Event Notification Report for February 15, 2006

AMERICIUM 241 CONTAMINATION UNDER STORAGE ROOM CABINETS

A contamination survey was being performed to relocate 16 cabinets in Room 25 of Magill Hall to change the use of the approximately 500 square foot storage room. These 16 cabinets had not been moved since the basement of Magill Hall went through a decontamination remediation related to an Americium 241 spill in 2000 [See EN# 37282 and EN# 37298]. The contamination survey was conducted due to a license condition relating to the removal of equipment from the facility due to the spill in the year 2000. After the cabinets were moved, fixed Am-241 contamination was found . The contamination testing was limited to 20-25 spots of 100 square centimeters on the floor of Room 25, except for one spot on one cabinet. It is estimated that approximately 30% of the room floor has potential contamination. The highest spot had 80,000 dpm fixed contamination of Am-241 (release limit of 100 dpm). Many other spots ran in the 15,000-35,000 dpm range. The average spot was calculated at 5000 dpm of fixed contamination of Am-241. Air monitoring of the room shows only background levels. Individual counting of the air samples is in progress. There is no indication of airborne contamination at this time.

The room is now controlled by a high security lock which can only be opened by the licensee RSO. The room has been posted as a Radioactive Materials Contaminated Area. A very high percentage of the contamination is fixed. One round of decontamination using wet paper towels has reduced the contamination considerably but was not eliminated. The licensee estimates that it will perform up to 3 additional decontamination rounds using gentle techniques (wet paper towels) one week apart to allow the floor to dry between rounds.

POTENTIAL UNCONTROLLED RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE

"This is an 8-hour notification being made to report exceeding the design basis for reactor coolant leakage outside of containment. The normal daily RCS leakrate was completed at 2345 on 2/15/06. This leakrate indicated a step change in unidentified leakrate to .8 gpm from .09 gpm. This leakage value is within the 1 gpm allowed by Technical Specifications. Investigation is on going, and the source of the leak has not been determined at this time, however preliminary conclusion is that the leakage is outside of containment and related to the centrifugal charging pumps. The design requirement ECCS leakage outside of containment is 3840 cc/hour ( .1 gpm) to support GDC-19 limits for control room habilitability.

"No safety system actuation occurred or were required. No injuries have occurred due to this event."

The licensee has performed troubleshooting to identify the source of the leak and to narrow down the portion of the charging system where they believe the leak to be located. The licensee believes the leak is in a relief valve or hard pipe system to the waste tanks, and that the leak is not external to the system.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM PAUL ABBOTT TO JOE O'HARA AT 2119 ON 4/6/06 * * *

"On February 16, 2006, PSEG made an 8-hour report (event number 42343) in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) because of exceeding the design basis limits for ECCS leakage outside containment. The leakage was determined to be approximately 0.8 gpm with a limit of 3840 cc/hour.

"Further investigation into this event determined that the leakage was not in the ECCS recirculation flow path. The cause of the elevated RCS unidentified leakrate was the failure of the automatic three-way high level divert valve (2CV35), which prevents a high level from occurring in the Volume Control Tank (VCT). This valve failed to fully isolate flow to the Chemical Volume Control (CVC) Hold-Up Tanks (HUTs) after VCT level dropped below the divert setpoint of 77% . This conclusion is based on the VCT level being at the divert setpoint a number of times during the shift, the increased use of the valve to control level, and valve performance to fully isolate flow to the CVC HUT'S.

"Because this flow path is automatically isolated on a Safety Injection signal by other means (valves), the leakage through this valve is not considered part of the ECCS recirculation flow path and therefore is not included in the calculation for ECCS leakage outside containment.

"The event is being withdrawn."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

R1DO(Finney) notified.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION - PRESS RELEASE CONCERNING TRITIUM INSPECTION PROGRAM

"This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) to let the NRC know that a press release issued by Exelon Nuclear at 1300 CST on February 15, 2006 mentions, in part, recently identified inadvertent tritium releases from Braidwood, Byron and Dresden Stations."

This event was reported by Exelon Corporate also includes Byron 1 & 2 ( both units at 100%) and Dresden 2 & 3 ( Unit 2 - 97% and Unit 3 - 98%).

See related Braidwood Station event - Event Number 42184.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.