| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
09/12/2006 - 09/13/2006 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 42833 | Rep Org: OR DEPT OF HEALTH RAD PROTECTION
Licensee: ASTARIS, LLC
Region: 4
City: McMINNVILLE State: OR
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN SIEBERT
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 09/07/2006
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 09/07/2006
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/07/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R4)
WILLIAM RULAND (NMSS)
ILTAB (via email) ()
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A TEXAS NUCLEAR GAUGE FOUND IN A SHIPMENT OF SCRAP STEEL
Cascade Steel located in McMinnville, OR received a rail shipment of scrap steel which triggered a portal alarm. During the investigation, a Texas Nuclear Gauge Model 5193, S/N B1207, containing 500 mCuries Cs-137, dated October 1978, was recovered. Thermomeasure Electronics, formerly Texas Nuclear, was contacted and confirmed that the last owner on record was Astaris of Pocatello, ID which may be out-of-business. Thermomeasure Electronics collected and disposed of sources at this location in 2002. Thermomeasure Electronic records identify the source S/N is MA5033 and that a total of eight (8) devices and one (1) gauge associated with Astaris are unaccounted for.
The State of Oregon is enroute to the Cascade Steel facility to recover the source. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42837 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DON SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 09/12/2006
Notification Time: 11:47 [ET]
Event Date: 07/18/2006
Event Time: 04:47 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
BINOY DESAI (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM ACTUATION DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO ONE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM BUS
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting more than one system.
"On July 18, 2006, at 0447 hours CDT, with Unit 2 operating at 100% thermal power, the electrical power to reactor protection system (RPS) bus 2A was interrupted during the performance of surveillance testing on RPS circuit protectors 2A1 and 2A2. The RPS buses 2A and 2B are normally powered from motor-generator (MG) sets 2A and 2B, respectively. During testing or maintenance intervals affecting either the MG set or the normal supply circuit protectors, the affected RPS bus is powered from a transformer supply through alternate power circuit protectors 2C1 and 2C2. Power to RPS bus 2A, which was being powered through the alternate power circuit protectors via a temporary transformer, was interrupted when circuit protector 2C1 actuated on a sensed undervoltage condition. The Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) logic circuits powered from RPS bus 2A were de energized, and PCIS logic Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 were actuated. None of the plant conditions which require PCIS Groups 2, 3, 6, or 8 actuation (e.g., low reactor water level, high drywell pressure, abnormal area radiation levels, high area temperature, etc.) existed, therefore these actuations are considered invalid.
"The following actuations/isolations occurred:
"Group 2: Isolation of the Pressure Suppression Chamber head tank pumps; and Drywell Floor and Equipment Drains Isolation
"Group 3: Isolation of the reactor water clean-up system
"Group 6: Initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment System; Initiation of Control Room Emergency Ventilation; and Isolation of the reactor zone and refuel zone normal ventilation systems.
"Group 8: This logic isolates the Traversing Incore Probes (TIP) if they are inserted. The TIPs were not inserted at the time of this event.
"All equipment responded in accordance with the plant design. Upon loss of power from the alternate source, the surveillance testing was suspended, and RPS Bus 2A was re energized from RPS MG set 2A. The affected logic was reset, and equipment was realigned as appropriate.
"There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into TVA's corrective action program for evaluation and resolution.
"The NRC senior resident inspector has been notified of this report. Reference corrective action document PER 106999." | |