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Event Notification Report for July 28, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
07/27/2006 - 07/28/2006

** EVENT NUMBERS **


42711 42726 42727 42732 42733 42734 42737

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 42711
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANDREW OHRABLO
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 07/17/2006
Notification Time: 21:38 [ET]
Event Date: 07/17/2006
Event Time: 15:47 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/27/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION FLOW BELOW LIMITS

"During review of instrumentation calibration, it was determined that a faulty flow instrument was used for determination of CREFS (Control Room Emergency Filtration System) flow. Due to the error of the flow instrumentation previous test results were deemed to be high outside acceptance criteria. These tests were performed in October of 2005. The CREFS was declared inoperable and preparation was made to rerun the surveillance. At 1900 the surveillance was completed. The results of the surveillance determined that CREFS flow was below the allowable limit. The minimum flow for CREFS is a requirement for post DBA dose calculation for Control Room personnel. With minimum flow not maintained, the Control Room post accident dose calculations may be violated.

"CREFS remains inoperable pending adjustments of ventilation dampers and successful performance of surveillance testing.

"Resident inspector has been notified."

The licensee has entered Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, Condition A, which is a 7 day LCO.

* * * UPDATE AT 1725 EDT ON 7/27/06 FROM DAVID VAN DER KAMP TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:

"This notification is being made to retract Event Notification #42711 which reported a loss of safety function due to the unplanned inoperability of the Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS). CREFS was declared inoperable due to flow below the acceptance criteria required per surveillance testing. Upon further evaluation, CNS has determined that CREFS satisfies the Technical Specifications (TS) surveillance requirements and that the safety function was not lost.

"The surveillance procedure acceptance criteria for CREFS minimum flow is not required by the TS and is not a direct indicator of system operability. The procedure has been revised to remove the minimum flow acceptance criteria. It has been determined that CREFS, at the flow conditions documented on July 17, 2006 and during a past surveillance in 2005, satisfied TS and USAR requirements and was capable of performing its safety function."

The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Farnholtz).

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General Information or Other Event Number: 42726
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TEXAS GAMMA RAY
Region: 4
City:  State: TX
County:
License #: L05561
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOB FREE
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 07/25/2006
Notification Time: 14:23 [ET]
Event Date: 05/01/2006
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/25/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)

Event Text

TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - BADGE EXPOSURE

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"Dosimetry supplier reported 12 rem exposure. Licensee determined that employee left badge in truck, in radiation field at several locations [various job sites] during the monitoring period."

TX Incident No. I-8348

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General Information or Other Event Number: 42727
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 4
City:  State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RUBEN CORTEZ
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 07/25/2006
Notification Time: 14:52 [ET]
Event Date: 07/21/2006
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/25/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IDENTIFIED IN ARC FURNACE ASH

The State provided the following information via email:

"On Friday, July 21, 2006, a truck containing electric arc furnace (EAF) dust departed the LeTourneau, Inc facility at 2400 South McArthur Blvd., Longview, TX. The dust is commonly referred to as K061 waste and is a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) hazardous waste that is a normal byproduct of steel production. A gate monitor alarmed at the Horsehead Resource Development Company, Inc. (Horsehead) in Rockwood, TN, indicating the possible presence of gamma emitting radioactive elements contained in the truck. An alarm of this type is typically associated with the melting of a volatile radioactive source.

"The truck was returned over the weekend of July 22 - 23, 2006 to the LeTourneau facility in Longview, TX, where it was isolated. On Monday July 24, 2006 LeTourneau obtained the services of a consultant to identify the material in the truck. Surveys of the truck by LeTourneau, on the morning of July 25, 2006, indicated the presence of Cesium-137 in the K061 waste. Cs-137 is a byproduct material that is commonly used in sources and devices that are distributed under both general and specific licenses for various industrial applications.

"After determining that the K061 in the truck was contaminated with Cs-137 a full survey of the furnace facility was performed and samples collected to quantify the activity of Cs-137. Radiation survey of the facility determined that exposure level in the facility ranged from 50 R/hr to 3000 R/hr. Highest readings were in the ash hopper and silo. LeTourneau does not believe that there were any significant doses to their employees or public; do to the location of the highest reading. LeTourneau plans to have result for the samples collected before the end of the week.

"LeTourneau notified the State immediately after determining that the K061 was contaminated with Cs-137."

The state is investigating this incident.

Texas Incident No.: I-8353

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42732
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVID OAKES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 07/27/2006
Notification Time: 03:07 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2006
Event Time: 19:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 07/27/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text


LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4 DEEMED TO BE NONCONSERVATIVE

"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.

"Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.4 requires only one of two atmospheric dump valves (ADV) per steam generator (SG) to be operable. Palo Verde Unit 3 currently has one ADV inoperable on the #2 SG. All other ADVs in Unit 3 (and all ADVs in Units 1 and 2) are OPERABLE. On July 26, 2006 at approximately 19:00 MST, Palo Verde Engineering personnel determined that this LCO is nonconservative since it does not satisfy the single failure criterion for the safety analyses for the accidents that would render one SG inoperable, specifically steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) with loss of offsite power (LOOP) which utilizes both ADVs on the unaffected SG. In case of one SG inoperable due to the event, and single failure of one ADV fail to open, the plant cannot be brought to safe shutdown condition during those accidents and may result in exceeding the acceptance criteria. This LCO should have required two ADVs per SG to be operable in order to satisfy safety analysis assumptions.

"An administrative control in accordance with NUREG-1432, Standard Technical Specifications will be put in place for immediate compensatory action. NUREG-1432 LCO 3.7.4 Condition A, one required ADV line inoperable requires restoration of the ADV line to OPERABLE status within 7 days. Reperformance of the safety analyses is expected to be the long term solution.

"The event did not result in any challenges to the fission product barrier or result in any releases of radioactive materials. There were no adverse safety consequences or implications as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42733
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID DUNCAN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 07/27/2006
Notification Time: 11:27 [ET]
Event Date: 07/27/2006
Event Time: 08:12 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/27/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

FOR CAUSE FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST POSITIVE

"On July 27, 2006 a licensee [DELETED] supervisor tested positive for alcohol on a for-cause fitness for duty test. The individual's unescorted access was suspended [pending review by the Medical Review Officer and the Employee Assistance Program supervisor]. This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR26.73(a)(2)(ii). A work investigation is in progress."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42734
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: RAY BUZARD
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 07/27/2006
Notification Time: 14:04 [ET]
Event Date: 06/05/2006
Event Time: 18:44 [MST]
Last Update Date: 07/27/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

INVALID EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR START

'The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.

"This report is being made under 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A).

"On June 5, 2006, at approximately 1844 Mountain Standard Time (MST), Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 experienced an invalid 'A' train emergency diesel generator (EDG) start in the emergency mode. The EDG had been stopped at 1835 MST following completion of troubleshooting steps related to the balance of plant engineered safety features actuation system (BOP-ESFAS) sequencer. The start occurred as additional troubleshooting steps progressed. The related 4160 vac class 1E bus, PBA-S03, remained energized by off-site power during the event. The EDG started successfully and remained unloaded until it was stopped at 2014 MST. No other engineered safety feature (ESF) equipment in the 'A' train actuated.

"(a) The specific train(s) and svstem(s) that were actuated:
Unit 1 'A' train EDG started in the emergency mode.

"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial:
Only EDG 'A' started as a single component and remained unloaded until it was stopped. No other ESF equipment actuated or was required. Essential spray pond pump 'A' was already running to provide EDG 'A' cooling water, from the previous EDG run. Bus PBA-S03 remained energized by off-site power throughout the duration of the event.

(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully:
EDG 'A' started successfully and reached required speed, frequency, and voltage. Loading onto bus PBA-S03 was not required. Operations noted the EDG started with no anomalies.

"The exact cause of the invalid start was not known at the time of this report.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42737
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JEFF WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 07/27/2006
Notification Time: 21:00 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2006
Event Time: 04:19 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/27/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

INVALID RPS BUS 'B' AND DIVISION 2 PCIS ACTUATIONS

"This telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report an invalid actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

"On June 4, 2006, at 0419 [CST], with Unit 1 in Mode 1 'Run' at approximately 100% power, the 1B Reactor Protection System (RPS) bus unexpectedly de-energized. As a result, an RPS Bus B half-scram and Division 2 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) isolations were received. All affected containment isolation valves closed as designed. RPS Bus B was transferred to its alternate feed, and restoration activities were begun.

"A walkdown found that the 1B RPS MG set output breaker had opened. Troubleshooting identified that the cause was a failure of the 1B RPS MG set voltage regulator. The voltage regulator was replaced and successfully tested, and the 1B RPS MG set was returned to service.

"Laboratory testing of the failed voltage regulator found that the stability potentiometer had failed, with excessive vibration identified as the apparent cause. Although the vibration levels at the MG set are considered to be normal, the voltage regulator is mounted in a control cabinet that sits directly on the generator end of the MG set. The normal vertical vibration on the 1B MG set was measured at greater than 2g, which could be sufficient over time to degrade the voltage regulator potentiometers. A design change has been initiated for both Units to isolate the voltage regulators from the RPS MG set vibrations.

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an invalid actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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