| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
09/22/2006 - 09/25/2006 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 42788 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BART BLAKESLEY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 08/19/2006
Notification Time: 23:10 [ET]
Event Date: 08/19/2006
Event Time: 18:49 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text RADIATION MONITOR ELECTRICAL SPIKE CAUSES SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
"The 'B' fuel pool radiation monitor spiked high causing an actuation of the secondary containment relays. 'A' SBGTS [Standby Gas Treatment System] train started, reactor building, turbine building, and rad waste building ventilation isolated. The Drywell Continuous Air Monitor (DW CAM) and O2 analyzer containment valves isolated. The control room ventilation system transferred to the high radiation mode.
"At the time of the occurrence the 'A' Fuel Pool radiation monitor was reading normal (0.5 mr/hr). The 'B' Fuel Pool radiation monitor was reading 80 mr/hr. The 'B Fuel Pool radiation monitor, soon after lowered to 30-40 mr/hr and then back to normal (10 mr/hr). The trip setpoint is 50 mr/hr. The trip was reset. The secondary containment isolation and all ventilation trips were restored to normal. The DW CAM and control room ventilation were restored to normal. A local survey was performed on the refuel floor, readings obtained were < 5 mr/hr at the detector and < 2 mr/hr in surrounding areas. The 'B' fuel pool radiation monitor high level trips were placed in the trip/bypass position. The 'B' fuel pool radiation monitor was placed in downscale trip condition to comply with Technical Specification Table 3.2.4. A team is being established to investigate the cause of the trip."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * Update on 09/22/06 at 1456 ET from Dave Burnett to MacKinnon * * *
"This report is being reclassified from a 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) [valid system actuation] to 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) [invalid system actuation].
"Based on further investigation, Monticello has determined that the actuation signal was an invalid spurious signal since other radiation monitors in the area did not indicate any change in value. The cause of the spurious signal was determined to be inducted noise through an unshielded cable which resulted in an increased output current to the instrument. Because the actuation signal was not valid, Monticello is reclassifying the initial event report as an unplanned system actuation under 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). This report will be made in lieu of reporting the event as an LER.
"In accordance with 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A):
"This report is not considered an LER and the report is being made under 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The original event report (ENS #42788) detailed the system affected, whether the actuation was complete or partial, and whether each affected system started and functioned successfully.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.'
NRC R3DO (Julio Lara) notified. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42851 | Rep Org: IOWA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF IOWA
Region: 3
City: IOWA CITY State: IA
County: JEFFERSON
License #: 0037-1-52-AAB
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAN MCGHEE
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 09/20/2006
Notification Time: 17:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2006
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (NMSS)
| Event Text IRRADIATOR SOURCE TEMPORARILY STUCK IN THE EXPOSED POSITION
On the night of 8/28- 8/29/2006 the large irradiator was being used for an all night procedure. The principle investigator for the irradiator was present to conclude the operation on the morning of August 29. At the time designated for source retraction, the irradiator source in fact did not retract to the stowed position. The source actuation system uses air pressure to expose the source and spring force to stow the source. The principle investigator tried to house the source by operating the "override" button. The source remained exposed. After approximately 15 minutes the source returned to the housed condition with no operator action. The irradiator will not be used until J.L. Shepard [the manufacturer] is contacted and the cause identified and corrected. The source is currently stowed.
The irradiator is an 8800 Curie Cs-137 self shielded irradiator.
Iowa event number I806004
The state notified Region 3 (Lynch).
* * * Update on 09/21/06 at 1510 ET from Randy D' Ahlin to MacKinnon * * *
The following updated information was called in by the State of Iowa Department of Public Health:
The irradiator type is an open beam irradiator. The irradiator has been repaired, tested and placed back in service on 09/21/06.
R3DO (Julio Lara) and NMSS EO (Cindy Flannery) notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42857 | Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 09/24/2006
Notification Time: 10:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/24/2006
Event Time: 04:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES MOORMAN (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM AND COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE LINE PROBLEMS
"On 9/24/06 at approximately 0430 EST, the NRC Duty Officer attempted to contact the plant via the ENS (Emergency Notification System) phone for the daily plant status. Communications via the ENS phone had apparently failed, and attempts by NRC to use the commercial lines for Unit 1, Unit 2 and the Shift Manager were also unsuccessful. The plant was notified at approximately 0650 by the TVA ODS (Operations Duty Specialist) that the NRC was apparently unable to communicate with Sequoyah via the ENS phone and commercial lines. Sequoyah staff was able to communicate with the NRC Duty Officer with a commercial line, however, the ENS phone line was not functional at that time. At approximately 0700, the ENS phone was successfully utilized to communicate with the NRC Duty Officer. This event is being reported under 10CFR50,72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities. An investigation will follow to determine the cause and required corrective actions."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |