 actions for Fire Area 41A, Screenhouse (DDCWP Rooms);
"6 actions for Fire Area 41B, Screenhouse Basement;
"10 actions for Fire Area 58 and 73, [Auxiliary] Building Ground Floor Unit 1 & 2;
"2 actions for Fire Area 59, [Auxiliary] Building Mezzanine Level Unit 1;
"1 action for Fire Area 80, 480V Safeguard Switchgear Room (Bus 112); and
"4 actions for Fire Area 81, 4.16 KV Safeguard Switchgear Room (Bus 15).

"These manual actions are credited for safe shutdown in an Appendix R Section III.G.1/G.2 fire area; however, they do not meet the criteria for allowable manual actions specified in RIS 2006-10, 'Regulatory Expectations with Appendix R Paragraph III.G-2 Operator Manual Actions.'

"The discovery or these non-compliant manual actions is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii). The manual actions have been determined to be feasible and will be treated as alternate compensatory measures for Fire Areas 2, 10, 20, 22, 23, 30, 33, 34, 37, 41A, 41B, 58, 59, 73, 80, and 81. An extent of condition review is continuing that will encompass the remainder of the safe shutdown areas in both Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) Units."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (M. Phillips).

* * * UPDATE AT 16:28 ON 6/6/2007 FROM W. BODIN TO M. ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"During performance of NFPA-805 Transition Project Task SUP-1, 'Manual Action Compliance,' it was determined that noncompliant manual operator actions are credited to achieve and maintain hot safe shutdown for a fire. The following actions were identified during the extent of condition reviews conducted subsequent to EN 43404 report.
# Non-Compliant Actions
1 action for Fire Area 4, Fuel Handling Area
12 actions for Fire Area 31, 'A' Train Hot SD panel, AFW & Air Compressors
11 actions for Fire Area 32, 'B' Train Hot SD panel, AFW & Air Compressors
2 actions far Fire Area 38, Unit 2 480V Normal Switchgear Room
1 action for Fire Area 39, Radwaste Building
2 actions for Fire Area 46, Cooling Tower Equipment House
4 actions for Fire Area 69, Turbine Building Ground & Mezzanine Floors Unit 1
3 actions for Fire Area 70, Turbine Building Ground & Mezzanine Floors Unit 2
2 actions for Fire Area 71, Containment Unit 2
2 actions for Fire Area 72, Containment Annulus Unit 2
5 actions for Fire Area 74, Aux Building Mezzanine Level Unit 2

"These manual actions are credited for safe shutdown in an Appendix R Section III.G.1/G.2 fire area, however, they do not meet the criteria for allowable manual actions specified in RIS 2006-10, 'Regulatory Expectations with Appendix R Paragraph III.G.2 Operator Manual Actions.'

"The discovery of these non-compliant manual actions is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii). The manual actions have been determined to be feasible and will be treated as alternate compensatory measures for Fire Areas 4, 31, 32, 38, 39, 46, 69, 70, 71, 72, and 74. This concludes the extent of condition review of the safe shutdown areas in both Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) units."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Phillips).

FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY IMPACTED BY A BREAKER COORDINATION ISSUE

"An engineering analysis has identified existing breaker coordination issues and their effect on plant fire protection and resulting safe shutdown capability. Cables associated with certain breakers do not have qualified fire barriers in place to prevent an upstream breaker from tripping. The affected cables are in fire areas that credit the affected train as the assured post fire safe shutdown train. The failure mode of concern is that a fire in the area where the cable is located could cause a short circuit between the cable connectors."

The fault current calculated for these cases is high enough to trip the upstream breaker(s) and it cannot be assured that the downstream load breaker(s) will act to clear the fault first.

"[This] event was initially discovered on 5/17/07. Mitigative actions were taken at that time, in the form of establishing fire watches for the affected fire areas. Reportability implications were discovered as a result of additional discussions that took place on 6/4/07."

"The following cables and power sources are impacted by this notification:
"CABLE NO. FIRE AREA AFFECTED PANEL
1CA581 Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Control Panel Room 1EDF
2CA581 Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Control Panel Room 2EDF
1IRE761 Unit 1 577 elevation Electrical Penetration Room 1EPD
2IRE761 Unit 2 577 elevation Electrical Penetration Room 2EPD

"Panels 1EDF and 2EDF are 125 VDC Vital Instrumentation and Control Auctioneered Distribution Centers. Loads fed from these distribution centers include Train 'B' circuits associated with the following: 4 KV Essential Switchgear Control Power, Diesel Generator Load Sequencer Control Power, and Auxiliary Feedwater System Control Power.

"Panels 1EPD and 2EPD are 125VDC Vital Instrumentation and Control Panel boards. These panel boards supply a variety of Train 'B' safety related control power loads."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.