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Event Notification Report for December 19, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
12/18/2006 - 12/19/2006

** EVENT NUMBERS **


42165 43051 43052 43055

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 42165
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
                   6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
                   BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: KEVIN BEASLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 11/22/2005
Notification Time: 15:54 [ET]
Event Date: 11/22/2005
Event Time: 12:05 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
SCOTT FLANDERS (NMSS)

Event Text

IMPROPER CRITICALITY SPACING FOR WASTE DRUM

"At 1205 CST, on 11-22-05 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that during waste drum remediation activities, a drum was discovered that was in violation of one leg of double contingency. Drum #39666W has been determined to contain up to (deleted) g (grams) U235 exceeding the allowed (deleted) gram limit for NCS Spacing Exempt drums. This drum was previously located in an NCS (Nuclear Criticality Safety) Spacing Exempt storage area in violation of NCSA WMO-001 requirements. The drum was moved to the C-335 storage area under an approved Remediation Guide which established a safety basis for the movement of drums that had been roped off and posted per earlier direction. This drum is currently stored in a Temporary Fissile Storage Area maintaining a minimum 2 foot edge-to-edge spacing under NCSA WMO-001, which maintains double contingency."

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS

"While the (deleted) gram U235 limit was exceeded for this drum; DAC-832-2A1280-0001 demonstrates that drums containing less than (deleted) grams U235 in an NCS Spacing Exempt array are subcritical. The storage area is roped off and posted to prevent the addition of fissile material to the area; therefore another upset would be required before a criticality is possible."

POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR)

"This drum is currently stored in the Temporary Fissile Storage Area under NCSA WMO-001, meeting double contingency. In order for a criticality to occur, two independent, unlikely, and concurrent events would have to occur."

CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.)

"Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls on mass."

ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS)

"The drum has been determined to contain (deleted) grams U235. Calculations performed demonstrate that drums containing less than (deleted) grams U235 each, in an NCS Spacing Exempt array are subcritical."

NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES

"Although the drum contains greater than the WMO-001 limit of (deleted) grams U235 for NCS Spacing Exempt drums, it has been shown to be less than (deleted) grams U235 based on independent sample results. Calculations performed demonstrate that drums containing less than (deleted) grams U235 each, in an NCS Spacing Exempt array, are subcritical. Therefore, an additional process upset (i.e., spacing upset) would be necessary in order to have a criticality. Therefore, while the drum contained greater than (deleted) grams U235 in the spacing exempt array, the array has been shown to be subcritical for drums containing less than (deleted) grams U235 thus maintaining one leg of double contingency."

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED

"At the time of discovery, the drum was being stored according to NCS approved spacing controls. The drum will continue to be handled according to approved controls until the U235 mass can be reduced to meet the NCS Spacing Exempt criteria per NCSA WMO-001.

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
See Related Event Report #40700.

* * * UPDATE 1802 EST ON 2/13/06 FROM K. BEASLEY TO S. SANDIN * * *

"At 1100 [CST], on 02-13-06 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that two additional waste drums were discovered that exceed the allowed [deleted] gram limit for NCS Spacing Exempt drums and had previously been located in an NCS Spacing Exempt storage area in violation of NCSA WMO-001. The drums are currently stored in a Temporary Fissile Storage Area under NCSA WMO-001, which maintains double contingency.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."

Notified R2DO(Ayres) and NMSS (Camper).

* * * UPDATE ON 3/20/06 AT 1859 EST FROM B. WALLACE TO HUFFMAN * * *

"At 1430, on 03-20-06, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that an additional waste drum has been discovered that exceeds the allowed (deleted) gram limit for NCS Spacing Exempt drums and had previously been located in an NCS Spacing Exempt storage area in violation of NCSA WMO-001. The drums are currently stored in a Temporary Fissile Storage Area under NCSA WMO-001, which maintains double contingency.

"The additional drum was determined to contain (deleted) grams U235. Calculations performed demonstrate that drums containing less than (deleted) grams U235 each, in an NCS Spacing Exempt array are subcritical."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Ernstes) and NMSS EO (Pierson) notified.

* * * UPDATE ON 4/20/06 AT 1750 EDT FROM B. WALLACE TO HUFFMAN * * *

" At 1130, on 04-20-06 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that an additional waste drum has been discovered that exceeds the allowed (deleted) gram limit for NCS Spacing Exempt drums and had previously been located in an NCS Spacing Exempt storage area in violation of NCSA WMO-001. The drums are currently stored in a Temporary Fissile Storage Area under NCSA WMO-001, which maintains double contingency.

"The additional drum (#41663) was determined to contain (deleted) grams of U235."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Lesser) and NMSS EO (Janosko) notified.

