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Event Notification Report for August 11, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
08/10/2006 - 08/11/2006

** EVENT NUMBERS **


42714 42756 42762

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 42714
Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ARNIE CRIBB
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 07/18/2006
Notification Time: 22:30 [ET]
Event Date: 07/18/2006
Event Time: 17:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

POTENTIAL FLOODING COMMON MODE FAILURE OF SERVICE WATER PUMPS

"At 1715, it was determined that current plant configuration does not match the assumptions of the Service Water Pump House flooding design calculation. The calculation assumes that a leak developing in the discharge valve bay would cause the water level to rise to the level of the system piping and then stabilize due to leakage out of the valve bay through the area where the piping penetrated the wall. This level is below any electrical equipment and therefore would have no adverse impact on the system. The area around the piping where it was assumed the water would escape was found to be sealed with a fire barrier material. Since the water could not escape, it would continue to rise until it impacted the pump discharge valve (motor operated valve). This would potentially render the Service Water train inoperable.

"A second issue with the design calculation was discovered in that it assumed the pump discharge bays for the other two pumps were physically isolated from each other. This is not the case. The discharge piping for the three pumps are cross-connected via a line which penetrates all three bays. The area between the cross connect piping and the bay walls is not sealed. Any leakage in one bay will be communicated to all three bays. This results in the potential for a leak in any of the bays to possibly impact the operability of both trains of Service Water."

The licensee has put compensatory measures in place to maintain equipment operability. The licensee has determined that by putting either of the two following compensatory measures in place equipment operability will be maintained:

1. They will provide a continuous watch of the areas to detect water leakage that may cause a flooding concern and close service water pump discharge valves within 15 minutes and secure the affected service water pump, or

2. They will remove the fire seals causing the potential flooding concern in rooms 25-01, 25-02 and 25-03 of the service water pump house.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

*** UPDATE F. LUCAS TO J. KNOKE AT 17:40 EDT ON 08/10/06 ***

The following retraction was submitted by licensee:

"EN #42714 was submitted by South Carolina Electric & Gas Company based on the potential loss of both trains of V.C. Summer Nuclear Station Service Water due to leakage/flooding in the pump discharge valve bays (pits). South Carolina Electric & Gas company retracts EN #42714 based on the following discussion.

"Engineering has performed a more rigorous evaluation of the subject scenario utilizing existing calculations and analyses. Any flood or spray event in the Service Water Pump House operating floor or any one discharge valve pit will eventually propagate to all three pits through the open areas around the pipe penetrations. The pits will fill up to the pipe level and would conceivably continue to fill to the operating floor level. The discharge motor operated valve and the control panel above the floor of each valve pit in this scenario would be submerged and would become disabled. The control panels would be shorted to ground, and would fail the discharge motor operated valves in the as-is open position which would not affect the service water supply of either train.

"Since the motor operated valves fail as-is, this subject scenario would not result in the loss of both trains of service water."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Contacted R2DO (K. Landis)

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General Information or Other Event Number: 42756
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: RMA GEOSCIENCE
Region: 4
City: CHINO State: CA
County: SAN BERNARDINO
License #: 6384-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CJ SALGADO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 08/08/2006
Notification Time: 18:17 [ET]
Event Date: 08/08/2006
Event Time: 05:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/09/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
ILTAB VIA EMAIL ()
MEXICO VIA EMAIL ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

After picking up the CPN Model MC-3 Moisture Density Gauge (s/n M38128625 10 millicuries Cs-137 and 50 millicuries Am-241:Be) at the company's office in Chino, CA, the gauge operator stopped at his residence in Victorville, CA, for 20 to 30 minutes. The operator's residence is on the way to the job site. The gauge was chained to the bed of the company truck which was parked in the operator's personal stall. When the operator returned to his truck the two chains that secured the gauge case to the truck were cut, and the gauge and case were gone. The San Bernardino Sheriff's Office was notified and investigated. The Radiation Safety Officer is preparing a reward offer. The gauge was within its leak test interval, and the last test was satisfactory.

* * * UPDATE ON 8/9/2006 AT 0001 FROM BARBARA HAMRICK TO ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The State provided the following information via email:

"Today at about 6:15 pm, the California Radiologic Health Branch reported that a moisture-density gauge had been stolen in Victorville, CA this morning. The gauge belonged to RMA Geoscience. We are happy to report, the gauge was found tonight intact, in an abandoned field in Victorville, by the Victorville Fire Department. The RSO was contacted, and will be retrieving the gauge tonight, and returning it to the authorized permanent storage location in Chino, CA."

Notified NMSS (Holahan), ILTAB, R1DO (Bywater) and Mexico (via E-mail).


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42762
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID KARST
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 08/10/2006
Notification Time: 16:40 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2006
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

ELEVATED TRITIUM LEVELS IN ONSITE SAMPLE LOCATIONS


"At 1400 on 8/10/06 KPS [made] a notification to the State and Local Government that samples taken at settling plugs in the basement of the Auxiliary Building and Turbine Building show elevated tritium levels. Detected tritium levels were between 6,000 and 103,000 pico curies per liter. The Radiological Effluent Program has not detected any elevated tritium levels outside the plant. RCS leakage is .19 gpm, stable and within Technical Specification limits and there is currently no identified leakage from the Spent Fuel Pool.

Investigation is continuing to identify the reason for the increase in tritium levels."

The licensee notified the following agencies:

State of Wisconsin: Department of Emergency Management and Department of Natural Resources Regional Office

County governments: Kewaunee County Emergency Director and Manitowoc County Emergency Director

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY KARST TO KOZAL ON 8/10/2006 AT 1839 * * *

The licensee is planning a press release concerning the elevated tritium levels. This press release will be issued the morning of 8/11/2006.

Notified R3DO (Kozak), NRR EO (Nieh), IRD (Wilson), R3 OPA (Mitlyng), HQ OPA (Hayden)

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