Event Notification Report for March 09, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/08/2006 - 03/09/2006
EVENT NUMBERS
4240342400424094248042495
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42403
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY PETRELLI
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY PETRELLI
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 03/10/2006
Notification Time: 00:58 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2006
Event Time: 22:14 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2006
Notification Time: 00:58 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2006
Event Time: 22:14 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
JOHN WHITE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 85 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM TURBINE TRIP
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS Actuation (scram) for Nine Mile Point Unit 2 which states 'Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' On 03/09/2006 at 2214 while operating at approximately 85 % reactor power (coast down to refueling) a condenser low vacuum condition resulted in a turbine trip and a subsequent reactor scram. A loss of sealing steam most probably caused the loss of condenser vacuum and an investigation is in progress. Special Operating procedure N2-SOP-101 C was entered. All control rods inserted [fully] as expected. Condenser vacuum has been stabilized and the main steam isolation valves are open. The plant is stable and recovery actions are in progress."
Decay heat is being removed via the turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. The condensate and feedwater system is in operation maintaining reactor vessel level. The electric plant is in a normal shutdown lineup and there was no effect from this transient on Unit 1.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0035 EST ON 3/14/06 FROM P. WALSH TO W. GOTT * * *
"This update is being made to provide additional information to EN# 42403 which was communicated via ENS on 3/10/06 at 0058 hours. During the scram that occurred at Nine Mile Point Unit 2 on 3/9/06 at 2214 hours, a primary containment isolation signal to RHR Shutdown Cooling, RHR Head Spray and RHR sample valves was received as designed. No components repositioned as the valves are normally closed during plant operations."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (P. Krohn).
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS Actuation (scram) for Nine Mile Point Unit 2 which states 'Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' On 03/09/2006 at 2214 while operating at approximately 85 % reactor power (coast down to refueling) a condenser low vacuum condition resulted in a turbine trip and a subsequent reactor scram. A loss of sealing steam most probably caused the loss of condenser vacuum and an investigation is in progress. Special Operating procedure N2-SOP-101 C was entered. All control rods inserted [fully] as expected. Condenser vacuum has been stabilized and the main steam isolation valves are open. The plant is stable and recovery actions are in progress."
Decay heat is being removed via the turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. The condensate and feedwater system is in operation maintaining reactor vessel level. The electric plant is in a normal shutdown lineup and there was no effect from this transient on Unit 1.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0035 EST ON 3/14/06 FROM P. WALSH TO W. GOTT * * *
"This update is being made to provide additional information to EN# 42403 which was communicated via ENS on 3/10/06 at 0058 hours. During the scram that occurred at Nine Mile Point Unit 2 on 3/9/06 at 2214 hours, a primary containment isolation signal to RHR Shutdown Cooling, RHR Head Spray and RHR sample valves was received as designed. No components repositioned as the valves are normally closed during plant operations."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (P. Krohn).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42400
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MURPHY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MURPHY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 03/09/2006
Notification Time: 09:20 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2006
Event Time: 05:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/09/2006
Notification Time: 09:20 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2006
Event Time: 05:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/09/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1.1 ENTRY DUE TO LOSS OF UNIT 3 STARTUP TRANSFORMER
"While the Unit 3 Startup Transformer was inoperable for planned maintenance, it was discovered that both the 3A and 3B Emergency Diesel Generators were inoperable. The Emergency Diesel Generators were inoperable due to a configuration that resulted in the Emergency Diesel Generators being in the Droop mode versus the Isochronous mode. This configuration was improperly established when offsite power was supplied to Unit 3 via the Main and Auxiliary Transformers (Backfeed).
"Upon discovery, jumpers were installed to place both [Unit 3] Emergency Diesel Generators in the proper Isochronous mode correcting this condition at 0615 on March 9, 2006. Unit 4 was identified to be in a condition where one of its required Startup Transformers [from Unit 3] and one of its required Emergency Diesel Generators [from Unit 3] were out of service. Both [Unit 3] Emergency Diesel Generators were restored to an operable condition approximately twenty (20) minutes after discovery."
Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 Action c entered due to inoperable Unit 3 Startup Transformer and one inoperable Unit 3 EDG and requires a 4 hour notification report to the NRC.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * * UPDATE AT 1301 EST ON 3/9/06 FROM M. MURPHY TO P. SNYDER * * * *
"As reported in Event Notification # 42400, with Unit 4 at 100% power in Mode 1, and the Unit 3 Startup Transformer out of service for planned maintenance, both the 3A and 3B Emergency Diesel Generators were declared inoperable due to a configuration that placed both Emergency Diesel Generators in the droop mode versus the normal isochronous mode. This placed Unit 4 in a Technical Specification Action Statement for one of its required Startup Transformers and one of its required Emergency Diesel Generators being inoperable.
"This EN# 42400 supplement documents that, although the 3A and 3B Emergency Diesel Generators were declared inoperable, the droop mode condition is bounded within previous analyses that demonstrate that the Emergency Diesel Generators and required electrical loads would operate to satisfactorily perform their safety function at the resulting reduced electrical frequency. Refer [to] Turkey Point LER 2004-001-01, dated 10/18/04."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Fredrickson).
"While the Unit 3 Startup Transformer was inoperable for planned maintenance, it was discovered that both the 3A and 3B Emergency Diesel Generators were inoperable. The Emergency Diesel Generators were inoperable due to a configuration that resulted in the Emergency Diesel Generators being in the Droop mode versus the Isochronous mode. This configuration was improperly established when offsite power was supplied to Unit 3 via the Main and Auxiliary Transformers (Backfeed).
"Upon discovery, jumpers were installed to place both [Unit 3] Emergency Diesel Generators in the proper Isochronous mode correcting this condition at 0615 on March 9, 2006. Unit 4 was identified to be in a condition where one of its required Startup Transformers [from Unit 3] and one of its required Emergency Diesel Generators [from Unit 3] were out of service. Both [Unit 3] Emergency Diesel Generators were restored to an operable condition approximately twenty (20) minutes after discovery."
Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 Action c entered due to inoperable Unit 3 Startup Transformer and one inoperable Unit 3 EDG and requires a 4 hour notification report to the NRC.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * * UPDATE AT 1301 EST ON 3/9/06 FROM M. MURPHY TO P. SNYDER * * * *
"As reported in Event Notification # 42400, with Unit 4 at 100% power in Mode 1, and the Unit 3 Startup Transformer out of service for planned maintenance, both the 3A and 3B Emergency Diesel Generators were declared inoperable due to a configuration that placed both Emergency Diesel Generators in the droop mode versus the normal isochronous mode. This placed Unit 4 in a Technical Specification Action Statement for one of its required Startup Transformers and one of its required Emergency Diesel Generators being inoperable.
"This EN# 42400 supplement documents that, although the 3A and 3B Emergency Diesel Generators were declared inoperable, the droop mode condition is bounded within previous analyses that demonstrate that the Emergency Diesel Generators and required electrical loads would operate to satisfactorily perform their safety function at the resulting reduced electrical frequency. Refer [to] Turkey Point LER 2004-001-01, dated 10/18/04."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Fredrickson).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42409
Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: JOHNS HOPKINS MEDICAL INSTITUTE
Region: 1
City: BALTIMORE State: MD
County:
License #: MD-07-005-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY MANLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Licensee: JOHNS HOPKINS MEDICAL INSTITUTE
Region: 1
City: BALTIMORE State: MD
County:
License #: MD-07-005-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY MANLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 03/13/2006
Notification Time: 11:13 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2006
Notification Time: 11:13 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
MICHELE BURGESS (NMSS)
ILTAB (email)
JOHN WHITE (R1)
MICHELE BURGESS (NMSS)
ILTAB (email)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING P-32
On March 9, 2006, Johns Hopkins Medical Institute reported that P-32 was missing from a vial being stored in one of the research facility's freezers. Approximately 10 millicuries is missing. The vial was received on March 2, 2006. Some P-32 (10%) was removed to conduct a research experiment and the vial was replaced in the freezer. When the researcher checked the vial the following day, the vial was empty. The Maryland Department of the Environment and the licensee are conducting investigations. The licensee has performed surveys of the floor that the storage freezer is on, checked for contamination on personnel who work in this area, and water coolers in the facility. All were negative.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
On March 9, 2006, Johns Hopkins Medical Institute reported that P-32 was missing from a vial being stored in one of the research facility's freezers. Approximately 10 millicuries is missing. The vial was received on March 2, 2006. Some P-32 (10%) was removed to conduct a research experiment and the vial was replaced in the freezer. When the researcher checked the vial the following day, the vial was empty. The Maryland Department of the Environment and the licensee are conducting investigations. The licensee has performed surveys of the floor that the storage freezer is on, checked for contamination on personnel who work in this area, and water coolers in the facility. All were negative.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 42480
Facility: NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES INC.
