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Event Notification Report for November 9, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
11/08/2006 - 11/09/2006

** EVENT NUMBERS **


42158 42928 42962 42971 42972 42973 42974 42976

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 42158
Rep Org: STS CONSULTANTS LTD
Licensee: STS CONSULTANTS LTD
Region: 3
City: MAPLE GROVE State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MOTTLOW
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 11/20/2005
Notification Time: 10:25 [ET]
Event Date: 11/20/2005
Event Time: 09:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
ANNE MARIE STONE (R3)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
CANADA CNSC (FAX) ()
TAS (EMAIL) ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

A Troxler Model 3420 moisture density gauge (nominally 40 milliCi Am-241/Be and 8 milliCi Cs-137) was stolen from the back of an employee technician's pickup truck while parked in a parking garage in Minnetonka, MN. The gauge was in its case inside a gang box. The gang box was double-locked and secured to the truck by cables or chains attached to the gang box handles which were found cut.

The licensee's license number, the gauge serial number, and the address of the parking garage were not available at the time of the report. The licensee stated that the theft has been reported to the local police department. There are no current plans for either a reward or a press release.

* * * UPDATE FROM C. VERKE TO W. GOTT AT 1522 ON 11/08/06 * * *

Minnesota became an Agreement State after the original report was made.

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"On November 20, 2005 the Troxler gauge, serial number 29535 was taken from a locked pickup truck. The locked transport case had been attached to the pickup truck bed by two chains. The pickup truck was in a secured garage of an apartment building in Minnetonka. The police report states that the garage had been ransacked and this was not the only item taken. The stolen gauge was noticed by the owner of an automotive repair business approximated 9 months later in the back area of the business. He thought that someone would come and claim it. At a point approximately 3 months later, when no one had picked it up, the business owner asked a friend of his who was having his vehicle worked on and was a member of the Metropolitan Transit Company if he knew what it was. At this point, the Minnetonka police were called, discovered the owner and returned it to senior project manager at STS Consultants, Ltd.

"The supervisor of the Radiation Control unit for the Minnesota Department of Health, Environmental Health Division was notified on the recovery of the gauge by NRC Region 3. He requested that a follow-up inspection be conducted.

"On November 6, 2006, the inspectors went to STS Consultants, Ltd. to survey a recovered Troxler gauge, serial number 29535, that had been stolen one year ago. Upon arrival they met with the senior project manager. The senior project manager showed the inspectors the gauge that was already out of the transport case. He was getting ready to do the leak testing. Meter readings were taken using a Ludlum 2241-3 meter, serial number 220224. Wipes were read with a Radiation Alert Inspector serial number 5588 on 11/7/06. The project manager did perform the leak test while the inspectors were there. The gauge will be sent in for repair and calibration. The gauge will be sent to a company in Sheboygan, Wisconsin.

"When the senior project manager received the gauge back from the Minnetonka police department, he found:
The transport case locks were broken;
The serial number of the gauge had been ground off; and
The trigger mechanism on the handle did not function properly.
He did discover the Am-Be source holder was still intact. With the trigger mechanism not working, he was not sure if the Cs 137 source was still intact.

"As a result of the meter readings and wipe results, the conclusion by the inspectors was that there was no contamination or leakage from the two sources contained within the gauge. There was no indication of any further follow-up needed."

Notified NMSS EO (G. Morell), R3DO (J. Cameron), emailed to ILTAB and faxed to Canada (CNSC).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 42928
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: ACURA ENGINEERING
Region: 4
City: LAKEWOOD State: CO
County:
License #: 37502
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOM PENTECOST
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 10/23/2006
Notification Time: 14:49 [ET]
Event Date: 10/22/2006
Event Time: 18:15 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
E. WILLIAM BRACH (NMSS)
ILTAB EMAIL ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN AND RECOVERED TROXLER GAUGE

The NRC Operations Center received the following information from the State of Colorado via fax:

"The Radiation Management Program of the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment received telephone notification on Monday 23 October 06 regarding the theft of a portable moisture density gauge.

"Radioactive Materials Involved: a Troxler 3430 gauge, serial number 28201 containing 333 MBq (9 mCi) of Cesium 137 and 1.63 GBq (44 mCi) of Am-241/Be.

