| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/18/2006 - 04/19/2006 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 42407 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM HUFFORD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 03/12/2006
Notification Time: 09:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/12/2006
Event Time: 02:17 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/18/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text LLRT TEST IDENTIFIED PIPING PENETRATION WITH EXCESSIVE LEAKAGE
"While performing local leak rate testing [LLRT] during a planned refueling outage, Susquehanna discovered a Type C penetration on Unit 1 with a leak rate of 12,700 sccm. The limit for this penetration, which can bypass secondary containment, is 4,247 sccm or 9 scfh. Even with this leak rate, the combined leak rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests meets the acceptance criteria of 10CFR50 Appendix J, which is 190,744.7 sccm. This condition seriously degrades the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, and is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1015 EDT ON 4/18/06 FROM JIM HUFFORD TO S. SANDIN * * *
"THE FOLLOWING IS A RETRACTION OF ENS NOTIFICATION #42407
"On March 12, 2006, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station reported that a Type C penetration valve on Unit 1 experienced a leak rate of 12,700 sccm during testing. This leakage rate exceeded the TS allowed limit of 4,247 sccm (9 scfh) for Secondary Containment Bypass Leakage (SCBL) valves. Although a non-intrusive investigation determined that a significant amount of the leakage was past a non-Technical Specification test boundary valve, workers were unable to immediately quantify the exact amount of leakage attributable to this valve. Susquehanna conservatively assigned all leakage experienced during the test to the primary containment isolation valve being tested and reported the situation as a condition that seriously degraded the nuclear power plant per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii). Subsequently, Susquehanna successfully re-worked the test boundary valve that was adversely affecting the leak rate test results. With no other changes in test conditions beyond this improvement in the test boundary, the test was re-performed with 464 sccm leakage observed. Total calculated leakage for SCBL amounted to 1306 sccm, well within Tech Spec limits. These results indicate that the excessive leakage was leakage past the test boundary valve and not the tested PCIV. As such, the SCBL limit was never exceeded and the ENS notification (#42407) is, therefore, being retracted."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Dan Holody). |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 42494 | Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: ERIC WALKER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 04/12/2006
Notification Time: 17:30 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2006
Event Time: 08:13 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/18/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
CHARLIE MILLER (NMSS)
| Event Text UF6 RELEASE DETECTION SYSTEM FAILED DURING TESTING
"At 0813 CDT on 04/12/2006, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that immediately following routine test firing of the C-333 Unit 4 cell 7 UF6 Release Detection System (TSR surveillance requirement 2.4.4.1-1), smoke and sparks were observed coming from the UF6 Release Detection System control module and the system ready light was extinguished. The Area Control Room alarm locked in and the system was declared inoperable by the PSS. The cell and associated piping were above atmospheric pressure (Cascade Mode 2) at the time of the failure.
"The UF6 Release Detection System is a TSR system that is required to be operable per TSR 2.4.4.1, when a cascade cell and associated piping are in Cascade Mode 2. After discovery of failed system condition, a continuous UF6 smoke watch was initiated on the areas affected by the loss of detection capability in accordance with LCO Required Actions 2.4.4.1.B.1 and 2.4.4.C.1.
"This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when:
a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident;
b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and
c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
"PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-06-1197; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2006-03."
There was no release from this event. The failure was shorted contacts in the alarm reset relay.
* * * UPDATE FROM WALLACE TO KNOKE AT 19:04 EDT on 04/18/06 * * *
"This report is being retracted. Subsequent to the event, Maintenance and System Engineering determined that the alarm disable switch control module faulted when the operator attempted to reset the ACR PGLD alarm. This fault caused the system power supply to fail. Resetting the alarms is the last step in the test procedure being performed when the failure occurred. Only after the alarms are cleared is the PGLD system returned to normal operating condition and testing complete. In this case, the evidence clearly indicated that the failure occurred during the conduct of the surveillance and the successful firing of the detectors and the start of the test provides positive evidence that the failure did not exist prior to the surveillance. Therefore, the in-service safety system failure reporting criteria of 10CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i) is not applicable.
"The Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this retraction."
Notified R2DO(Lesser) and NMSS (Janosko). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42495 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: NON-DESTRUCTIVE & VISUAL INSPECTION
Region: 4
City: State: LA
County:
License #: LA-5601-l01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE HENRY VIA E-MAIL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 04/13/2006
Notification Time: 09:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2006
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/13/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
TROY PRUETT (R4)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT OF DAMAGED RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA
The State provided the following information via email:
"This is an incident involving a SPEC 150 exposure device with serial number 0288 that contained a 80 Ci source of Ir-192 (SPEC G-60 serial number NA-2006). On March 9, 2006 while radiographing a coupon, the exposure device was placed in contact with a welding lead. When the exposure device was cranked out the crankout cable formed an electrical conductor from the welding lead to the coupon. An arc and smoke was observed. The radiographer immediately returned the source to the shielded position. The radiographer approached the exposure device with a survey meter and determined the source was in the shielded position. The radiographer disconnected the source tube and replaced the safety plug. While attempting to remove the drive cable connector from the source pigtail, the connector came off. The radiographer replaced the dust cover cap, secured the exposure device in the transport container and called the main office. Neither radiographer received an excessive exposure. The exposure device and equipment were sent to SPEC for evaluation. SPEC stated that the integrity of the encapsulated source was not harmed, but the pigtail itself was unusable, and the source had to be disposed. The exposure device operated properly and was cleared for use by SPEC."
