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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
07/28/2006 - 07/31/2006
** EVENT NUMBERS **
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| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 41791 |
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAN DALY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ |
Notification Date: 06/23/2005
Notification Time: 22:08 [ET]
Event Date: 06/23/2005
Event Time: 15:49 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/28/2006 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION |
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
99 |
Power Operation |
99 |
Power Operation |
| 3 |
N |
Y |
99 |
Power Operation |
99 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
OFFSITE POWER SOURCE DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO LOW VOLTAGE
"At 15:49 hours Central Daylight Savings Time, June 23, 2005, entered DOA 6500-12, Low Switchyard Voltage. Bulk Power Operations reported predicted post Unit trip with LOCA switchyard voltage for Unit 2 is 342.5 KV and for Unit 3 is 342.3 KV. This rendered both Unit 2 and Unit 3 offsite electrical power sources inoperable. This predicted voltage is the value required to support Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) loading. Entered applicable Technical Specification required actions for both Units due to both offsite power sources being declared inoperable for Unit 2 and Unit 3.
"As of 1744 hours, restored Unit 2 offsite electrical power source to operable status by performing Transformer 86 Tap Changer adjustment per applicable procedure. TR 86 [transformer 86] supplies Unit 2 offsite electrical power.
"As of 1948 hours, switchyard voltage was restored to operable limits. This restored Unit 3 offsite electrical power source to operable status.
"This notification is provided in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) to report a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and the state.
* * * UPDATE FROM P. SALGADO TO M. RIPLEY 1258 EDT 07/28/06 * * *
"The purpose of this report is to retract ENS report 41791 (June 23, 2005) for Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS). The report was made following notification from Bulk Power Operations that the predicted post Unit trip with LOCA switchyard voltage rendered both Unit 2 and Unit 3 offsite electrical power sources inoperable. Both offsite electrical power sources were declared inoperable, the appropriate Technical Specification required actions were taken and an ENS notification was made in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b) (3)(v)(D) for an event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.
"In July 2006, DNPS performed a reanalysis of the June 23, 2005 event. The reanalysis determined that the computer model used to determine the required switchyard voltage for the June 23, 2005 event conservatively assumed that the Reserve Auxiliary Transformers (RATs) were supplying all plant 4 kilovolt (Kv) electrical loads and the second source of offsite power for each unit was based on a post unit trip. During normal plant operation the 4kV electrical loads are split between the RATs and the Unit Auxiliary Transformers (UATs). The reanalysis used the split bus configuration and the actual switchyard voltages at the time of the June 23, 2005 event. The reanalysis concluded that the voltages were greater than required, ensuring that the second source of offsite power for each unit would remain operable following a postulated design basis accident. Therefore, there was no condition present on June 23, 2005, that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function and this event is not reportable under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3 DO (R. Lanksbury) |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 42726 |
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TEXAS GAMMA RAY
Region: 4
City: State: TX
County:
License #: L05561
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOB FREE
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA |
Notification Date: 07/25/2006
Notification Time: 14:23 [ET]
Event Date: 05/01/2006
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/25/2006 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
GREG MORELL (NMSS) |
Event Text
TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - BADGE EXPOSURE
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"Dosimetry supplier reported 12 rem exposure. Licensee determined that employee left badge in truck, in radiation field at several locations [various job sites] during the monitoring period."
TX Incident No. I-8348 |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 42727 |
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 4
City: State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RUBEN CORTEZ
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER |
Notification Date: 07/25/2006
Notification Time: 14:52 [ET]
Event Date: 07/21/2006
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/25/2006 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
GREG MORELL (NMSS) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IDENTIFIED IN ARC FURNACE ASH
The State provided the following information via email:
"On Friday, July 21, 2006, a truck containing electric arc furnace (EAF) dust departed the LeTourneau, Inc. facility at 2400 South McArthur Blvd., Longview, TX. The dust is commonly referred to as K061 waste and is a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) hazardous waste that is a normal byproduct of steel production. A gate monitor alarmed at the Horsehead Resource Development Company, Inc. (Horsehead) in Rockwood, TN, indicating the possible presence of gamma emitting radioactive elements contained in the truck. An alarm of this type is typically associated with the melting of a volatile radioactive source.