"Event details: The theft occurred at the residence of an employee of the licensee ( DELETED) at 6:15 PM on Sunday 22 Oct 06. The Troxler gauge was reported to be in a locked case, chained and locked in the bed of a Ford Ranger. The employee witnessed the theft of the truck from his garage with the gauge secured in the bed of the truck.

"The local police were called at the time of the theft but (DELETED) did not have a police contact name or phone number at the time of this report."

Notification was made by licensee RSO to the State of Colorado.

CO Incident Number 42928.

* * * UPDATE FROM STATE (PENTECOST) TO M. RIPLEY AT 1129 EST ON 11/8/06 * * *

The State provided the following information via email:

"On 7 Nov 06, the stolen Ford ranger was recovered by Lakewood [CO] police without the gauge. Later that evening, the Thornton [CO] police recovered the gauge within a different stolen vehicle. The gauge and transport case have been returned undamaged and properly functioning to Acura Engineering."

Notified R4 DO (J. Clark), NMSS EO (G. Morell) and ILTAB (Email)


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 42962
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: PACIFIC ECOSOLUTIONS (PECOS)
Region: 4
City: RICHLAND State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0393-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKEL J. ELSEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 11/03/2006
Notification Time: 13:05 [ET]
Event Date: 11/01/2006
Event Time: 10:20 [PST]
Last Update Date: 11/03/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4)
SANDRA WASTLER (NMSS)

Event Text

WASHINGTON STATE AGREEMENT STATE REPORT

This event was received via e-mail

"On November 1, three workers were involved in separating sources, lead pigs (shielded containers) and trash from a barrel. Work was being conducted in a ventilated enclosure within a PEcoS waste processing building. Two workers inside the enclosure were wearing respirators and the supervisor (not wearing a respirator) was immediately outside the enclosure directing the work. At the end of the day, the supervisor noted he was contaminated. The supervisor was scheduled for whole-body counting at the Battelle facility early the next day. An uptake of approximately 11.7 nanocuries of Americium 241 was confirmed. The preliminary dose estimate to the individual's lung was 97.5 Rem CDE. The individual was started on chelation treatment. The other two workers were sent for whole body counting on November 3.

"The operation included opening one lead pig that contained three Am-241 sources. Contamination previously had not been detected outside the pig or in the trash. Sources were surveyed for dose rate and separated from the lead pig without contamination smears being taken. No release to the public or the environment occurred. Operations in this and adjacent areas were stopped once the situation was known. An investigation was initiated by PEcoS. The area was evacuated and is currently being ventilated. DOH has an inspector on-site performing an incident investigation.

"Media is aware of the incident.

"Notification Reporting Criteria: WAC 246-221-250(2) Notification of Incidents (24 hour notification)

"Isotope and Activity involved: Am-241 total activity from twelve drums was manifested at 6.8 GigaBq (184 millicuries). Only one drum was open at the time of the incident.

"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): Three workers were involved. One worker has an apparent over exposure of 97.5 Rem CDE to the Lung. No release to public or environment.


'Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number) : N/A

"Disposition/recovery: N/A

"Leak test? N/A

'Vehicle: (description; placards; Shipper; package type; Pkg. ID number)

"Release of activity? N/A

"Consultant used? [deleted] at Battelle in vivo counter facility, Dr. [deleted] at Advanced Medical, and [deleted] at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory."


Washington State Report # WA-06-063.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42971
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BOB VANDERBYE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 11/08/2006
Notification Time: 09:19 [ET]
Event Date: 11/08/2006
Event Time: 08:05 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

PLANT COMPUTER DOWN FOR UPGRADE

"Farley Nuclear Plant is replacing the Unit 1 plant computer with an upgraded plant computer. The total time that the plant computer may be down is a maximum of 10 days. The functions for emergency preparedness will be completed within the first 12 hours of the outage. During that first 12 hours a contingency plan is in place to ensure that the TSC would have the required data if an emergency was declared. A 5054Q was written for this and was reviewed by the Region 2 NRC EP staff prior to implementation."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 42972
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
                   6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
                   BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: MATT MAURER
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 11/08/2006
Notification Time: 08:52 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/2006
Event Time: 08:59 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)

