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Event Notification Report for February 17, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
02/16/2006 - 02/17/2006

** EVENT NUMBERS **


42156 42219 42242 42333 42342 42343 42344 42345

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General Information or Other Event Number: 42156
Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: IRIS NDT
Region: 4
City: TULSA State: OK
County:
License #: OK30246-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE BRODERICK
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 11/19/2005
Notification Time: 11:54 [ET]
Event Date: 11/18/2005
Event Time: 20:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R4)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE OF A RADIOGRAPHER

At 2000 on 11/18/05 during a radiography job at P2S in Sand Springs, OK, a radiographer received a 23 Rem calculated dose. He went out to change the camera film when he thought his assistant had fully retracted the source. The radiographer was in front of the camera for approximately 3 minutes. The licensee stated that the cause of the overexposure was miscommunication.

When the radiographer was on his way to the camera he set down his radiation detection instrument and answered a cell phone call. At the same time the assistant who was responsible for retracting the source was sending a text message on his cell phone. The radiographer's alarming rate meter was turned off. The camera was a SPEC Model 150 with a 66 Curie Iridium-192 source. The camera was tested after the event and found to be in good operating condition.

Both the radiographer and the assistant have been suspended pending further investigation. The dosimeters of the individuals have been sent to be read and readings should be available on 11/21/05. The licensees radiation safety officer made the report to the state after taking both individuals to the hospital for blood tests as a precautionary measure. On 11/21/05 the state will investigate this incident further at the jobsite.

* * * UPDATE FROM STATE (M. BRODERICK) TO M. RIPLEY 1515 ET 02/16/06 * * *

The results of a chromosome analysis performed on a blood sample indicated that the best estimate of the radiographer's exposure as a result of the event was 4 Rem (with a 95% confidence interval of 0 - 17 Rem). The licensee states that the blood analysis results are in agreement with the radiographer's dosimetry, and the radiographers dose for the year is calculated to be 6.9 Rem.

Notified R4 DO (D. Graves) and NMSS EO (G. Morell)

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 42219
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KELLY ROBINSON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 12/22/2005
Notification Time: 10:20 [ET]
Event Date: 12/22/2005
Event Time: 09:03 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN MCDERMOTT (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE

"The HPCI flow control current loop was found degraded in such a manner that HPCI would not perform its intended function. HPCI was declared inoperable per TS 3.5.E.2 (14 day LCO). Repair efforts have been initiated."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM M. RAMSEY TO M. RIPLEY AT 1601 ET ON 02/16/06 * * *

"On 12/22/05, the HPCI System flow indicator 'spiked' a number of times with the system in its normal standby line-up. Control Room Operators declared the HPCI system inoperable and entered a 14 day LCO per TS 3.5.E.2, to troubleshoot and repair the system as appropriate.

"The safety function of HPCI system is to provide and maintain an adequate coolant inventory inside the reactor vessel to prevent fuel clad conditions from exceeding 10CFR50.46 criteria as a result of postulated small breaks in the Nuclear System process barrier. To ensure that this safety function is met, the HPCI System must be able to deliver a minimum actual flow rate of 3570 gallons per minute (gpm) to the reactor vessel. The actual flow rate was reduced below the Technical Specification value of 4250 gpm to account for potential flow instrument string inaccuracies. The delivery of 3570 gpm of actual flow demonstrates that sufficient margin to safety function is maintained during accident conditions. In automatic operation, the HPCI flow controller uses the flow signal to maintain a flow rate of 4250 gpm and is designed to automatically adjust developed flow rate in response to changes in flow signals.

"System operation is tested quarterly by monitoring flow to ensure that the HPCI system can perform its safety functions. The Technical Specification surveillance requirement states that the HPCI system shall deliver at least 4250 gpm at normal reactor operating pressure when recirculating to the Condensate Storage Tank.

"The event investigation revealed that the cause of the flow spikes was a malfunctioning electrical component in the power supply module within the flow controller. Power to the flow transmitter is supplied by this module. The power supply would malfunction for a few seconds and then would return to normal operation, thereby resulting in step changes in the HPCI flow signal. It is conservative to assume the actual HPCI flow rate would have been reduced by the full amount of the flow rate, for the entire duration of the flow signal. Additional conservatism also exists because the HPCI system flow is unlikely to have been able to respond to the full value of a short duration flow spike.

"When calculating the average HPCI flow rate, the impact of the flow spikes decreases as a longer period is evaluated because the duration of all of the flow spikes added together is very short and comparably longer periods of stable performance exist between the individual spikes. Therefore, it is conservative to evaluate the shortest period of time that HPCI is required to perform its safety functions that is stated in the Design Bases Document as 1000 seconds. With HPCI operable, the worst case period occurred just prior to it being declared 'Inoperable'. HPCI was calculated to have developed an actual flow rate of greater than 4191 gpm during the worst case 1,000 second period.

