The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is in the process of rescinding or revising guidance and policies posted on this webpage in accordance with Executive Order 14151 Ending Radical and Wasteful Government DEI Programs and Preferencing, and Executive Order 14168 Defending Women From Gender Ideology Extremism and Restoring Biological Truth to the Federal Government. In the interim, any previously issued diversity, equity, inclusion, or gender-related guidance on this webpage should be considered rescinded that is inconsistent with these Executive Orders.

Event Notification Report for June 23, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
06/22/2006 - 06/23/2006

** EVENT NUMBERS **


42653 42658 42660

To top of page
General Information or Other Event Number: 42653
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: FORT JAMES OPERATING COMPANY
Region: 4
City: CAMAS State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0228-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 06/19/2006
Notification Time: 15:18 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/2006
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/19/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
ELMO COLLINS (NMSS)
CANADA (CNSC)- Email ()
ILTAB ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TRITIUM SIGNS

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"The Radiation Safety Office of Fort James Operating Company notified the department on 23 May 2006 that one Generally licensed tritium exit sign was missing. The exit sign was noted missing on 5 May 2006 during a corporate inventory of all radioactive material possessed at the site. The sign's bracket was also missing. There was no evidence the sign was damaged while being removed. The Radiation Safety Officer interviewed numerous workers to try and locate the sign but was unable to determine what happened.

"Isotope and Activity involved: 11.5 Ci (425.5 MBq) H-3.

"Tritium Exit Sign, S/N M5099."

WA State Report No.WA-06-021

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 42658
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DENNIS GRIFFITH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 06/21/2006
Notification Time: 10:02 [ET]
Event Date: 06/19/2006
Event Time: 16:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/22/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
OMID TABATABAI (NRR)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

INITIAL PART 21 NOTIFICATION - PRIME MEASUREMENT PRODUCTS, MODELS 763 AND 763A GAGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS AND MODEL 764 DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS

"This report is made per 10CFR21.21 Notification of failure to comply or existence of a defect and its evaluation.

"Callaway Plant received a notification dated May 18, 2006, from PRIME Measurement Products (formerly ITT Barton) stating Barton Model 763 and 763A Gage Pressure Transmitters and Model 764 Differential Pressure Transmitters may have defective external lead-wire connectors, which could affect their performance during an accident. The notification provided by PRIME stated the affected transmitters were manufactured after May 1982 and shipped from the factory prior to April 1, 2006.

"The potential defect is characterized as follows: The transmitters' external lead wires enter the electronics enclosure through a hermetic seal called a connector assembly. The external lead wires are soldered to the glass sealed pins of the hermetic seal. Epoxy potting is used to structurally support the soldered wire connections and establish a seal to protect the solder connections from shorting, which could be caused by an electrically conductive accident environment. The defect is that the insulated portions of the wires in the connectors, manufactured after May 1982, may not be embedded deeply enough into the epoxy potting to provide an electrical connection that would not be affected in an accident environment.

"The notification also states that actual transmitter installation may preclude shorting of exposed conductors due to the existence of conduit, conduit seals, and special wire connectors which could protect the exposed wires at a defective connector from conductive moisture.

"Callaway Plant identified thirty applicable Barton transmitters and connector assemblies in warehouse stock. Inspections of these operational spare parts identified three connectors, which had exposed conductors external to their seal. One connector had this defect on one lead wire and two connectors had this defect on both lead wires.

"Callaway has also identified that thirty-nine potentially affected transmitters are installed in the plant. An inspection plan has been developed to perform the required inspections, based on safety significance, ALARA considerations, and potential accident environmental conditions. Additional reporting requirements associated with the installed components will be evaluated under 10CFR50.72 as required.

"On 06/19/06, Callaway Plant personnel completed evaluations and determined the defective connections constitute a defect per 10CFR21 require initial NRC notification within two days.

"The NRC resident inspectors have been notified of this issue."

* * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (D. GRIFFITH) TO M. RIPLEY 1515 EDT 06/22/06 * * *

"This report is a revision to report EN # 42658 reported on 06/21/2006.

Added statement: "The suppliers of the identified transmitters were Prime Measurement Products and Westinghouse Electric Corporation."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified NRR (O. Tabatabai), R4 DO (D. Graves)

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 42660
Facility: SEABROOK
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DENNIS BEMIS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 06/22/2006
Notification Time: 14:28 [ET]
Event Date: 06/22/2006
Event Time: 06:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/22/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

24 HOUR LICENSE CONDITION REPORT OF OPERATION IN A CONDITION PROHIBITED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

"At 0620 today, FPL Energy Seabrook discovered that the plant was in it condition prohibited by the technical specifications. At approximately 1900 yesterday, June 21, one of the two train-B vital battery chargers was removed from service, rendering the charger inoperable. This condition went unrecognized until 0620 this morning (June 22). Seabrook Station Technical Specification 3.8.2.1 permits two hours to restore a battery Changer to operable status, otherwise, the plant must shutdown to hot standby within the next 6 hours and cold shutdown within the following 30 hours. In this event, the train-B full-capacity battery charger was inoperable for approximately 12.5 hours, exceeding the time permitted by the technical specifications. During the period the charger was inoperable, the redundant battery charger in train B and both train-A battery chargers remained in service and operable. This notification is being made as a 24-hour report in accordance with license condition 2.G of the Seabrook Station operating license."

Investigation into the circumstances of the event are ongoing. The normal battery charger had been removed from service for normal maintenance and testing. A backup battery charger was placed on the battery which permitted the licensee to continue normal plant operations without entering the two hour TS LCO for 3.8.2.1. During the maintenance and testing of the primary battery charger, the backup battery charger was also rendered inoperable resulting in no battery charger for the affected battery bank. The licensee stated that at 0726 EDT on 6/22/06, the battery charger was restored to service and the technical specification exited.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021