* * * UPDATE ON 4/21/06 AT 2040 EDT FROM WALKER TO HUFFMAN * * *

"At 1333, on 4-21-06 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that seven additional waste drums had been discovered that exceed the allowed (deleted) gram limit for NCS Spacing Exempt drums and had previously been located in an NCS Spacing Exempt storage area in violation of NCSA WMO-001. The drums are currently stored in a Temporary Fissile Storage Area under NCSA WMO-001, which maintains double contingency.

"Seven additional drums (41160W,41161W,41162W,41158W,41159W,40605W.41681W) were determined to contain in excess of the (deleted) gram limit of U235 but less than the (deleted) gram safety limit."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Lesser) and NMSS EO (Janosko) notified.

* * * UPDATE ON 4/28/06 AT 1802 EDT FROM WALKER TO A. COSTA * * *

"At 1430, on 04-28-06 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that an additional waste drum has been discovered that exceeds the allowed [DELETED] gram limit for NCS Spacing Exempt drums and had previously been located in an NCS Spacing Exempt storage area in violation of NCSA WMO-001. The drum is currently stored in a Temporary Fissile Storage Area under NCSA WMO-001, which maintains double contingency.

"[This] one additional drum, # 43170W was determined to contain in excess of the [DELETED] gram limit of U235 but less than the [DELETED] gram safety limit."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Landis) and NMSS EO (Giitter).

* * * UPDATE ON 10/11/06 AT 1551 EDT FROM WALLACE TO HUFFMAN * * *

At 0900, on 10-11-06 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that an additional waste drum (#41470W) has been discovered that exceeds the allowed limit (but less than the safety limit) for NCS Spacing Exempt drums and had previously been located in an NCS Spacing Exempt storage area in violation of NCSA WMO-001. The drum is currently stored in a Temporary Fissile Storage Area under NCSA WMO-001, which maintains double contingency.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Decker) and NMSS EO (Essig).

* * * UPDATE ON 10/24/06 AT 1130 EDT FROM K. A. BEASLEY TO MACKINNON * * *


At 1000, on 10/24/06 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that an additional waste drum has been discovered that exceeds the allowed [Deleted] gram limit for NCS Spacing Exempt drums and had previously been located in an NCS Spacing Exempt storage area in violation of NCSA WMO-001. The drum is currently stored in a Temporary Fissile Storage Area under NCSA WMO-001, which maintains double contingency.

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. Notified R2DO (Brain Bonser) and NMSS (Sandra Wastler).


* * * UPDATE ON 12/08/06 AT 1604 EST FROM K. A. BEASLEY TO KOZAL * * *

At 1140 on 12/08/06 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that an additional waste drum (42171W) has been discovered that exceeds the allowed [Deleted] gram limit for NCS Spacing Exempt drums and had previously been located in an NCS Spacing Exempt storage area in violation of NSCA WMO-001. The drum is currently stored in a Temporary Fissile Storage Area under NCSA WMO-001, which maintains double contingency.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2RDO (Lesser) and NMSS EO (Janosko).

* * * UPDATE ON 12/18/06 AT 1250 EST FROM B. W. WALLACE TO KOZAL * * *

At 1250 on 12/18/06 the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that 4 additional waste drums (39639W, 42118W, 42488W, & 43521W) had been discovered that exceeds the allowed [Deleted] gram limit for NCS Spacing Exempt drums and had previously been located in an NCS Spacing Exempt storage area in violation of NSCA WMO-001. The drum is currently stored in a Temporary Fissile Storage Area under NCSA WMO-001, which maintains double contingency.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2RDO (Moorman) and NMSS EO (Ruland).

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43051
Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: BOWSER-MORNER, INC.
Region: 3
City: DAYTON State: OH
County:
License #: OH31210580003
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 12/14/2006
Notification Time: 12:27 [ET]
Event Date: 12/13/2006
Event Time: 15:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/14/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
ILTAB via email ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

OHIO AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST/STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

"Lost or stolen Troxler moisture density gauge from Toledo Office of licensee. Last physically seen on 11/28/06 in secure storage area. Was discovered missing when periodic inventory was being performed on 12/13/06. Gauge is not on licensee's premises or in possession of any current employees. Gauge has not been signed out in any utilization log since 11/28/06. Incident has been reported to Toledo Police Department. Licensee is still investigating. Troxler model 3440, S/N 023819, containing 10 mCi (millicuries) Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241. Reported to BRP on 12/13/06 at (approx.) 3: 30 PM."