Event Text

PROCESS GAS LEAK DETECTOR FAILURE

"At 0859 on 11/7/2006, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of a failure of the C-337A process gas leak detector (PGLD) YE-613-21 to alarm during TSR [Technical Safety Requirements] surveillance 2.2.4.1-1. TSR surveillance 2.2.4.1-1 is a quarterly test to verify that the PGLD will detect a UF6 release, alarm, and alert personnel. PGLD YE-613-21 provides coverage for the north section of the facility UF6 piping trench. Staff review of the failure, suggest that PGLD YE-613-21 may have failed prior to being removed from service to perform the 11/7/06 TSR surveillance. PGLD YE-613-21 was replaced and tested satisfactorily. Additional testing and engineering review of PGLD YE-613-21 is being performed to ensure the operability of the PGLD and to develop any needed corrective actions.

"This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

"PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-06-3670; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2006-10; NRC Worksheet No. 42972."

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 42973
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
                   6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
                   BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: MATT MAURER
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 11/08/2006
Notification Time: 10:56 [ET]
Event Date: 11/07/2006
Event Time: 16:07 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)

Event Text

FAILURE OF PROCESS GAS LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM

"At 1607 on 11/7/2006, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of a failure of the C-333 Unit 6 Cell 3 process gas leak detection (PGLD) system. C-333 operators were alerted to the Unit 6 Cell 3 PGLD failure by the receipt of an Area Control Room alarm. The operators responded to the Unit 6 Cell 3 cell panel and discovered that the PGLD system was inoperable. C-333 Unit 6 Cell 3 and associated piping were operating above atmospheric pressure (Cascade Mode 2) at the time of the PGLD failure. The operators initiated a continuous smoke watch of the area with lost PGLD coverage until the associated equipment and piping pressure was reduced below atmospheric pressure in accordance with TSR LCO 2.4.4.1. The PGLD system is required per TSR 2.4.4.1 to be operable when a cascade cell and associated piping is above atmospheric pressure (Cascade Mode 2).

"This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

"PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-06-3679; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2006-11; NRC Worksheet No. 42973."

The licensee stated that the equipment and piping pressure was reduced in order to allow the process to continue operating in a condition where the PGLD system is not required to be operable. The licensee is investigating the cause of the failure but it is preliminarily believed to be a failure of an instrumentation power supply.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42974
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: KEN KINGSTON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 11/08/2006
Notification Time: 14:30 [ET]
Event Date: 11/08/2006
Event Time: 11:06 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown

Event Text

SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION - EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR AUTO START

"On November 8, 2006, at approximately 11:06 Central Standard Time (CST) a valid actuation of Fort Calhoun station (FCS) Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator 2 (DG-2) occurred as a result of undervoltage on its respective safety bus (1A4). DG-2 started as a result from manually deenergizing bus 1A4 during the performance of the Bus Ground Fault Locator Function Test. The DG-2 output breaker was disabled as part of the test and therefore did not close onto the bus. The procedure was deficient in ensuring that DG-2 was not in automatic.

"No loads were being supplied from Bus 1A4 at the time and thus no loads were lost. No other Safeguards systems or equipment were actuated.

"Fort Calhoun Station is currently in a refueling outage, Mode 5 with the core offloaded to the Spent Fuel Pool. No Technical Specifications were entered as a result of this actuation due to plant being less than 300F.

"Emergency Diesel Generator 2 was taken out of automatic, lockout relays reset and the engine was shutdown."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42976
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BRUCE FRANZEN
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 11/09/2006
Notification Time: 04:33 [ET]
Event Date: 11/08/2006
Event Time: 22:54 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 85 Power Operation 85 Power Operation
3 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

FAILURE OF CONTROL ROOM HVAC TO MAINTAIN CONTROL ROOM TEMPERATURE

"At 22:54 hours on November 8, 2006, the B Control Room HVAC Refrigeration and Condensing Unit (RCU) failed to maintain proper Control Room temperature and cycling excessively. The RCU is a single train system and therefore is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The RCU is required to operate during a design basis accident to maintain Main Control Room habitability/temperature. The Air Filtration Unit (AFU) of CREVS remains operable. This places unit 2 in a 30 day LCORA per Tech Spec 3.7.5 Required Action A.1."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Friday, March 30, 2012