Event Notification Report for March 14, 2006

LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION

"On 03/14/06 at 1655 hours, the 'A' Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) system was removed from service to address a high oil level and subsequent high bearing drain oil temperatures. The 'A' CREF train was declared inoperable and a 7-day LCO was entered. While placing the 'B' CREF train in-service the chiller did not respond as expected. The chiller failed to properly load and supply cooling. At 1659 hours the 'B' CREF train was declared inoperable. This resulted in both 'A' and 'B' trains of CREF [being] unable to perform their design safety function and thus unable to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This failure placed the Hope Creek Station in a Technical Specification 3.0.3 condition requiring a unit shutdown. Oil level was restored to normal band for the 'A' CREF train at 1732 hours and the 3.0.3 condition was exited prior to any actions being initiated to start reducing reactor power to achieve a Hot Shutdown condition.

"A 8 hour report is being made under ECG Section 11.2.2.b, an Event/Condition could have prevented certain safety functions IAW 10.CFR50.72(b)(3)(v).

"At the time of event all safety systems were operable. The license has notified the NRC resident inspector."

* * * UPDATE FROM ZAKARIAN TO HUFFMAN AT 1359 EDT ON 4/22/06 * * *

"This is a retraction of the event notification made on 3/14/06 at 20:21 (ET) hours. This event (#42422) was initially reported as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The safety function of the system is to ensure that the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system. Further review has determined that the Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) chiller system maintained its capability to complete its specified safety function. During the event, the chilled water and affected room temperatures increased only minimally and remained well below the maximum allowable temperatures. The proceduralized in-progress activity to address the 'A' chiller high oil level condition promptly re-established full system cooling prior to approaching any required temperature limits. The procedure was completed in a timely manner with no complications. Therefore, the temperature limits of the Control Room and equipment rooms would not have been challenged had an event occurred during the time 'A' chiller oil level was being adjusted and the safety function of maintaining room ambient air temperature within limits would have been accomplished."

The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector. R1DO(Holody) notified.

LICENSED SRO FAILED RANDOM FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST

A licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been put on administrative hold, and the individual has been escorted offsite. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * * UPDATE ON 3/14/06 AT 1534 FROM S. BRANTLEY TO P. SNYDER * * * *

The licensee will be issuing a press release on this event. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE FALLS FROM TRUCK

As a licensee employee was leaving the office in Purcellville, VA in his truck, he was stopped at an intersection nearby by bystanders. They informed him that an object (a Troxler gauge in its case) had fallen from the open tailgate of his truck. Local police responded to the incident and contacted the fire marshal who told the officer that the device in its case was designed for that type of an impact. The gauge remained intact and no radiation exposures were reported. The Troxler moisture density gauge is a model # 3411, containing Am-241 (40 millicuries) and Cs-137 (8.7 millicuries). The employee loaded and secured the case containing the gauge and proceeded to the job site. The licensee will perform a leak test on the gauge. The licensee is holding mandatory gauge refresher training for their employees as a corrective action to this incident.


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

INADVERTANT CORE SPRAY PUMP ACTUATION

"The notification is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2) (iv) (A) and is reported per 10CFR50.73(a)(1)

"An invalid actuation of the 1 C Core Spray Pump start during D13 LOCA/LOOP Testing.
a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated. The 1C Core Spray Pump actuated automatically on an inadvertent Division 3 LOCA signal during LOCA/LOOP testing. No other ECCS train/system actuated.
b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial. The 1C Core Spray Pump actuated in the minimum flow protection mode.
c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully. The 1 C Core Spray System started and functioned successfully but did not inject into the vessel. On March 14, 2006 at 5:40 PM during performance of the D13 LOCA/LOOP Test, ST-6-092-117-1, the 1 C Core Spray pump was inadvertently started. The pump started (but did not inject) when an I&C Technician attempted to demonstrate operation of the test switch. He inadvertently picked up the energized test switch which was next to 2 spare test switches and manipulated it which resulted in a Division 3 LOCA signal to the 1C Core Spray Pump. The 1C Core Spray Pump never injected and was running with min-flow protection and functioned as expected. The cause of the event was lack of attention to detail and self check."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.