| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
11/07/2006 - 11/08/2006 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 42902 | Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: ERICK MATZKE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 10/12/2006
Notification Time: 19:26 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2006
Event Time: 17:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/07/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text STEAM GENERATOR INSTRUMENTATION NONCONFORMANCE
"During a review of two nonconformances documented in the station's corrective action system, an unanalyzed condition which could significantly degrade plant safety was noted. The steam generator level instrumentation was not installed as documented in the UFSAR. Letdown valves and piping inside containment was not installed as described in the UFSAR. An unacceptable scenario is a postulated design basis accident in one of the steam generators and a single failure of the letdown piping in the vicinity of the instrumentation piping of the other steam generator, which could, produce conditions that would mislead the operator as to the condition of the plant during the accident."
This condition was discovered during steam generator replacement when the old steam generators were removed and the instrumentation piping became visible. The replacement piping will be routed in accordance with approved drawings. This piping is not required in the current mode.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 11/07/06 AT 1152 EST FROM ERICK MATZKE TO MACKINNON * * *
"Additional review of the situation previously reported has determined that there are no unanalyzed interactions between the SG level instrumentation tubing and the letdown system. The review determined that the previous determination was incorrectly postulating the occurrence of simultaneous accidents. This observation was not readily apparent during the initial review. Therefore this event is not reportable under 10CFR50.72. Event number 42902 is being withdrawn.
"However, the continuing review has identified a failure which will require reporting under part 50.73, but not 50.72."
R4DO (Jeffrey Clark) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the retraction of this event by the licensee. |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 42943 | Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: RICH LOWERY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 10/28/2006
Notification Time: 21:52 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2006
Event Time: 17:09 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/07/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling Shutdown | 0 | Refueling Shutdown | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION
"An 8 hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) is being made due to discovery of a previously unanalyzed plant condition. The chemical volume control system (CVCS) charging line is a high energy line susceptible, within design space, to a rupture that could result in pipe whip and an impingement condition. The containment penetration (M-3) for the charging line is directly below the high-pressure safety injection (HPSI) header penetrations (M-5 & M-6). Due to this proximity, a failure of the charging line could impact the SI-1503 class HPSI line (M-6) causing damage to the header and rendering it incapable of fulfilling its design function. The two HPSI headers are different class piping with the M-5 penetration being a 2500 psig (SI - 2501 Class) line and the M-6 penetration being a 1500 psig (SI-1503 Class) line. The 2500 psig line is constructed of robust enough piping to not be susceptible to failure, however both HPSI headers are cross connected prior to location of concern. Although both HPSI and CVCS breaks are isolable, operator action would be required to identify and isolate the break location. The possible result of a high energy line break of charging piping could result in all three pipe headers being inoperable until manual action could be taken to isolate leakage on the 1500 psig HPSI line. Plant is currently shutdown for refueling outage with scheduled startup of November 21, 2006."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY ERICK MATZKE TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1119 EST ON 11/07/06 * * *
"Additional review of the stations design and licensing basis has determined that the charging and high pressure safety injection systems are correctly designed to the stations high energy line break criteria for lines inside containment. This situation is not reportable and therefore event notification 42943 is being withdrawn."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Clark) |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42962 | Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: PACIFIC ECOSOLUTIONS (PECOS)
Region: 4
City: RICHLAND State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0393-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKEL J. ELSEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 11/03/2006
Notification Time: 13:05 [ET]
Event Date: 11/01/2006
Event Time: 10:20 [PST]
Last Update Date: 11/03/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4)
SANDRA WASTLER (NMSS)
| Event Text WASHINGTON STATE AGREEMENT STATE REPORT
This event was received via e-mail
"On November 1, three workers were involved in separating sources, lead pigs (shielded containers) and trash from a barrel. Work was being conducted in a ventilated enclosure within a PEcoS waste processing building. Two workers inside the enclosure were wearing respirators and the supervisor (not wearing a respirator) was immediately outside the enclosure directing the work. At the end of the day, the supervisor noted he was contaminated. The supervisor was scheduled for whole-body counting at the Battelle facility early the next day. An uptake of approximately 11.7 nanocuries of Americium 241 was confirmed. The preliminary dose estimate to the individual's lung was 97.5 Rem CDE. The individual was started on chelation treatment. The other two workers were sent for whole body counting on November 3.
"The operation included opening one lead pig that contained three Am-241 sources. Contamination previously had not been detected outside the pig or in the trash. Sources were surveyed for dose rate and separated from the lead pig without contamination smears being taken. No release to the public or the environment occurred. Operations in this and adjacent areas were stopped once the situation was known. An investigation was initiated by PEcoS. The area was evacuated and is currently being ventilated. DOH has an inspector on-site performing an incident investigation.
"Media is aware of the incident.
"Notification Reporting Criteria: WAC 246-221-250(2) Notification of Incidents (24 hour notification)
"Isotope and Activity involved: Am-241 total activity from twelve drums was manifested at 6.8 GigaBq (184 millicuries). Only one drum was open at the time of the incident.
"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): Three workers were involved. One worker has an apparent over exposure of 97.5 Rem CDE to the Lung. No release to public or environment.
'Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number) : N/A
"Disposition/recovery: N/A
"Leak test? N/A
'Vehicle: (description; placards; Shipper; package type; Pkg. ID number)
"Release of activity? N/A
"Consultant used? [deleted] at Battelle in vivo counter facility, Dr. [deleted] at Advanced Medical, and [deleted] at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory."
Washington State Report # WA-06-063. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42969 | Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DALE TURINETTI
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 11/07/2006
Notification Time: 13:16 [ET]
Event Date: 09/25/2006
Event Time: 10:34 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/07/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION - PARTIAL PHASE A CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation partial containment Phase A isolation affecting more than one system.
"On 09/25/2006 at approximately 1034 hours, while in MODE 6, 'Refueling Operations' with no core alterations in progress, a partial Containment Phase 'A' Isolation occurred without a valid initiating signal from the Train 'A' Solid State Protection System. All components responded as designed and Operations verified stable conditions in accordance with plant operating procedures.
"The following components were actuated:
1-XCR-100, Containment Air Supply Header No. 2 Containment Isolation Valve,
1-XCR-102, Control Air Supply Header No. 1 Containment Isolation Valve,
1-VCR-11, Glycol to Air Handling Units,
1-VCR-21, Glycol from Air Handling Units,
1-DCR-600, Containment Sumps to Dirty Waste Hold-up Tank Containment Isolation Valve,
1-DCR-610, Ice Condenser Fans Cooler Units Drain to WDS Containment Isolation Valve,
1-CCR-455, CCW to Reactor Support Coolers Containment Isolation Valve,
1-QCR-919, Demin Water to Containment Isolation Valve,
1-QRV-51, Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Line from CVCS Isolation Valve,
1-QRV-61, Alternate Charging Line to Cold Leg 1 Isolation Valve,
1-QRV-62, Normal Charging Line to Cold Leg 4 Isolation Valve.
"All components responded as expected. The remaining Phase 'A' components did not actuate because they had been previously removed from service.
"This event was caused by an intermittent electrical connection at Universal Logic Card A313 receptacle and a failed A213 card. The inadequate receptacle spring tension on the A313 card has been corrected, and the failed A213 card has been replaced. There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event has been entered into the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant's corrective action program. The NRC Senior Resident was notified of this report, time 1220, 11/7/06." | |