|
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
04/10/2006 - 04/11/2006
** EVENT NUMBERS **
|
| Other Nuclear Material |
Event Number: 42485 |
Rep Org: DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
Licensee: DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
Region: 4
City: LITTLE ROCK State: AR
County:
License #: 03-23853-01VA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GARY WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN |
Notification Date: 04/10/2006
Notification Time: 13:54 [ET]
Event Date: 12/31/2005
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/10/2006 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X |
Person (Organization):
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
GREG MORELL (NMSS) |
Event Text
LOSS OF GENERAL LICENSED MATERIAL DUE TO IMPROPER DISPOSAL DURING CONSTRUCTION
"My name is Gary Williams with the Department of Veterans Affairs, National Health Physics Program [NHPP]. I am calling to report a loss of radioactive materials.
"The loss occurred at a medical permittee authorized under the master materials license issued to the Department of Veterans Affairs, NRC License 03-2385301VA. The permittee is the Clement J. Zablocki VA Medical Center, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
"The loss occurred in 2005 and was discovered in April 2006. The basis for the report is under 10 CFR 31.5(c)(10) in that radioactive materials obtained under a general license were lost and the reporting requirements in 10 CFR 20.2201 must be followed.
"Specifically, the permittee stated one tritium exit sign was apparently disposed or discarded during a facility construction project in 2005. The sign was last seen in 2004.
"The sign was either of two models. The first model is a 11.5 Curie sign from Shield Source Incorporated. The second model is a 20 Curie sign from SRB Technology. These types of signs were manufactured circa 1994.
"The Department of Veterans Affairs will evaluate the circumstances related to the loss of radioactive materials and submit a written report to NRC, Region III, within 30 days."
HOO NOTE: The Department of Veterans Affairs coordinates all reports to the NRC from their NHPP Director's Office located in Little Rock, AR. NRC oversight for the VA Master Materials licensee is assigned to NRC Region III.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 42486 |
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: KEN KINGSTON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE |
Notification Date: 04/10/2006
Notification Time: 14:24 [ET]
Event Date: 04/10/2006
Event Time: 10:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/10/2006 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS |
Person (Organization):
TROY PRUETT (R4) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
96 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
PERSONNEL AIR LOCK DOOR EQUALIZING VALVE LEAKING BY
"It was reported to the Shift Manager this morning in Condition Report 200601444 that the inner Personnel Air Lock (PAL) door equalizing valve was leaking by. Although the condition was reported this morning, it was actually discovered following a containment entry on Friday, April 7, 2006. Fort Calhoun Station Technical Specification 2.6(1)b,(ii) states that with the PAL inoperable, except as the result of an inoperable air lock door, maintain at least one air lock door closed; restore the inoperable air lock to operable status within 24 hours or be in at least hot shutdown within the next six hours and in cold shutdown within the following thirty hours. The leak by past the inner air lock door is applicable to this Fort Calhoun Station Technical Specification. The Shift Manager determined at 10:00 CDT that Fort Calhoun was in excess of the Limiting Conditions for Operation of Technical Specification 2.6(1)b(ii) and entered Technical Specification 2.0.1 (Motherhood) which requires the unit to be placed in at least hot shutdown within six hours, in at least subcritical and less than 300°F within the next six hours, and at least cold shutdown within the following thirty hours, unless corrective measures are completed that permit operation under the permissible action requirements for the specified time interval as measured from initial discovery or until the reactor is placed in an operating mode in which the specification is not applicable.
"At 10:55 CDT on April 10, 2006, a shutdown was commenced and negative reactivity was introduced to the core. At the same time, machinists were dispatched to troubleshoot the situation and found a loose collar on the valve assembly that was preventing full closure of the valve. The collar was adjusted and post-maintenance testing was completed. The inner PAL door equalizing valve was declared operable at 13:10 CDT. Technical Specifications 2.0.1 and 2.6(1)b(ii) were exited, the unit shutdown was ceased at a power level of 96.04% and preparations are being made to return the unit to full power."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 42487 |
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: ALLAN BRIESE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN |
Notification Date: 04/10/2006
Notification Time: 15:39 [ET]
Event Date: 04/10/2006
Event Time: 12:33 [MST]
Last Update Date: 04/10/2006 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS |
Person (Organization):
TROY PRUETT (R4) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
91 |
Power Operation |
88 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
UNIT 2 ENTERED A TS REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO INOPERABLE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On April 10. 2006, at approximately 12:33 hours Mountain Standard Time (MST), Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 2 commenced a reactor shutdown required by Technical Specification [TS] 3.7.5 Condition C. Limiting Condition for Operability (LCO) 3.7.5 requires three AFW trains to be Operable. Condition A of this LCO provides allowance for one steam supply to the turbine driven AFW to be inoperable for a 7 day period. If the inoperable SGAUV138A valve is not restored to an operable condition within 7 days, Unit 2 will be required to shutdown to Mode 3 in 6 hours and to Mode 4 in 12 hours, starting at 10:41 MST on April 10, 2006.
"The event did not result in the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and is present in the control room." |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 42488 |
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE JESTER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN |
Notification Date: 04/10/2006
Notification Time: 23:33 [ET]
Event Date: 04/10/2006
Event Time: 16:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/10/2006 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION |
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
95 |
Power Operation |
95 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO DESIGN DEFICIENCY
"EVENT DESCRIPTION:
"At 1630 on 4/10/06, plant personnel identified a potential failure mode of the recently modified chlorine detectors. The failure mode has the potential to render the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system inoperable following power restoration after a LOOP/LOCA event. Due to this design deficiency, the CREV system was declared inoperable per LCO 3.7.3, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System, which placed both units in LCO 3.7.3 Condition B. Required Actions for this Condition are to be in Hot Shutdown in 12 hours and in Cold Shutdown in 36 hours. In addition TRM [Technical Reference Manual] 3.18, CREV Smoke Protection Mode, is being entered for Condition B. The Plan required by TRM 3.18 Condition B is to remove the Chlorine Tank Car from site AND to disable the Chlorine detectors to prevent them from actuating. These actions were completed at 2100 on 4/10/06 and the CREV System Rad/Smoke Mode was restored to operable.
"This situation has been evaluated as reportable to the NRC within 8 hours per 0OI-01.07, Attachment 1. The criteria is 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D). The condition at the time of discovery that could have prevented the fulfillment of safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. (Item # 3.4.4 of 0OI-01.07 Attachment1).
"INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION:
"The initial safety significance of this event is considered minimal due to the immediate implementation of Tech Spec and TRM required actions following discovery of the design deficiency.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
"The Plan required by TRM 3.18 Condition B is to remove the Chlorine Tank Car from site AND to disable the Chlorine detectors to prevent them from actuating. These actions were completed at 2100 on 4/10106 and the CREV System Rad/Smoke Mode was restored to operable. The Chlorine Tank Car will remain off-site and the Chlorine detectors will remain disabled until the design deficiency is corrected."
The deficiency with the chlorine detectors which had been modified in February 2006 was identified using the plant simulator.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
|