| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
01/25/2006 - 01/26/2006 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 42021 | Rep Org: WYLE LABORATORIES
Licensee: BUSSMANN
Region: 1
City: HUNTSVILLE State: AL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRUCE BATEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 09/27/2005
Notification Time: 17:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2005
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
TABATABAI (faxed) (NRR)
| Event Text MATERIAL DEFECT REPORT
The licensee provided the following information via facsimile:
"Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, this letter notifies the NRC of the existence of a possible defect in Bussmann KWN-R fuses.
"The defect is a poor solder connection of the fuse link assembly to the rejection ferrule. The defect applies potentially to all KWN-R fuses.
"An evaluation was performed and determined that this defect can create a substantial safety hazard or contribute to circumstances that would exceed safety limits as defined in the technical specifications of a license issued pursuant to 10CFR50. Safety-related circuits that include fuses with this defect may not be able to perform their safety-related function as required during a design basis event. Therefore, this potential defect is reportable per 10 CFR Part 21.
"DESCRIPTION OF ANOMALY:
The customer reports that the fuse lost electrical continuity while in service. The customer cut the fuse open and found the fuse element intact and a lack of electrical continuity across the soldered connection of the element to the rejection ferrule of the fuse. According to the customer, the fuse had been in service since 3/31/05 carrying 2 - 3 amperes, and there were no overcurrent events which caused the fuse to open.
"DISPOSITION - COMMENTS - RECOMMENDATIONS:
The customer returned the fuse to Wyle for failure analysis. Wyle forwarded the fuse to the manufacturer for evaluation. The manufacturer found a poor solder connection on the rejection cap. Apparently the cap did not get hot enough to reflow solder during the manufacturing process. The manufacturer stated the issue could be isolated to this particular fuse due to placing it in an incorrect bin, but the issue may extend to other fuses due to a process problem. Based on the evaluation, a potential defect exists in other KWN-R fuses.
"As a screening test to ensure a good soldered connection, the manufacturer recommends performing a Current Carrying Capacity Test for 30 minutes at 110% of rated current after warm up at 100% of rated current.
"This anomaly impacts qualification of KWN-R fuses. Only KWN-R fuses that pass the 110% Current Carrying Capacity Test are qualified."
* * *UPDATE PROVIDED BY BATEMAN TO ROTTON AT 0942 EST ON 01/25/06 * * *
The manufacturer provided the following information via fax:
"This letter provides an update to the referenced letter that Wyle submitted to the NRC on the above subject [on 09/27/05]
"The KWN-R fuses affected are limited to [less than or equal to] 30 amps. KTN-R fuses [less than or equal to] 30 amps are added to the referenced Part 21 notification since these fuses are manufactured using the same process as the KWN-R fuses.
"Thus far, poor solder joints have been found in 3, 6, and 10 amp KWN-R fuses. In addition to the date codes previously mentioned (L05, M37, M17), poor solder joints have also been found in date codes L11, L19, M07, M20, M40.
"Poor solder joints have also been found in 3, 4, 5, and 15 amp KTN-R fuses of the 1987-1991, vintage (no date code on fuses).
"When performing the 110% Current-Carrying Capacity Test, the fuses should be warmed up at 100% until their temperature and the voltage drop across them are stable before applying 110% current to avoid blowing the fuses.
"A mechanical drop test has been added to the KWN-R and KTN-R manufacturing process. This drop test should be added to the screening process. The drop test consists of:
1. Measure and record the fuse resistance.
2. Drop the fuse though a 3 foot pipe onto a laminated workbench onto the non-rejection end of the fuse.
3. Measure the fuse resistance after the drop.
4. Acceptance Criteria: Fuse resistance should be the same resistance after the drop (+/- 10%) and within the manufacturer's specified range."
Notified R1DO (Perry), R2DO (Payne), R3DO (Lipa), R4DO (Spitzberg), and NRR (Tabatabai) |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42279 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: J.R.J. PAVING INC.
Region: 4
City: DALLAS State: TX
County:
License #: L05307-002
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAN JISHA
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 01/20/2006
Notification Time: 16:44 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2006
Event Time: 14:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/20/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
TAS (e-mail) ()
MEXICO (via-fax) ()
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
At about 1400 hours Central Standard Time, while working at a site in Fort Worth, a 2003/2004 Chevrolet pick-up carrying a Troxler moisture density gauge belonging to the licensee was stolen. The gauge is a model number 3440 with a serial number of 28640. It has two sources. One is a 44 millicurie Americium-Beryllium source (model # A/S AmBe Model 997 Type X-LP 3021 and 3027) and the other is a 9 millicurie Cesium-137 source (model # A/S CDCW556; IPL Model HEG/137-AM). The licensee called the State an hour after the truck and gauge were stolen.
The licensee filed a police report. The State of Texas is continuing to investigate the incident.
Texas Incident #: I-8290
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42285 | Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: CHAD G. BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 01/25/2006
Notification Time: 01:33 [ET]
Event Date: 01/24/2006
Event Time: 19:32 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INVALID HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY (HPCS) INITIATION SIGNAL DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING
"50.72 (b) (3) (vi) Non-Emergency 8Hr Reportable
"When I&C was performing STP-051-4256, HPCS Drywell Pressure High Channel Calibration and Logic System Functional Test (B21-N067R, B21-N667R), a human performance error resulted in an invalid HPCS initiation signal. Division III diesel generator and the HPCS pump started. The HPCS injection valve stroked open and was manually overridden closed after full open indication, thus HPCS system injection was terminated. HPCS System was unavailable due to being overridden with an initiation signal present from 1932 until 2109 [CST] for a total of 1 Hr and 37 minutes.
"NUREG 1022 states that single-train systems that perform safety functions (i.e., HPCS), when lost, prevents the fulfillment of the safety function of that system."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 42286 | Rep Org: US EPA, ECOSYSTEMS RESEARCH DIV
Licensee: US EPA, ECOSYSTEMS RESEARCH DIV
Region: 1
City: ATHENS State: GA
County:
License #: 10-10146-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES KITCHENS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 01/25/2006
Notification Time: 15:16 [ET]
Event Date: 01/25/2006
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/25/2006 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
| Person (Organization):
NEIL PERRY (R1)
MICHELE BURGESS (NMSS)
LANCE ENGLISH Email (TAS)
| Event Text MISSING NICKEL 63 SEALED SOURCE
US EPA Ecosystems Research Division RSO called to state that a 15 milliCurie sealed source of Ni-63 was misplaced. The last time an inventory was taken of this electron capture source was on 06/22/05, and was believed to have been used some time around 12/20/05. The source is used for chemical analysis in a Gas Chromatograph. The RSO believes this source to be misplaced and not stolen.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. | |