"The calculation for 'HPCI Flow Control & Indication Loop Accuracy' provides total loop accuracy of plus or minus 216.2 gpm at 4250 gpm for Design Bases Accident conditions. A calculated flow rate of 4191 gpm, minus the flow instrument loop uncertainty of 216 gpm yields a worst case actual flow rate of 3975 gpm. A flow rate of 3975 gpm is greater than the 3570 gpm assumed in event calculations.

"The subject flow controller power supply module was removed and bench tested to demonstrate that sufficient operating margin existed to provide reasonable assurance that the power supply would not have failed if called upon to mitigate a design bases accident with sufficient margin. The testing simulated HPCI operation at 4250 gpm for more than 24 hours. No flow spikes were recorded during this period. Based upon these test results and the analysis provided above, if the subject power supply component had remained in service and HPCI operation was required, the system would have performed its required safety function for a duration exceeding any analyzed event.

"ENS Event Number 42219, completed on 12/22/05, is being retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1 DO (J. Trapp)

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 42242
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KEITH DUNCAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 01/04/2006
Notification Time: 18:29 [ET]
Event Date: 01/04/2006
Event Time: 13:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION RELATED TO EMERGENCY DIESEL FUEL OIL TANK VORTEX FORMATION

"At 1345, 1/4/06, Callaway Nuclear Plant completed a preliminary evaluation of the potential for vortex formation at the suction of the Emergency Diesel Generator fuel oil transfer pumps. This evaluation was performed in response to industry operating experience concerning an NRC finding identified during a utility inspection. The preliminary conclusion was that the existing Technical Specification level requirements for the Emergency Diesel Generator underground fuel oil storage tanks may be non-conservative and should be increased by an additional 489 gallons. This will result in a six day fuel oil volume requirement of 69,746 gallons and a seven day fuel oil volume requirement of 80,816 gallons.

"A review of indicated fuel oil storage tank levels for the last three years was conducted and it was determined that there was sufficient fuel oil contained within the underground storage tanks to satisfy the new, higher volume requirements. In those instances where the volume would have been below the new requirements, this condition was already being tracked in the Callaway Plant Equipment Out of Service Log (EOSL) to satisfy associated Technical Specification requirements.

"It was conservatively decided to institute administrative controls utilizing plant procedural controls and establish new, elevated fuel oil tank level limits which will ensure vortex formation can not occur. Once the evaluation results are finalized, a review of all actions taken to date will be performed to ensure all required actions have been identified and appropriate measures taken to ensure compliance."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY SHIFT MANAGER (BRADLEY) TO ROTTON AT 1539 ON 02/16/06 * * *

"The evaluation discussed in the original notification has been completed. Administrative minimum limits for fuel oil level established to maintain compliance with the original Technical Specification Emergency Diesel Generator underground fuel oil volume requirements were in fact sufficient to ensure the prevention of vortex formation at the suction of the fuel oil transfer pumps. The fuel oil transfer subsystem remained capable of performing its safety function; therefore, there are no applicable reporting criteria under 50.72 or 50.73 and Event Notification 42242 is retracted.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

Notified R4DO (Graves).

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General Information or Other Event Number: 42333
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: MACTECH ENGINEERING, INC
Region: 4
City: FORT WORTH State: TX
County:
License #: L05490
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 02/13/2006
Notification Time: 16:20 [ET]
Event Date: 12/12/2005
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/13/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE - TROXLER GAUGE STOLEN AND RECOVERED IN TEXAS

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"The gauge was unlocked in the company pickup truck. The technician was in the process of carrying the striker plate and drive rod into a below ground level test site, when he returned for the gauge it was missing. The technician reported the missing gauge to his company, Paris Texas Police Department and Paris Fire Department. The gauge was found in a parking lot the next morning by law enforcement.

"The gauge was a model # 3440 (serial # 27497) containing a Cs-137 nominal 8 mCi (source # 7501281) and an Am-241/Be source with nominal 40 mCi (serial # 47-23993).

"This event information was found as part of a review of all reports received from April 2005 till February 12, 2006 by this department."

Texas Report No. I-8286

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42342
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RICH KLINEFELTER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 02/16/2006
Notification Time: 03:38 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2006
Event Time: 02:35 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
INFORMATION ONLY
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 97 Power Operation 97 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

INJURED PERSON TAKEN TO LOCAL HOSPITAL

"This is a voluntary notification. 10CFR50.72 is not applicable.

"At 0235 on February 16, 2006, an operator informed the Control Room that a Health Physics Technician had fallen and received a cut to the head. The site first aid team and Field Unit Supervisor were dispatched and they determined the individual needed to be transported to an off site medical facility. An ambulance arrived on site at 0300 and transported the individual to a local hospital. However, the ambulance never entered the protected area. The individual was not contaminated as determined by Health Physics.

