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Event Notification Report for May 9, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
05/08/2006 - 05/09/2006

** EVENT NUMBERS **


42455 42560 42561

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 42455
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: WALT COOMBS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 03/31/2006
Notification Time: 02:26 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2006
Event Time: 21:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
SONIA BURGESS (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE LEAKAGE ABOVE ALLOWABLE LIMITS

"At 21:00 hours on 3/30/06, Unit Two feed water header check valves 2-0220-58A and 2-0220-62A LLRT [local leak rate test] results were both indeterminate, as a result both were greater than the allowable La containment leakage rate allowed by Tech Spec 5.5.12." La is defined as the maximum allowable leak rate at a specified pressure.

"This is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)."

The "indeterminate" leak rate was higher than the test equipment could read.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1635 EDT ON 5/8/06 FROM JIM STORTZ TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:

"ENS Retraction - Feed Water Header Check Valve Leakage > La Containment Leakage

"The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS report made on 3/31/2006 at 0226 EDT (Event # 42455). The initial report was made when it appeared the Unit 2 feed water header check valves 2-0220-58A and 2-0220-62A LLRT (local leak rate test) results were both indeterminate. As a result, both valves appeared to have had a leakage rate greater than the allowable La containment leakage rate allowed by Tech Spec 5.5.12, where La is defined as the maximum allowable primary containment leak rate at accident pressure. Quad Cities assigned all leakage experienced during this test to the primary containment isolation valves being tested and reported the situation as a condition that seriously degraded the nuclear power plant per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).

"Subsequently, Quad Cities Station performed testing on 4/2/06 utilizing a higher fill rate test methodology. The subsequent test was completed with satisfactory results.

"Based on this subsequent testing, ENS report (# 42455) is being retracted."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Pelke).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42560
Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL ZACCONE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/08/2006
Notification Time: 14:21 [ET]
Event Date: 05/08/2006
Event Time: 12:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
TONY McMURTRAY (NSIR)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

EARLY WARNING SIREN SYSTEM (EWSS) DECLARED INOPERABLE

"Intermittent radio functionality was noticed during routine radio operation at 1203. Radio checks were satisfactorily performed immediately after this occurrence; however, at 1230, the intermittent problem recurred. VCSNS declared that the siren control system would not operate at 1230. Our procedures require notification of the South Carolina Emergency Management Division and the local counties within 1 hour. Informal notifications to Fairfield and surrounding counties, and the State Area Coordinator were completed by 1242. Official notifications were made via the ESSX system at 1321."

"This report is being made to the NRC per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of >25% of the EWSS. Additionally, this is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(2) (xi) due to the notification made to other government agencies."

The local counties notified include Fairfield, Newberry, Richland and Lexington. The outage affects the entire EWSS. The licensee informed state/local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1723 EDT ON 5/8/06 FROM FRED LUCAS TO S. SANDIN * * *

The EWSS has been returned to service. Notified R2DO (Munday) and NSIR (McMurtray) via email.

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 42561
Rep Org: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES
Region: 4
City: ALVIN State: TX
County:
License #: 42-32219-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK A. RANDIG
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 05/08/2006
Notification Time: 11:43 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2006
Event Time: 18:27 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
DALE POWERS (R4)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)

Event Text

PART 21 NOTIFICATION INVOLVING FAILURE OF AMERSHAM-660B CRANK ASSEMBLY

The licensee provided the following information via email:

"This report is being submitted by Team Industrial Services, Inc. (TISI), as required by 10CFR Part 21. This report is to serve as notification of a nonconforming condition encountered by TISI, when using crank assemblies, manufactured or serviced by the supplier shown below, with Amersham-660B radiographic exposure devices.

"NDT Repair Service and Supply, Inc.
7874 Highway 90 East
Morgan City, LA 70380

"An initial failure of these crank assemblies (s/n NDT-267) was noted by TISI personnel performing industrial radiography at a jobsite in Sewaren, NJ on 04/18/06. Specifically, the radiography crew was able to connect the drive cable assembly to the exposure device, without connecting the drive cable to the source connector. As a result, the radiography crew was unable to return the source assembly to the exposure device, and emergency source retrieval was required. Based on our understanding of the specifications established in ANSI N432-1981, section 6.1.4, these controls should not have allowed exposure of the source assembly if the drive cable was not properly connected.

"Subsequent evaluation of other crank assemblies purchased from the supplier noted the same failure. As a result, all TISI branches have been directed to identify these assemblies as nonconforming and to remove them from service. A Supplier Corrective Action Request (SCAR) has been issued, per TISI's Quality Assurance Program, against this supplier as a result, requesting a determination of the root cause of this nonconformance, action to correct, and action to prevent recurrence."

See related EN#42508.

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