"The truck was returned over the weekend of July 22 - 23, 2006 to the LeTourneau facility in Longview, TX, where it was isolated. On Monday July 24, 2006 LeTourneau obtained the services of a consultant to identify the material in the truck. Surveys of the truck by LeTourneau, on the morning of July 25, 2006, indicated the presence of Cesium-137 in the K061 waste. Cs-137 is a byproduct material that is commonly used in sources and devices that are distributed under both general and specific licenses for various industrial applications.
"After determining that the K061 in the truck was contaminated with Cs-137 a full survey of the furnace facility was performed and samples collected to quantify the activity of Cs-137. Radiation survey of the facility determined that exposure level in the facility ranged from 50 µR/hr to 3000 µR/hr. Highest readings were in the ash hopper and silo. LeTourneau does not believe that there were any significant doses to their employees or public due to the location of the highest reading. LeTourneau plans to have result for the samples collected before the end of the week.
"LeTourneau notified the State immediately after determining that the K061 was contaminated with Cs-137."
The state is investigating this incident.
Texas Incident No.: I-8353 |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 42729 |
Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: AKRON GENERAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 3
City: AKRON State: OH
County:
License #: 02120780000
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK LIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ |
Notification Date: 07/26/2006
Notification Time: 10:48 [ET]
Event Date: 07/10/2006
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2006 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
GREG MORELL (NMSS) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL OVERDOSE
The following information was provided by the state related to prostate brachytherapy which was performed on 7/10/2006 using I-125 seeds.
"Prostate seed implant plans are specified in kerma units (U) by default in our computer planning system. However, the ordering of seeds is specified in mCi [milliCuries]. In this instance the default seed strength was not changed to mCi and a plan was developed for [the patient] to receive 111 seeds of an activity of 0.394 U per seed when 0.394 mCi was desired. The order form was completed for 111 seeds of the expected (not planned) activity of 0.394 mCi per seed. The result was an implant with seeds of activity 27% higher than planned."
The overdose was noticed by the hospital on 7/12/2006. The physician, the patient, and the state of Ohio were notified on 7/13/2006. The State inspected the facility on 7/18/2006. |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 42731 |
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: LEIGHTON AND ASSOCIATES
Region: 4
City: SANTA PAULA State: CA
County:
License #: 3109-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ |
Notification Date: 07/26/2006
Notification Time: 23:50 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2006
Event Time: 14:05 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/27/2006 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
EDWIN HACKETT (NMSS) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"At approximately 2 P.M., the licensee called the Department to report that one of their moisture density gauges (CPN model MC3, serial # M39099115) had been run over by a large truck at approximately 12:20 P.M. earlier in the day. This happened when the gauge user had his back turned from the gauge and he was standing approximately 15-20 feet from the gauge. The gauge source rod (Cs-137) was in the shielded position at the time. The housing was severely damaged and the source rod handle was broken off near the weld joint where the source rod attaches to the source capsule. Both the 8 mCi Cs-137 and the 50 mCi Am-241:Be sources remained in their shielded positions as determined by subsequent surveys.
"The incident happened at a Cal Trans job in Santa Paula, CA on Highway 150 at the 28.12 mile marker. The Cal Trans supervisor immediately shut the job down and sent all of the workers home. The area where the gauge was located was secured and roped off until the sources were verified to still be in the gauge.
"The gauge and the broken gauge handle was transported back to the Santa Clarita storage location where a representative from RHB performed the survey to verify that the sources were in the gauge and in their shielded positions. The gauge will be transported to local CPN service representative , Maurer Technical Services in Laguna Hills, where they will do leak tests on the gauge." |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 42738 |
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM KONRAD
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY |
Notification Date: 07/29/2006
Notification Time: 19:19 [ET]
Event Date: 07/29/2006
Event Time: 15:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/29/2006 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION |
Person (Organization):
ANNE MARIE STONE (R3) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
A/R |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
0 |
Hot Shutdown |
Event Text
REACTOR SCRAM AND ECCS INJECTION DUE TO LOSS OF FEEDWATER
"At 15:50 EDT on 7/29/06, a Level 3 reactor scram occurred due to a loss of feedwater. The loss of feedwater was caused by a loss of Division 1 electrical power. All control rods fully inserted into the core. The lowest reactor vessel water level reached was 110 inches. HPCI and RCIC auto initiated on Level 2 and injected into the reactor pressure vessel. The Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generators auto initiated and supplied the Division 1 ESF buses. Level 3 and Level 2 isolations occurred as expected. Reactor water level is now being controlled in the normal water level band using Standby Feedwater. No SRVs lifted and RPV pressure is being controlled by the Turbine Pressure Regulator with the main condenser available as the heat sink.
