Event Notification Report for May 17, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/16/2006 - 05/17/2006
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 42585
Facility: FRAMATOME ANP RICHLAND
Region: 2 State: WA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
FABRICATION & SCRAP RECOVERY
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
NRC Notified By: ROBERT LINK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: WA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
FABRICATION & SCRAP RECOVERY
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
NRC Notified By: ROBERT LINK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/18/2006
Notification Time: 15:26 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2006
Event Time: 12:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2006
Notification Time: 15:26 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2006
Event Time: 12:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
POSTULATED CRITICALITY DUE TO BACKFLOW TO AN UNFAVORABLE GEOMETRY VESSEL
"During a regularly scheduled review of the ISA for a process system in the ELO building, the ISA team postulated where fissile solution could backflow into an unfavorable geometry vessel (55-gallon drum). This system configuration did not have sufficient IROFS designated to ensure that the performance criteria of 10 CFR 70.61 were met. The process system was immediately shut down, the potential for back flow to the unfavorable geometry vessel was removed, and the potential for similar accident sequences in this and related process systems was evaluated. This evaluation found one additional system configuration in the same process system where fissile solution could backflow into an unfavorable geometry vessel. The details of this condition are still undergoing internal investigation. This configuration does not have sufficient IROFS designated to ensure that the performance criteria of 10 CFR 70.61 are met. The process equipment associated with this scenario is also shut down and will remain shut down pending establishment of sufficient IROFS to meet the performance criteria of 10 CFR 70.61
"The material in the identified system sources that is normally in the tanks that could back flow to the unfavorable geometry vessel is uranyl nitrate solution with a range of [deleted] g U/liter. However on certain rare occasions, there is the potential for uranyl nitrate solution with up to [deleted] U/liter to be present in these tanks. This is the highest concentration observed by veteran system operators.
"The 95/95 upper limit of keff for a single 55 gallon drum containing uranyl nitrate solution with [deleted] U/liter, sitting on a 30 cm thick concrete slab and with [deleted] cm of water tight fitted water reflector is approximately [deleted]. At [deleted] U/liter the 95/95 upper limit of keff is approximately [deleted]. The allowed 95/95 upper limit on keff for normal conditions is [deleted] and [deleted] for abnormal conditions.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
"Safety significance is low. The potential of accidental nuclear criticality in the as found condition remained unlikely.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED:
"The potential criticality pathway involves having more than [deleted] U/liter uranyl nitrate solution in the system tanks, an improper valve line up and then pumping the solution back through an air powered double diaphragm pump into the 55-gallon drum.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (Mass, Moderation, Geometry Concentration etc.):
"The controlled parameter on the 55 gallon drum of feed material was concentration. The maximum allowed concentration is [deleted] U/1 UNH solution.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (Include process limit and % worst case critical mass:
"The facility is limited by NRC license to an enrichment of [deleted] wt.% U-235. The maximum amount of material that could potentially back flow into the 55-gallon drum is approximately [deleted] liters and the maximum expected concentration would be [deleted] U
"The normally expected concentration is less than [deleted] U/liter. According to ARH-600 page III.B6-3, the minimum critical spherical mass of UN solution is in excess of [deleted] kg.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"The back flow potential was eliminated and the system tagged out of service pending a complete re-analysis of the process system and the establishment of sufficient IROFS to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61.
"Related process systems that might have a similar potential were also shut down pending completion of an evaluation to ensure that the same potential does not exist in these areas."
"During a regularly scheduled review of the ISA for a process system in the ELO building, the ISA team postulated where fissile solution could backflow into an unfavorable geometry vessel (55-gallon drum). This system configuration did not have sufficient IROFS designated to ensure that the performance criteria of 10 CFR 70.61 were met. The process system was immediately shut down, the potential for back flow to the unfavorable geometry vessel was removed, and the potential for similar accident sequences in this and related process systems was evaluated. This evaluation found one additional system configuration in the same process system where fissile solution could backflow into an unfavorable geometry vessel. The details of this condition are still undergoing internal investigation. This configuration does not have sufficient IROFS designated to ensure that the performance criteria of 10 CFR 70.61 are met. The process equipment associated with this scenario is also shut down and will remain shut down pending establishment of sufficient IROFS to meet the performance criteria of 10 CFR 70.61
"The material in the identified system sources that is normally in the tanks that could back flow to the unfavorable geometry vessel is uranyl nitrate solution with a range of [deleted] g U/liter. However on certain rare occasions, there is the potential for uranyl nitrate solution with up to [deleted] U/liter to be present in these tanks. This is the highest concentration observed by veteran system operators.
"The 95/95 upper limit of keff for a single 55 gallon drum containing uranyl nitrate solution with [deleted] U/liter, sitting on a 30 cm thick concrete slab and with [deleted] cm of water tight fitted water reflector is approximately [deleted]. At [deleted] U/liter the 95/95 upper limit of keff is approximately [deleted]. The allowed 95/95 upper limit on keff for normal conditions is [deleted] and [deleted] for abnormal conditions.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
"Safety significance is low. The potential of accidental nuclear criticality in the as found condition remained unlikely.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED:
"The potential criticality pathway involves having more than [deleted] U/liter uranyl nitrate solution in the system tanks, an improper valve line up and then pumping the solution back through an air powered double diaphragm pump into the 55-gallon drum.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (Mass, Moderation, Geometry Concentration etc.):
"The controlled parameter on the 55 gallon drum of feed material was concentration. The maximum allowed concentration is [deleted] U/1 UNH solution.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (Include process limit and % worst case critical mass:
"The facility is limited by NRC license to an enrichment of [deleted] wt.% U-235. The maximum amount of material that could potentially back flow into the 55-gallon drum is approximately [deleted] liters and the maximum expected concentration would be [deleted] U
"The normally expected concentration is less than [deleted] U/liter. According to ARH-600 page III.B6-3, the minimum critical spherical mass of UN solution is in excess of [deleted] kg.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"The back flow potential was eliminated and the system tagged out of service pending a complete re-analysis of the process system and the establishment of sufficient IROFS to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61.
"Related process systems that might have a similar potential were also shut down pending completion of an evaluation to ensure that the same potential does not exist in these areas."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42582
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE KOCHERT
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE KOCHERT
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/17/2006
Notification Time: 16:45 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2006
Event Time: 15:03 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2006
Notification Time: 16:45 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2006
Event Time: 15:03 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 90 | Power Operation | 70 | Power Operation |
NEWS RELEASE AND NOTIFICATION TO OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES - PLANNED PLANT SHUTDOWN
"This 4-hour phone call is being made to the NRC per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi), news release or notification to other government agencies. This call is to inform the NRC that a Notification was made to the Missouri Public Service Commission (MPSC) at 1503 on 5/17/2006, and a press release reporting that the Callaway Plant is shutting down on May 17, 2006, for an outage expected to last longer than 72 hours. The below information was presented to the MPSC.
"The following is a report to the Missouri Public Service Commission (MPSC), to notify the MPSC of a forced outage at the Callaway Nuclear Plant. This notification is reportable under 4CSR240-3.1903(3)(B) because the outage is expected to last longer than 72 hours.
"At 1130, May 17, 2006, the Callaway Plant started shutting down to determine the cause of a valve problem in the non-nuclear part of the plant that is preventing the plant from operating at full power.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
"This 4-hour phone call is being made to the NRC per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi), news release or notification to other government agencies. This call is to inform the NRC that a Notification was made to the Missouri Public Service Commission (MPSC) at 1503 on 5/17/2006, and a press release reporting that the Callaway Plant is shutting down on May 17, 2006, for an outage expected to last longer than 72 hours. The below information was presented to the MPSC.
"The following is a report to the Missouri Public Service Commission (MPSC), to notify the MPSC of a forced outage at the Callaway Nuclear Plant. This notification is reportable under 4CSR240-3.1903(3)(B) because the outage is expected to last longer than 72 hours.
"At 1130, May 17, 2006, the Callaway Plant started shutting down to determine the cause of a valve problem in the non-nuclear part of the plant that is preventing the plant from operating at full power.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42583
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: EBERHART/UNITED CONSULTANTS, INC.
Region: 4
City: PLACENTIA State: CA
County:
License #: CA 3564-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONELLE KRAJEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: EBERHART/UNITED CONSULTANTS, INC.
Region: 4
City: PLACENTIA State: CA
County:
License #: CA 3564-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONELLE KRAJEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/17/2006
Notification Time: 20:28 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2006
Event Time: 08:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2006
Notification Time: 20:28 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2006
Event Time: 08:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
CALIFORNIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE RUN OVER
Eberhart/United Consultants, Inc. located in Placentia, CA reported to the State of California at 1000 PDT on 05/17/06 that one of their CPN MC3 (serial number M390304918) moisture density gauge was run over at a work site; Fontana Speedway, 9300 Cherry Avenue, CA; at 0830 PDT. When the gauge was run over the gauge was in backscatter mode of operation. The casing of the gauge was destroyed. The area was cordoned off and the RSO for Eberhart/United Consultants, Inc. was contacted. CPN Maurer Technical Services came out to the site and took possession of the gauge and took it back to their facility located in Laguna Hills. Wipe test of the sources are clean and the sources will be leak tested. Maurer Technical Services reported that the shielding for the Cesium-137 source had been compromised. State of California representative stated the highest radiation reading from the gauge at one foot was 18 milliRem per hour. The gauge contains a 10 milliCurie Cesium-137 source and a 50 millicurie Am-241/Be source. The RSO will be giving retraining to all staff to cover the emergency procedures for this type of incident.
Eberhart/United Consultants, Inc. located in Placentia, CA reported to the State of California at 1000 PDT on 05/17/06 that one of their CPN MC3 (serial number M390304918) moisture density gauge was run over at a work site; Fontana Speedway, 9300 Cherry Avenue, CA; at 0830 PDT. When the gauge was run over the gauge was in backscatter mode of operation. The casing of the gauge was destroyed. The area was cordoned off and the RSO for Eberhart/United Consultants, Inc. was contacted. CPN Maurer Technical Services came out to the site and took possession of the gauge and took it back to their facility located in Laguna Hills. Wipe test of the sources are clean and the sources will be leak tested. Maurer Technical Services reported that the shielding for the Cesium-137 source had been compromised. State of California representative stated the highest radiation reading from the gauge at one foot was 18 milliRem per hour. The gauge contains a 10 milliCurie Cesium-137 source and a 50 millicurie Am-241/Be source. The RSO will be giving retraining to all staff to cover the emergency procedures for this type of incident.