Louisiana Report LA060005 |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42498 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: COMMERCIAL METALS
Region: 4
City: BEAUMONT State: TX
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT FREE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 04/13/2006
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 04/06/2006
Event Time: 11:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/13/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
TROY PRUETT (R4)
MATTHEW HAHN (TAS)
MEXICO (E-MAIL) ()
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN ALLOY ANALYZER
An alloy analyzer was stolen between 11:00 and 12:00 on 4/6/2006. The device was in Beaumont, TX and the theft was reported to the local police (case number 069751).
Description: Niton model XL 800, serial # U2184
Source: 10 milliCurie Cd-109 (This was the original activity when purchased five years ago), Source model # XFB3205, Serial # NR6244
Texas Incident Number I-8324
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42499 | Rep Org: ALABAMA RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: GALLET AND ASSOCIATES
Region: 1
City: EUTAW State: AL
County:
License #: AL-991
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID TURBERVILLE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 04/14/2006
Notification Time: 08:57 [ET]
Event Date: 04/13/2006
Event Time: 09:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE - DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"On the morning of April 13, 2006 at approximately 9:30 am CDT, a Troxler model 3430 moisture density gauge, serial number 22787 containing 8 millicuries of Cs-137 and 40 millicuries of Am-241:Be was damaged while in use at a temporary job site in Eutaw, Alabama when it was run over by a dump truck. The licensee, Gallet & Associates notified the Alabama Office of Radiation Control at 11:55 am. Gallet & Associates is authorized to possess and use radioactive material under their Alabama Radioactive Material License No. 991. The licensee representative stated that they were able to place the sealed source rod in the shielded position and lock the device in the safe position. Radiation levels around the gauge were found to be within the normal range. The gauge was placed back in the transport container and returned to the licensee's facility. The licensee was advised to perform a leak test of the gauge.
"This is all the information that this Agency has at this time and is current as of 8:00 am CDT, April 14, 2006."
Alabama Incident No 06-21 |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42500 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TEXAS INSTRUMENTS, INC
Region: 4
City: DALLAS State: TX
County:
License #: 585-D-103-G
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY JISHA
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 04/14/2006
Notification Time: 10:10 [ET]
Event Date: 04/14/2006
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
TROY PRUETT (R4)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE - TWO TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS LOST
The State provided the following information via email:
"Event type: Lost, two self-luminous, 20 Ci/ea., H-3, exit signs were discovered missing, presumed discarded.
"Event description:
The manufacturer is SRB Technologies (Canada), Inc.
1) Model: BetaLux-E/Luminexit, SN 272697, Activity: 20 Ci;
2) Model: BetaLux-E/Luminexit, SN 270605, Activity: 20 Ci.
"One sign was noted as being discarded by the housekeeping staff and a subsequent inventory investigation showed that another sign was missing from an area that was renovated in August of last year."
Texas Incident No.: I- 8325
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42503 | Rep Org: KANSAS DEPT OF HEALTH & ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: ROSEL COMPANY
Region: 4
City: State: KS
County: CLARK COUNTY
License #: 27-C057-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID WHITFILL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 04/14/2006
Notification Time: 15:35 [ET]
Event Date: 06/02/2005
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
TROY PRUETT (R4)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - ABANDONED WELL LOGGING SOURCE
The licensee provided the following information via facsimile:
"06/03/05: High Bluff Operating, LLC reported The Rosel Company of Liberal, Kansas lost a logging tool downhole in Clark County, Kansas. The logging cable broke, and the tool dropped to a depth of 5866 feet. The tool was 'fished' from the hole, but the density pad broke off the tool and stayed in the hole. An experienced 'fishing tool expert' recommended that cement the possible source in place.
"[High Bluff] proposes: 75' of red dyed cement on top of the pad with a 'whipstock' device preventing reentry of the hole. Set 5740 feet of production casing to prevent deepening. Post at the wellhead a plaque noting the required Information.
"06/04/05: [Kansas] replied to [High Bluff] and concurred with his plan.
"11/01/05: [High Bluff] sent in his final report. Correct the final depth to 5856'. Modified the plan of action to be 5710 feet of casing and 146 feet of red dyed cement by Allied Cement. The plaque was still awaiting production and placement.
"11/11/05: [High Bluff] reported the plaque was unacceptable, and a new plaque was being made.
"03/22/06: Received cd-rom of digital pictures taken of well site, time stamped 03/13/2006. Plaque meets general requirements. Event considered closed."
Source: 2 Curie Cs-137, Serial Number CSV-K98 manufactured by Gulf Nuclear
Kansas Report Number: KS050022 |
| Hospital | Event Number: 42507 | Rep Org: DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
Licensee: DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
Region: 4
City: LITTLE ROCK State: AR
County:
License #: 03-23853-01VA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: EDWIN LEIHOLDT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 04/18/2006
Notification Time: 16:42 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2006
Event Time: 12:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/18/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(1) - SURFACE CONTAM LEVELS > LIMITS
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3)
GARY JANOSKO (NMSS)
MARK LESSER (R2)
| Event Text RECEIPT OF PACKAGE WITH SURFACE CONTAMINATION
"Licensee called pursuant to 10 CFR 20.1906, to report the receipt of a package of radioactive material with removable surface contamination slightly exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 71.87(i). The package was received at approximately 1245 CT today by the VA Medical Center in Birmingham, AL.
"Several wipe tests were performed on the package. The one showing the greatest removable contamination indicated 283 dpm/cm2, slightly exceeding the regulatory limit of 220 dpm/cm2. The package was received from a commercial nuclear radiopharmacy, Birmingham Nuclear Pharmacy, in Birmingham AL. The final delivery carrier has been notified."
The radionuclide is Technetium-99m.
HOO NOTE: The Department of Veterans Affairs coordinates all reports to the NRC from their NHPP Director's Office located in Little Rock, AR. NRC oversight for the VA Master Materials licensee is assigned to NRC Region III. Permittee: VA Medical Center, 700 South 19th Street, Birmingham, Alabama, 35233, Permit Number 01-00643-02. |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 42508 | Rep Org: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES
Region: 4
City: ALVIN State: TX
County:
License #: 42-32219-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 04/18/2006
Notification Time: 19:27 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2006
Event Time: 18:27 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/18/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
| Person (Organization):
GARY JANOSKO (NMSS)
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
| Event Text EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION CAUSED RADIOACTIVE SOURCE TO BE STUCK IN UNSHIELDED POSITION
The licensee reported that there was a stuck source at a temporary job site [Motiva Refinery] in Perth Amboy, NJ. The exposure device involved was an Amersham-660B [Model A424-9] which contained a 17-Curie Iridium-192 source.
When the source stuck in the extended position, the crew tried unsuccessfully to retract it. The workers then secured the area of concern and put up a controlled boundary to limit personnel exposure to 2 mr/hr or less. Licensee notified AEA-QSA [aka QSA-Global, Inc.] to come to the work site and repair or replace the defective equipment. It is unknown if any of the workers were overexposed due to this incident, however, licensee suspects they were not. Licensee will be evaluating the workers personal dosimeters, and other instruments, to ensure accurate readings of personnel exposure.
* * * UPDATE FROM QSA-GLOBAL TO KNOKE AT 21:03 EDT ON 04/18/06 * * *
GSA-Global, Inc. is going to Motiva Refinery in Perth Amboy, NJ, to perform an "emergency source retrieval" on the Amersham-660B [Model A424-9] which contained the 17-Curie Iridium-192 source. This work is being performed for their client Team Cooperheat located in Aston, PA.
Notified R1DO (Holody), NMSS EO (Janosko and Pangburn) |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42509 | Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID KARST
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 04/18/2006
Notification Time: 20:22 [ET]
Event Date: 04/18/2006
Event Time: 12:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/18/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SHIELD BUILDING VENTILLATION SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE
"On 4/18/2006, at 1200 hours, while the plant was operating at full power, the plant entered a 12 hour Technical Specification (TS) action statement for both trains of the Shield Building Ventilation (SBV) System being declared inoperable. The SBV System action statement was entered when the plant declared Relay Flacks RR-119 and RR-120 inoperable due to non-qualified fuses and cables being installed in six (6) of the boxes contained in these racks. The instruments associated with the six (6) boxes were not found in Technical Specification required instruments or alarms. The issue was that a downstream failure on the non-qualified Instruments may not have qualified fault protection, therefore a fault could impact safety related equipment. Other Technical Specification equipment affected by the inoperability of RR-119 and RR-120 include both trains of Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring System (ICCMS), Reactor Vessel Level Indication (RVLIS), Pressurizer Safety Valve Outlet Temperature, and Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve Outlet Temperature.
"At 1611 actions taken by plant staff returned RR-120 to operable and the 12 hour action statement for SBV was exited. The plant remains in a 7 Day Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) pending the return of RR-119. Due to the fact that Train B of SBV has been made operable, a plant shutdown was not commenced.
"This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) 'Any event that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material'."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |