United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Reports Associated with Events > Event Notification Reports > 2006 > March 22

Event Notification Report for March 22, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
03/21/2006 - 03/22/2006

** EVENT NUMBERS **


42427 42436 42437 42438

To top of page
General Information or Other Event Number: 42427
Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: PROFESSIONAL INSPECTION AND TESTING INC
Region: 1
City: MT AIRY State: MD
County:
License #: MD-13-021-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY MANLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 03/17/2006
Notification Time: 11:16 [ET]
Event Date: 03/17/2006
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
ILTAB (email) (NSIR)

Event Text

MARYLAND AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE

A Troxler model 3430 moisture density gauge was stolen from a locked storage trailer on a temporary jobsite on Reistertown Road in Pikesville, MD. The gauge serial number is #23191 and contained a 8 millicurie Cs-137 source and 40 millicurie Am-241 source. The Maryland State inspectors and the Baltimore City Police are on the scene to conduct their investigation. The Maryland Department of the Environment will be issuing a press release on 3/17/06.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 42436
Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CHRIS HOMESLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 03/21/2006
Notification Time: 05:39 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2006
Event Time: 02:29 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO INADVERTENT EMERGENCY SIREN ACTUATION

"At approximately 0238 [EST], received first notification of an actuation of the Early Warning Siren System. This call came from Fairfield County 911 dispatcher after they received numerous calls from area residents. Subsequent calls were received from the State Warning Point, Lexington, Newberry and Richland County's 911 dispatcher as well as calls from the public. The Secondary Alarm Station informed the Control Room that when an attempt was made to silence one individual siren (N-86) that was in alarm, all the sirens were inadvertently actuated. Sirens appear to have alarmed for approximately three minutes and then shut off (per design). Subsequent investigation by the Emergency Preparedness group did not reveal any human error. The investigation into the siren actuation is ongoing. All sirens are operable at this time. SCANA Public Relations has been informed and will be preparing a press release, as will the SC Emergency Management Division. A local television station, WIS TV, will be interviewing SCANA Public Relations personnel at approximately 0630."


The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 42437
Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT LAKIS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/21/2006
Notification Time: 17:20 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2006
Event Time: 16:08 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

DEGRADED CONDITION - INDICATION ON PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE BOUNDARY WELD

"On March 18, 2006, with the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station in Mode 6 (Refueling), an axial indication was discovered on the Reactor Coolant Pump 1-1 Cold Leg Drain Line Nozzle to Elbow Weld. At the time of discovery, the indication was determined to be at least 0.25 inches in length, but the through-wall depth of this indication could not be determined.

"Further evaluation of this indication is in progress by an offsite engineering organization. Based upon preliminary evaluation, it has been determined that this indication cannot be found acceptable under ASME Section XI.

"10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) requires reporting of any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded. NUREG-1022, 'Event Reporting Guidelines - 10CFR50.72 and 10CFR50.73' lists as an example of such degradation 'Welding or material defects in the primary coolant system which cannot be found acceptable under ASME Section XI, IWB-3600, 'Analytical Evaluation of Flaws' or ASME Section XI, Table IWB-3410-1, 'Acceptance Standards.'

"Based upon the preliminary evaluation by the offsite engineering organization, the axial indication is being conservatively reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) as a serious degradation of a principle safety barrier. The plant is currently defueled, and plans are underway to determine the necessary repair [to] this indication."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

To top of page
General Information or Other Event Number: 42438
Rep Org: ROSEMOUNT NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS, INC
Licensee: ROSEMOUNT NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS, INC
Region: 3
City: CHANHASSEN State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ROBERTS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/21/2006
Notification Time: 16:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/21/2006
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/21/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3)
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
CAROLYN EVANS (R2)
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
O.TABATABAI (E-MAIL) (NRR)
J. FOSTER (E-MAIL) (NRR)

Event Text

PART 21 NOTIFICATION CONCERNING ROSEMOUNT TRANSMITTERS

The licensee provided the following information via facsimile:

"Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, section 21.21(b), Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc. (RNII) provided information that certain Rosemount Pressure Transmitters may not conform to RNII's published qualified life specification. The specific models affected are:

"(a) Certain Model 1153 Series B and 1153 Series D pressure transmitters of all range codes and measuring types (gage, differential, absolute) shipped between 16 December 2005 and 13 January 2006, and

"(b) Certain Model 1154 and 1154 Series H pressure transmitters of all range codes and measuring types (gage, differential, sealed reference) shipped between 16 December 2005 and 13 January 2006

"For every RNII Model 1153 and Model 1154 transmitter, four diodes are used on a circuit card assembly which is installed and sealed within the sensor module sub-assembly. The primary function of these diodes is to convert an AC oscillator signal to a DC current that is proportional to the capacitance of the sensor. The diodes (P/N D2911218A) are manufactured by Microsemi Corp (MSG).

"Recently during standard receiving inspection, it was noted that the glass packaging on several of the diodes exhibited an unusual 'cloudy' appearance. Upon supplier analysis it was determined that the cloudy appearance was due to interaction between cleaning solution and metallic components of the diode. Cleaning solution was able to penetrate the glass diode package because of a poor hermetic seal. Over time, this condition could degrade the performance and reliability of the diode, particularly at elevated temperatures. The resultant effect on the transmitter might include degraded temperature effect performance and increased drift between calibration cycles.

"Through further internal investigation MSC was able to bound the potential problem to two lot codes. These lot codes were traced from MSC through our circuit card supplier and to RNII to identify the shipped transmitters affected by this notification.

"RNII built up several test transmitters using diodes having a cloudy appearance and performed thermal aging on the transmitters to simulate typical operating conditions, followed by high temperature testing. Test results suggest that potentially affected transmitters would operate within published performance specifications, including the Nuclear Steam Pressure/Temperature specification. Nonetheless, RNII and MSC were unable to demonstrate the long term reliability of the suspect diodes over the full qualified life of the transmitter.

"Therefore, based on analysis of the test results, RNII has established the following qualified life limits for transmitters affected by this notification. This specification supersedes the published qualified life for all pressure transmitters affected by this notification:

Interim Qualified Life = 5.1 years @ 120 F Operating Temperature

"RNII does not have sufficient information relative to each end use's specific applications to determine the potential safety-related impact of this notification to each end user's plant. Each end user must determine the impact on its plant operations and plant safety and take action as deemed necessary."

RNII recommends that "the end user must determine the impact of this potential non-conformance upon its plant's operation and safety, and take action as deemed necessary. RNII recommends that potentially affected transmitters be returned to RNII for replacement of the module at the end user's earliest opportunity and consistent with the abbreviated interim qualified life specification. RNII requests that the end users contact RNII to facilitate the transmitter return process as necessary."

Plants which have been supplied these transmitters: Nine Mile Point; Catawba; River Bend; Quad Cities; Braidwood; Dresden; Perry; Turkey Point; Vogtle; Palisades; and Hope Creek.

Rosemount is in the process of contacting the end users.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, March 30, 2012
Friday, March 30, 2012