"At the time of the scram, work was being performed on the 120kV mat which resulted in a loss of Bus 101.
"Group 13 (Drywell Sumps) isolated on Reactor Water Level 3. Group 10 (Reactor Water Cleanup Inboard), Group 11 (Reactor Water Cleanup Outboard), Group 12 (Torus Water Management System), Group 17 ( Reactor Recirc Pump Seals and Primary Containment Radiation Monitoring), and Group 18 (Primary Containment Pneumatic Supply) isolated on Reactor Water Level 2."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee stated that HPCI injected for 2 minutes and was then secured as Standby Feedwater was started. At the time of the notification, Bus 101 had been re-energized, and preparations were being made to restore normal power to the Division 1 buses and return the Emergency Diesel Generators to standby. The licensee is investigating the exact cause of the loss of power. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 42739 |
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRAD LEWIS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE |
Notification Date: 07/30/2006
Notification Time: 11:15 [ET]
Event Date: 07/30/2006
Event Time: 07:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/30/2006 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS |
Person (Organization):
ANNE MARIE STONE (R3) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
M/R |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
0 |
Hot Standby |
Event Text
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWN FOR HIGH CONTAINMENT AIR TEMPERATURE
"On July 30, 2006, at 0730, a plant shutdown was initiated in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) Action 3.6.5.B.1. This action requires that the unit be placed in Mode 3 within six hours if containment air temperature is not restored to within limits during the previous eight hours.
"On July 29, 2006, at 2026 TS Action 3.6.5.A was entered due to containment lower compartment average air temperature exceeding the TS Limiting Condition for Operation 3.6.5.B limit of 120 degrees Fahrenheit. Efforts to reduce the containment temperature during the eight hour completion time of Action 3.6.5.A were unsuccessful.
"In accordance with normal plant operating procedures, the unit shutdown was completed by initiating a manual reactor trip from 16.5% Reactor Power following a controlled plant shutdown on July 20, 2006, at 1014. All safety systems and plant equipment used in the shutdown functioned as designed."
All rods inserted fully without incident. No PORV/safety valves lifted. Decay heat is being removed with AFW. Unit 2 containment air temperature is 117 degrees Fahrenheit.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 42740 |
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: CHET DEMARAIS
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL |
Notification Date: 07/31/2006
Notification Time: 00:11 [ET]
Event Date: 07/30/2006
Event Time: 17:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/31/2006 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION |
Person (Organization):
ANNE MARIE STONE (R3) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION DUE TO 'B' SPENT FUEL RAD MONITOR FAILURE
"At 1730 on 7/30/06 the 'B' Spent Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor spiked high, which resulted in the closure of the DW CAM (Continuous Air Monitor) and the Oxygen analyzer primary containment isolation valves. The spikes (2) of approximately 50 mR/hour occurred during this event. Only 1 automatic isolation occurred. The Spent Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor High Rad signal also resulted in a Reactor Bldg Isolation (Secondary Containment), start of 'A' Standby Gas Treatment, and transfer of the Control Room Ventilation to the High Rad Mode. The 'A' Spent Fuel Pool Monitor remained constant at its background radiation level. No activities were in progress on the Refuel Floor at the time of the trips. Rad Protection Tech surveyed the area with no abnormal readings noted. The 'B' Spent Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor was declared inoperable. All automatic isolation valves have been reset, Rx Bldg Ventilation, Control Room Ventilation have been reset and SBGT (Standby Gas Treatment) has been secured. Normal trip setpoint is 50 mR/ hour."
The licensee has taken the actions of LCO 3.2.E
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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