| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
05/22/2006 - 05/23/2006 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 42454 | Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN DAMPF
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 03/30/2006
Notification Time: 21:40 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2006
Event Time: 16:50 [CST]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INADEQUATE OPERATOR RESPONSE TIME FOR COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM REALIGNMENT DURING A LARGE BREAK LOCA
"At 1650 on March 30, 2006, a concern was identified where the operators in the training simulator could not complete realignment of the component cooling water (CCW) flow to the residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger in a timely manner under certain accident scenarios. This could result in exceeding the maximum design temperature of the CCW system. In addition, assumptions made in the containment pressure and temperature analysis following a large break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) are non-conservative with respect to when CCW flow to the RHR heat exchangers is manually established in accordance with emergency operating procedures.
"Callaway plant FSAR indicates CCW system flow is manually aligned to the RHR heat exchangers prior to the recirculation phase of emergency core cooling system (ECCS). If the automatic transfer of the RHR pumps to cold leg recirculation, which happens at the Lo-Lo-1 level of the refueling water storage tank (RWST), occurs before CCW flow has been manually aligned to the RHR heat exchanger, containment sump water at temperatures up to 270F can be circulated through the RHR heat exchanger without CCW flow on the other side of the heat exchanger. The CCW side of the heat exchanger would contain stagnant water. This water can heat up quickly with no established flow and exceed the design rated temperature of the system.
"Recent simulator scenarios of large break LOCAs have shown that the CCW alignment is not reached before the Lo-Lo-1 RWST alarm level is reached. The CCW alignment is completed as part of procedure ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation. A review of two large break LOCA scenarios completed on 3-20-06 show that it takes between 1:00 and 1:30 minutes to initiate the step to align CCW to the RHR heat exchangers and takes between 3:00 and 4:30 minutes to complete the alignment.
"In addition to CCW system temperature concerns, an assumption that CCW flow is established to the RHR heat exchanger prior to reaching the Lo-Lo-1 level in the RWST is made in the containment temperature and pressure response analyses. As a result, a failure to establish CCW flow to the RHR switchover would result in an adverse impact on the inputs used in the Licensing Bases Containment Analysis. However, preliminary sensitivity runs using containment analyses codes indicate that post-peak temperature and pressure are not significantly affected by this issue.
"Actions taken:
"1650 Declared both trains of CCW inoperable. Declared both trains of ECCS inoperable and entered Technical Specification 3.0.3
"1710 Both trains of CCW aligned with flow through the RHR heat exchangers
"1711 Exited Technical Specification 3.0.3 "
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY GREG BRADLEY TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1747 EDT ON 05/22/06 * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous notification made on 3/30/06 (EN# 42454). That report was made per 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation. An engineering evaluation has determined the RHR and CCW systems would have fulfilled their safety functions had they been necessary to respond to an event. Since the safety functions would have been performed there are no applicable reporting criteria under 50.72 or 50.73 and Event Notification 42454 is retracted.
"The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified."
Notified R4DO (Shaffer). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42583 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: EBERHART/UNITED CONSULTANTS, INC.
Region: 4
City: PLACENTIA State: CA
County:
License #: CA 3564-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONELLE KRAJEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 05/17/2006
Notification Time: 20:28 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2006
Event Time: 08:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
| Event Text CALIFORNIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE RUN OVER
Eberhart/United Consultants, Inc. located in Placentia, CA reported to the State of California at 1000 PDT on 05/17/06 that one of their CPN MC3 (serial number M390304918) moisture density gauge was run over at a work site; Fontana Speedway, 9300 Cherry Avenue, CA; at 0830 PDT. When the gauge was run over the gauge was in backscatter mode of operation. The casing of the gauge was destroyed. The area was cordoned off and the RSO for Eberhart/United Consultants, Inc. was contacted. CPN Maurer Technical Services came out to the site and took possession of the gauge and took it back to their facility located in Laguna Hills. Wipe test of the sources are clean and the sources will be leak tested. Maurer Technical Services reported that the shielding for the Cesium-137 source had been compromised. State of California representative stated the highest radiation reading from the gauge at one foot was 18 milliRem per hour. The gauge contains a 10 milliCurie Cesium-137 source and a 50 millicurie Am-241/Be source. The RSO will be giving retraining to all staff to cover the emergency procedures for this type of incident. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42584 | Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: YEH AND ASSOCIATES INC.