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
NRC Notified By: KRIS WEIR
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
NRC Notified By: KRIS WEIR
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 04/06/2006
Notification Time: 09:21 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2006
Event Time: 23:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2008
Notification Time: 09:21 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2006
Event Time: 23:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
MICHELE BURGESS (NMSS)
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
MICHELE BURGESS (NMSS)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT INVOLVING LICENSEE SUPERVISOR
The licensee reports that a facility supervisor has been found to be in violation of the fitness for duty program procedure (NFS-HR-08-001A) due to failure to adhere to a 5 hour alcohol abstinence requirement before reporting to the site The individual's site access has been denied.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Contact the HOO for additional details.
* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT INVOLVING LICENSEE SUPERVISOR
The licensee reports that a facility supervisor has been found to be in violation of the fitness for duty program procedure (NFS-HR-08-001A) due to failure to adhere to a 5 hour alcohol abstinence requirement before reporting to the site The individual's site access has been denied.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Contact the HOO for additional details.
* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42495
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: NON-DESTRUCTIVE & VISUAL INSPECTION
Region: 4
City: State: LA
County:
License #: LA-5601-l01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE HENRY VIA E-MAIL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: NON-DESTRUCTIVE & VISUAL INSPECTION
Region: 4
City: State: LA
County:
License #: LA-5601-l01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE HENRY VIA E-MAIL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 04/13/2006
Notification Time: 09:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/13/2006
Notification Time: 09:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/13/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
TROY PRUETT (R4)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
TROY PRUETT (R4)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT OF DAMAGED RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA
The State provided the following information via email:
"This is an incident involving a SPEC 150 exposure device with serial number 0288 that contained a 80 Ci source of Ir-192 (SPEC G-60 serial number NA-2006). On March 9, 2006 while radiographing a coupon, the exposure device was placed in contact with a welding lead. When the exposure device was cranked out the crankout cable formed an electrical conductor from the welding lead to the coupon. An arc and smoke was observed. The radiographer immediately returned the source to the shielded position. The radiographer approached the exposure device with a survey meter and determined the source was in the shielded position. The radiographer disconnected the source tube and replaced the safety plug. While attempting to remove the drive cable connector from the source pigtail, the connector came off. The radiographer replaced the dust cover cap, secured the exposure device in the transport container and called the main office. Neither radiographer received an excessive exposure. The exposure device and equipment were sent to SPEC for evaluation. SPEC stated that the integrity of the encapsulated source was not harmed, but the pigtail itself was unusable, and the source had to be disposed. The exposure device operated properly and was cleared for use by SPEC."
Louisiana Report LA060005
The State provided the following information via email:
"This is an incident involving a SPEC 150 exposure device with serial number 0288 that contained a 80 Ci source of Ir-192 (SPEC G-60 serial number NA-2006). On March 9, 2006 while radiographing a coupon, the exposure device was placed in contact with a welding lead. When the exposure device was cranked out the crankout cable formed an electrical conductor from the welding lead to the coupon. An arc and smoke was observed. The radiographer immediately returned the source to the shielded position. The radiographer approached the exposure device with a survey meter and determined the source was in the shielded position. The radiographer disconnected the source tube and replaced the safety plug. While attempting to remove the drive cable connector from the source pigtail, the connector came off. The radiographer replaced the dust cover cap, secured the exposure device in the transport container and called the main office. Neither radiographer received an excessive exposure. The exposure device and equipment were sent to SPEC for evaluation. SPEC stated that the integrity of the encapsulated source was not harmed, but the pigtail itself was unusable, and the source had to be disposed. The exposure device operated properly and was cleared for use by SPEC."
Louisiana Report LA060005