"A courtesy call was made to the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency due to an emergency vehicle entering the site."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42343
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC POWELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 02/16/2006
Notification Time: 06:38 [ET]
Event Date: 02/15/2006
Event Time: 23:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

POTENTIAL UNCONTROLLED RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE

"This is an 8-hour notification being made to report exceeding the design basis for reactor coolant leakage outside of containment. The normal daily RCS leakrate was completed at 2345 on 2/15/06. This leakrate indicated a step change in unidentified leakrate to .8 gpm from .09 gpm. This leakage value is within the 1 gpm allowed by Technical Specifications. Investigation is on going, and the source of the leak has not been determined at this time, however preliminary conclusion is that the leakage is outside of containment and related to the centrifugal charging pumps. The design requirement ECCS leakage outside of containment is 3840 cc/hour ( .1 gpm) to support GDC-19 limits for control room habilitability.

"No safety system actuation occurred or were required. No injuries have occurred due to this event."

The licensee has performed troubleshooting to identify the source of the leak and to narrow down the portion of the charging system where they believe the leak to be located. The licensee believes the leak is in a relief valve or hard pipe system to the waste tanks, and that the leak is not external to the system.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Hospital Event Number: 42344
Rep Org: ST MARYS HEALTH CARE
Licensee: ST MARYS HEALTH CARE
Region: 3
City: GRAND RAPIDS State: MI
County:
License #: 21-01078-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DALE SCHIPPERS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 02/16/2006
Notification Time: 13:35 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2006
Event Time: 13:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(2) - EXTERNAL RAD LEVELS > LIMITS
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)

Event Text

PACKAGES RECEIVED WITH HIGH LEVELS OF EXTERNAL TECHNECIUM 99 CONTAMINATION

The RSO for St Marys Health Care performed receipt inspections on two packages delivered from Cardinal Health Pharmacy in Denison, MI that contained 9 milliCuries of I-131 and 14 milliCuries of I-131.

The package that contained the 9 milliCurie source had external radiation levels of 0.08 mRem/hr at 3 feet and 1.5 mRem/hr on the surface, and external removable contamination of 16,000 DPM of Tech 99 (gamma emitter). That package also had removable surface contamination on the exterior of the source container inside the packaging material of 619,000 DPM of Tech 99.

The second package that contained the 14 milliCurie source had external radiation levels of 0.08 mRem/hr at 3 feet and 1.5 mRem/hr on the surface, and external removable contamination of 5,000 DPM of Tech 99. That package also had removable surface contamination on the exterior of the source container inside the packaging material of 320,000 DPM of Tech 99.

The licensee immediately notified the RSO for Cardinal Health Pharmacy in Denison, MI concerning the delivery.

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 42345
Rep Org: SOUTHEAST MISSOURI STATE UNIVERSITY
Licensee: SOUTHEAST MISSOURI STATE UNIVERSITY
Region: 3
City: CAPE GIRARDEAU State: MO
County:
License #: 24-09296-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WALT LILLY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 02/16/2006
Notification Time: 17:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/15/2006
Event Time: 09:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
E. WILLIAM BRACH (NMSS)

Event Text

AMERICIUM 241 CONTAMINATION UNDER STORAGE ROOM CABINETS

A contamination survey was being performed to relocate 16 cabinets in Room 25 of Magill Hall to change the use of the approximately 500 square foot storage room. These 16 cabinets had not been moved since the basement of Magill Hall went through a decontamination remediation related to an Americium 241 spill in 2000 [See EN# 37282 and EN# 37298]. The contamination survey was conducted due to a license condition relating to the removal of equipment from the facility due to the spill in the year 2000. After the cabinets were moved, fixed Am-241 contamination was found . The contamination testing was limited to 20-25 spots of 100 square centimeters on the floor of Room 25, except for one spot on one cabinet. It is estimated that approximately 30% of the room floor has potential contamination. The highest spot had 80,000 dpm fixed contamination of Am-241 (release limit of 100 dpm). Many other spots ran in the 15,000-35,000 dpm range. The average spot was calculated at 5000 dpm of fixed contamination of Am-241. Air monitoring of the room shows only background levels. Individual counting of the air samples is in progress. There is no indication of airborne contamination at this time.

The room is now controlled by a high security lock which can only be opened by the licensee RSO. The room has been posted as a Radioactive Materials Contaminated Area. A very high percentage of the contamination is fixed. One round of decontamination using wet paper towels has reduced the contamination considerably but was not eliminated. The licensee estimates that it will perform up to 3 additional decontamination rounds using gentle techniques (wet paper towels) one week apart to allow the floor to dry between rounds.

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