Region: 4
City: DENVER State: CO
County:
License #: 984-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP EGIBI
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA | Notification Date: 05/18/2006
Notification Time: 08:57 [ET]
Event Date: 05/18/2006
Event Time: 02:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
| Event Text COLORADO AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER GAGE
The licensee left a paving job site and while driving to another job site noticed that the truck's tailgate was down. The driver stopped and noticed that the gauge was missing and the licensee contacted the State Colorado Department of Health and Environment who responded to incident site. It appears that the gauge was not secured in its casing and most likely was run over on the highway as it fell from the truck bed. Pieces of the gauge (handle and push rod) were found in the proximity of the intersection of Interstate 25 with Academy Boulevard, Colorado Springs, Colorado. The moisture density gauge was a Troxler Model 3401 serial number 30-1031 containing two sources: 8 millicuries of Cs-137 and 40 millicuries of Am/Be. The sources have not yet been found. The State and Highway Patrol are at the incident area and will continue to investigate this occurrence.
At 1155 on 05/18/06, Tim Bonzer from the Colorado Department of Health reported that both sources had been recovered and packed in a sand filled cooler and will be transported to the state office where the sources will be leak checked prior to shipping to Troxler.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42586 | Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: ASC GEOSCIENCES, INC
Region: 1
City: FT MEYERS State: FL
County:
License #: 1690-2
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE FURNACE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 05/18/2006
Notification Time: 15:36 [ET]
Event Date: 05/18/2006
Event Time: 15:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
| Event Text FLORIDA AGREEMENT STATE - DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE
"Truck belonging to licensee flipped over on interstate, driver is unhurt. Gauge container crushed, gauge handle broken. Licensee performed leak test at scene and transported gauge back to licensed storage facility. Further action is referred to [Florida] Radioactive Materials."
Gauge was a Troxler model number - 3430, serial number 26308. Isotopes - Cs-137, 8 millicuries and Am-241/Be, 40 millicuries. Accident occurred on Interstate 75 at North Bonita Beach Road, Lee County, Florida.
Florida Incident Number: FL06-072 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42594 | Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE WHEELER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 05/22/2006
Notification Time: 10:13 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2006
Event Time: 07:01 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MARK SHAFFER (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM AS A MITIGATING ACTION DUE TO LOWERING SERVICE AIR PRESSURE
"CNS was operating at 100% power at 06:51 CDT on May 22, 2006 when Plant Service Air pressure began lowering due to an unknown cause. Additional Service Air Compressors could not be started in time to recover Service Air pressure. A rapid power reduction was performed and at 07:01 the reactor was manually scrammed as a mitigating action due to lowering Plant Service Air pressure. All control rods fully inserted and a Group 2 Isolation occurred due to low Reactor Vessel level as expected following the manual scram. Minimum Reactor level was -20 inches Wide Range. The reactor is currently shutdown and stable with level maintained at 35 inches in the green band on the Narrow Range Indicators with the Feedwater System. Reactor pressure following the scram was stabilized at approximately 900 psig using the Main Condenser Bypass Valves and is slowly lowering.
"This report is made in accordance with 10CFR50.72 as a 4 Hour Report due to a valid RPS actuation and as an 8 Hour Report due to a valid Group 2 Isolation actuation. All automatic actions functioned as expected. The plant is being maintained in Hot Shutdown while the cause of the Plant Service Air Pressure lowering is being investigated. The NRC Senior Resident inspector has been informed of the event."
The scram was characterized as uncomplicated. The licensee is not in any significant tech spec LCO and all systems functioned as required. It was noted that there are 3 service air compressors available and only one of the compressors was running at the time of the event. The licensee does not yet know the cause of the service air pressure loss or why the backup compressors did not autostart. Instrument air pressure was maintained during the event. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42595 | Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: PATRICK RYAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 05/22/2006
Notification Time: 13:11 [ET]
Event Date: 03/26/2006
Event Time: 03:47 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
BRUCE BURGESS EMAIL (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 80 | Power Operation | 80 | Power Operation | Event Text 60 DAY NOTIFICATION - INVALID ACTUATION OF HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY PUMP
"The following 60-day report is being made under 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of the High Pressure Cory Spray pump that occurred at 0347 hours on March 26, 2006. As allowed by 10CFR50.73(a)(1) this notification is being made via telephone. NUREG-1022, Revision 2 identifies the information that needs to be reported as follows:
"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated.