Reference Number 2006-103

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43052
Rep Org: SCIENTECH, LLC
Licensee: NUS INSTRUMENTS, LLC
Region:
City: IDAHO FALLS State: ID
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARTIN R. BOOSKA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 12/14/2006
Notification Time: 14:47 [ET]
Event Date: 12/14/2006
Event Time: 14:47 [MST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
OMID TABATABAI (NRR)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
JAMES MOORMAN (R2)
JULIO LARA (R3)
DAVID PROULX (R4)

Event Text

PART 21 - DEFECT FOUND IN BASIC COMPONENTS (FOXBORO REPLACEMENT MODULES) SUPPLIED TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

Scientech LLC company manufactures a replacement for obsolete Foxboro 66 R Lead/Lag unit - a TMD500, the time domain module in NUSI's Series 500 line. The Fully model number is of the form TMD500-xx/xx/xx/xx-xx-xx-yy, where xx defines certain input, output, and power options, while 'yy' selects the style of faceplate.

Two shipments were made to Ginna, one of five modules and one of nine modules, were made in mid-September of 2006. Ginna performed receipt inspection and tested the modules for proper operation. The tests confirmed that NUSI had configured the modules as required and the modules worked as expected.

Ginna Station installed the NUSI TMD500 modules in the reactor protection channels as part of a modification required for an extended power uprate.

After further testing twelve modules in total were installed; 4 modules configured for OPDT setpoint calculator, and 8 modules configured as lag units. Two lag modules units were installed in each of the four reactor protection channels on the output side of the Thot R/I modules, to dampen the effects of hot leg streaming. All of these modules were bought under one purchase order and received in September 2006.

On 11/2/06, several days after installation and calibration activities were completed, computer monitoring of the OPDT setpoints indicated that Channel 1 OPDT setpoint calculator module was following Tavg as it increased from 550 degrees F. The magnitude was small - approximately 0.3 degrees F change for a 10 degree F change in Tavg. However, the output of the module should have been steady until Tavg reached 574 degrees F. Ginna Station Operations declared reactor protection channel 1 OPDT setpoint inoperable when this condition was identified. The module was replaced, the replacement calibrated, and the channel was declared operable.

On 11/6/06, several days later, computer monitoring of the channel 2 OPDT setpoint calculator showed it was exhibiting the same anomalous behavior that has occurred previously on the channel 1 OPDT setpoint calculator. Operations declared channel 2 OPDT setpoint inoperable. Ginna requested a team from NUSI travel to site and address the problem. A team of one engineer, one assembler, and the QA Manager traveled to Ginna to inspect and hopefully correct the problem.

Troubleshooting by Ginna Station I&C personnel determined that the zero potentiometer wiper was shorted to the module case. The edge of the mounting fixture for the Lo Lim potentiometer had cut through the insulation of the wire going to the wiper of the Zero potentiometer.

The NUSI team arrived on site while Ginna personnel were making repairs, and provided advice. The team inspected the module originally found defective and removed from service; they found that the wire to the wiper of the Zero potentiometer was damaged. They reinsulated the wire with electrical tape in accordance with approved Ginna procedures and tested the module, confirming that it worked correctly. The NUSI team then returned to the Idaho Falls facility on the 11/08/06. NUSI initiated Non-Conformance Report 06N-090 and this 10CFR21 evaluation on 11/10/06.

Extent of Condition: There are four module types that use this style of faceplate:

TMD500-[options]-01 Time Domain Module, MTH500-[options]-01 Simple Math Module, CMM500-[options]-01 Complex Math Module, and HLS500-[options]-01 High/Low Select Module.

Modules in this category were sold to Ginna and Indian Point. These modules were also sold to Westinghouse for resale; the module identifiers were the same with the substitution of "9000" for "500" in the module number.

Per Scientech; Ginna, as stated above, is aware of the problem associated with the TMD500 but they have not been officially informed of a Part 21 being issued concerning the TMD500 problem. As for the Indian Point 2 and Westinghouse they have also not been informed of the Part 21 being issued. The major problem will be trying to trace down the where abouts of the "9000s" that were sold to Westinghouse.

* * * UPDATE AT 1057 EST ON 12/18/06 FROM MARTIN BOOSKA TO S. SANDIN * * *

Scientech confirmed that Ginna, Indian Point 2 and Westinghouse have been informed of this Part 21 notification. Notified R1DO (Powell), R2DO (Moorman), R3DO (Duncan), R4DO (Whitten) and NRR (Hodge, Tabatabai) via email.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43055
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GORDON E. ROBINSON
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 12/18/2006
Notification Time: 13:55 [ET]
Event Date: 12/18/2006
Event Time: 11:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/18/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF OFF-SITE EMERGENCY SIRENS

"A press release issued for an inadvertent actuation of the emergency sirens. This item is reportable under 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as offsite notification as an event of public interest."

The licensee was performing scheduled silent testing of the off-site emergency sirens. During the test a signal for the sirens to sound was sent in error, and the sirens sounded. There was no emergency.

Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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