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Event Notification Report for March 29, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
03/28/2006 - 03/29/2006

** EVENT NUMBERS **


42386 42447 42448 42450

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 42386
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: CHRIS SKINNER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 03/04/2006
Notification Time: 14:51 [ET]
Event Date: 03/03/2006
Event Time: 18:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 91 Power Operation 91 Power Operation

Event Text

REACTOR BUILDING VENTILATION FLOWPATH INOPERABLE

"This notification is being made in accordance with License Condition 2.F for Nine Mile Point Unit 2 which states in part 'report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2.C of this license in the following manner: initial notification shall be made within 24 hours to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System, with written follow-up within 30 days in accordance with the procedures described in 10 CFR 50.73(b), ( c), and (e).' License Condition 2.C (2) states in part 'Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.' This notification describes a licensee identified condition where both redundant Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) trains were apparently inoperable in violation of Technical Specifications. The condition has been corrected.

"At 1800 on 3 March 2006, while operating at 91 % power (coast down to refueling), Nine Mile Point Unit 2 identified a condition in which both trains of SGT were apparently rendered inoperable for intermittent time periods of a few hours in length, starting from 17 February 2006 through about 1900 on 28 February 2006. This was not recognized at the time; as such the requirement to initiate a plant shutdown per LCO 3.0.3 was not performed. The condition was caused by use of a heavy-duty tarp and associated cargo net supporting it from underneath, installed across the Unit 2 Reactor Building Hoist Well. Installation of the tarp and net across the hoist well occurred between the above dates, for time periods of a few hours each, in order to support refueling preparations, thereby avoiding spread of contamination during rigging activities. The blockage of the Reactor Building Hoist Well would have obstructed or significantly degraded the design flow paths of both trains of SGT if called upon to perform their safety functions in a design basis accident. Therefore current information indicates this tarp installation configuration renders the SGT system inoperable.

"The tarp and net were permanently removed at about 1900 on 28 February 2006 when a supervisor questioned if tarp installation was allowed while the reactor was at power.

"Although removal of the tarp and net typically required only a few minutes effort by plant workers, its installation and continued blockage of the ventilation flow path would have resulted in declaration of the [SGT] safety systems to be inoperable if not removed. Workers were not sensitive to the safety function of the open ventilation flow path provided by the hoist well, and no programmatic training or administrative requirements were identified which prohibited the configuration at conditions other than cold shutdown.

"Nine Mile Point is in the process of taking compensatory measures to preclude installation of the tarp when SGT is required to be operable by briefing operations, radiation protection and refuel worker crews on ventilation requirements and sensitivity to safety functions. Operations took physical control (lock and key) of the tarp. Corrective actions to provide administrative controls on the tarp installation are in process. Detailed evaluation of the safety significance of the condition is ongoing.

"Initial review of plant records indicate that this configuration was also installed intermittently around July 2003. It was recognized as undesirable but was not identified as an operability or reportability issue at the time. Corrective action to prevent its recurrence was not effective. More detailed information on specific dates and durations when this configuration existed will be provided in the 30 day written LER report, after a detailed review.

"The instances noted above and any similar conditions identified will be explained in detail in the follow-up LER that will be submitted as required by 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) - 'Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plants Technical Specifications .'"

Unit-1 is not affected since they have a different method to control use of this tarp. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM T. RESTUCCIO TO HUFFMAN AT 2209 ON 3/28/06 * * *

"At 1800 on 3 March 2006, while operating at 91% power (coast down to refueling), Nine Mile Point Unit 2 identified a condition in which both trains of the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) system were apparently inoperable for intermittent time periods of a few hours of length, starting from 17 February 2006 through about 1900 on 28 February 2006. This was not recognized at the time; as such the requirement to initiate a plant shutdown per LCO 3.0.3 was not performed. The condition was caused by use of a heavy-duty tarp and associated cargo net supporting it from underneath, installed across the Unit 2 reactor Building Hoist Well. Installation of the tarp and net across the hoist well occurred between the above dates, for time periods of a few hours each, in order to support refueling preparations, thereby avoiding the spread of contamination during rigging activities. The blockage of the reactor Building Hoist Well would have obstructed or significantly degraded the design flow paths of both trains of SGT if called upon to perform their safety functions in a design basis accident. Review of plant records indicate that this condition was also installed intermittently around July 2003.

"A subsequent evaluation of the safety significance of this condition has been performed. This evaluation considered actual area of flow path remaining with the tarp in place, as well as bounding outside temperatures during the times the tarp may have been installed. The evaluation has concluded that the secondary containment function, and therefore the SGT system, remained operable and would have performed its intended safety function during a design basis accident during the time periods the tarp may have been installed during the last three years. This evaluation provides the basis for retraction of the ENS report of March 4, 2006."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO(Cook) has been notified.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 42447
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: ARIS & ASSOCIATES
Region: 4
City: HOLLYWOOD PARK State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 03/24/2006
Notification Time: 19:10 [ET]
Event Date: 02/23/2006
Event Time: 14:40 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/24/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
DANIEL GILLEN (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING LOSS AND RECOVERY OF A MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information is a summary of a report received via fax:

On 2/24/06 the Texas Department of State Health Services was notified that a moisture density gauge was left in a motel room and later recovered still in its DOT shipping container. The cause of the incident is attributed to negligence on the part of the authorized user who has been subsequently terminated by the licensee. Local Police, FBI, and other States, as needed, were notified as well as San Antonio Police HazMat. There were no known personnel exposures involved. The license number, make, model and source content of the moisture density gauge were not available at the time of the report. Additional information will be submitted to NMED when available.

TX Incident No. I-8310

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 42448
Rep Org: NATIONAL INST OF STANDARDS & TECH
Licensee: NATIONAL INST OF STANDARDS & TECH
Region: 1
City: GAITHERSBURG State: MD
County:
License #: SNM-362
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TIM MENGERS
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 03/28/2006
Notification Time: 09:36 [ET]
Event Date: 03/27/2006
Event Time: 09:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
36.83(a)(5) - INOP ACCESS CTRL SYS
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)

Event Text

IRRADIATOR SHUTTER FAILS TO CLOSE

The air-actuated shutter mechanism on one of the facility's irradiators (Neutron Products S/N T1497 with 13,500 Curies Co-60) failed to re-close. The irradiator source remained in its shield. A staff scientist entered the irradiator room and isolated the air supply to the shutter allowing the shutter to close. The scientist received less than 2 mrem during the incident. The cause of the shutter failure is being investigated.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42450
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: KEVIN HUBER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/28/2006
Notification Time: 17:29 [ET]
Event Date: 03/28/2006
Event Time: 13:57 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2006
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
FRANK GILLESPIE (NRR)
PETER WILSON (IRD)
DWIGHT CHAMBERLAIN (R4)
FRED HILL (DHS)
STAN KIMBELL (FEMA)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 60 Power Operation 60 Power Operation

Event Text

UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO RANGE BRUSH FIRE NEAR PLANT

The licensee declared an unusual event due to a range brush fire primarily involving tumbleweeds that is several hundred yards outside of the protected area. The basis for the declaration is EAL 9.4.U.3 for a fire near the plant that threatens to reduce the level of safety. The fire currently is not threatening anything (such as offsite power lines or buildings). The plant is not in any major limiting conditions of operation (LCO). The Hanford Fire Department has responded. The criteria for termination of the UE is when the fire is extinguished.

The licensee has notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM F. SCHILL TO HUFFMAN AT 1953 EST ON 3/28/06 * * *

"At 1640 PST on March 28, 2006, Columbia Generating Station exited Unusual Event status due to the Emergency Action Level condition no longer being valid. The range fire reported earlier no longer has the potential to reduce the level of safety. The range fire is under control after burning approximately 0.4 acres approximately 150 yards southeast of the protected area boundary. Two engines from the Hanford Fire Dept. responded. No offsite power sources were affected or threatened. No press release is planned."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R4DO(Powers), NRR EO(Gillespie), IRD(Wilson), DHS(Hill), and FEMA(Liggett) notified.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, March 30, 2012
Friday, March 30, 2012