"On March 26, 2006 at 0347, the Division 4 Nuclear System Protection System (NSPS) power was lost due to a loss of the Division 4 NSPS inverter. The High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) pump started automatically as a result of this failure. This response is identified in the Operations bus outage procedure as a potential impact of the loss of Division 4 NSPS and was considered expected. Immediate actions were taken to secure HPCS and declare it inoperable.
"An Apparent Cause Evaluation was performed. The apparent cause of the loss of Division 4 NSPS Inverter was determined to be the age related failure of the Z111 voltage regulator on the 12 Static Switch logic card.
"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.
"The automatic start of High Pressure Core Spray was partial since the 1E22-F004 HPCS Injection Valve does not receive an open permissive when the Division 4 NSPS Inverter is deenergized.
"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.
"The start of High Pressure Core Spray pump was successful and functioned properly in the minimum recirculation flow mode."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42596 | Rep Org: NDT REPAIR SERVICE, INC.
Licensee: NDT REPAIR SERVICE, INC.
Region: 4
City: MORGAN CITY State: LA
County:
License #: LA-6631-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRIAN BELLARD, SR
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 05/22/2006
Notification Time: 16:32 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2006
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
MARK SHAFFER (R4)
MEL GRAY (R1)
MIKE MARKLEY EMAIL (NMSS)
| Event Text PART 21 NOTIFICATION - NDT EQUIPMENT FAILURE
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"Per the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21 this letter has been written to inform you of a reportable condition in regards to a Crankout Assembly Failure Reported by Team Industrial Services on April 18, 2006, Event# 42508, and on May 08, 2006, Event# 42561.
"On May 8, 2006, NDT Repair Service was notified, by Team Industrial Services, of an equipment failure during radiographic operations using one of our Control Assemblies (PN# RT1117 25ft Control Assembly For Use with AEA-QSA 6608 Exposure Device). It was noted to us that the Control Assembly could be connected to the exposure device without connecting the drive cable to the source assembly. The Exposure Device could then be put into the operation mode and the source could then be cranked out therefore causing a misconnect; which violates the ANSI N432-1981, Section 6.1.4, as required by 10 CFR Part 34.
"NDT Repair Service immediately halted distribution of Control Assemblies for the AEA-QSA 6608 Exposure Device pending investigation of the probable cause of the failure. After further investigating into the cause of the failure it was found, that, the basic component that caused the failure was the Control Adapter, which is part of the Control Assembly that connects to the Exposure Device.
"Through further internal investigation, NDT Repair Service was able to limit the potential problem to 1 lot of 25 Control Adapters that we took delivery of on November 13, 2003 and it was noted that 9 of the 25 adapters were out of tolerance and needed rework. The Root Cause of the defect in the control adapter was found to be that back stops for the drive cables were drilled too deep allowing the adapter to hook up to the exposure device without connecting to the source assembly, therefore allowing the source to be cranked out and causing a misconnect." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42597 | Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: KEN GOODALL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 05/22/2006
Notification Time: 22:05 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2006
Event Time: 22:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
74.11(a) - LOST/STOLEN SNM
| Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1)
THOMAS BLOUNT (IRD)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
BENJAMIN SANDLER (TAS)
BAUMGARTNER (EPA)
BIASCO (DHS)
CASTO (FEMA)
BAILEY (DOE)
GILES (USDA)
PYLES (HHS)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL (.003 GRAMS) LOST
During ongoing activities to remove non-fuel material from the Pilgrim Spent Fuel Pool it has been identified that an irradiated neutron detector containing a very small quantity (less than 0.003 grams) of special nuclear material is not in its expected location. Per the inventory sheets the neutron detector should have been enclosed in a "dry tube" in the Spent Fuel Pool. Processing of the "dry tube" for shipment identified that the neutron detector is not in its expected location.
This condition is being conservatively reported under 10CFR74.11. There is no evidence of theft or diversion. Investigation is continuing.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspec | |