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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
12/02/2005 - 12/05/2005
** EVENT NUMBERS **
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| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 42177 |
Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: MEDI-PHYSICS
Region: 3
City: CHICAGO State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01052-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN |
Notification Date: 11/30/2005
Notification Time: 16:03 [ET]
Event Date: 11/28/2005
Event Time: 15:10 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/30/2005 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE |
Person (Organization):
PATRICK LOUDEN (R3)
LYDIA CHANG (NMSS) |
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING RADIOACTIVE I-131 SPILL
"On November 29, 2005 the corporate radiation safety officer contacted the Division by telephone concerning an event that occurred at a nuclear pharmacy operated by Medi-Physics, Inc, dba GE Healthcare (license number IL-01052-01) located at 1053 W. Grand, Chicago, IL. During the call, the Division was advised that, 100 mCi of Na I-131 was spilled at 15:10 on November 28, 2005, when a vial was dropped to the floor and broke outside a fume hood in the iodine room located within the restricted area of the facility. Contamination was detected on the operator's pants and shoes and on various surfaces in the room. However, no personal contamination was detected following removal of the individual's lab coat, shoes, and other clothing. Bioassay results taken shortly after the incident and the next day indicated thyroid uptake was minimal.
"A response team from the licensee's main offices performed remediation that evening to contain and shield much of the activity and employ other measures to prevent the spread of contamination. As a result of these efforts, contamination was confined within the iodine room of the restricted area of the pharmacy. Air monitoring results show that there was no elevation of airborne radioactivity in the restricted area or in the effluent air at the release point from the facility that was above regulatory limits. A recovery drum was used to collect and hold waste and materials generated as a result of the clean up. The dose rate on the surface of the container was approximately 350 µSv/h (35 mR/h) and the dose rate at the nearest outside wall in an unrestricted area was 4 µSv/h (0.4 mR/h).
"The area will be monitored on an ongoing basis until routine conditions are restored. Although measured dose rates are only slightly elevated at the workstations within the room, access to the room has been limited to monitoring activities, in the interest of ALARA. Prescriptions for radioiodine are temporarily being referred to the company's alternate radiopharmacy."
IL Report Number: IL050070 |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 42183 |
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RON FRY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA |
Notification Date: 12/02/2005
Notification Time: 05:05 [ET]
Event Date: 12/02/2005
Event Time: 00:49 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/02/2005 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE |
Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM (SPDS) FAILURE ON UNIT TWO
"At 0049 hours on 12/2/2005 the Unit 2 [safety parameter display system] SPDS system failed. The cause of the failure is under investigation and is expected to exceed 8 hours.
"ERDS remains operable but several points are not available. For example 23 of 58 ERDS points are unavailable while SPDS is out of service, The ERDS system can transmit the remaining points.
"Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability - A review of the ability of the Emergency organization to function without SPDS was performed. Alternate sources for many of the points in SPDS were identified and are contained on an Emergency Plan format in PICSY (plant integrated computer system). Those points not available from PICSY can be obtained from the control room. With these compensatory actions and the communications in place between the facilities, there will not be a major loss of emergency assessment capability.
"Since the Unit 2 SPDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE (Gordy Robinson verbal notification to Joe O'Hara at 0719 EST on 12/2/2005): * * *
" As of 0530 EDT on 12/02/05, Unit 2 SPDS was restored to Operable status following replacement of the CPU Board for the Remote Data Concentrator (RDC). NRC Resident was notified." R1DO (Todd Jackson) notified. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 42184 |
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE DEBOARD
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA |
Notification Date: 12/02/2005
Notification Time: 11:45 [ET]
Event Date: 12/02/2005
Event Time: 10:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/02/2005 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION |
Person (Organization):
PATRICK LOUDEN (R3)
ERIC BENNER (NRR)
THOMAS BLOUNT (IRD) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
| 2 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION - ELEVATED LEVELS OF TRITIUM FOUND IN GROUNDWATER
"This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for a press release issued by Exelon Nuclear at 10:00 AM CST on December 2, 2005 regarding elevated levels of tritium found in groundwater on the Braidwood Station site property near the plant's north boundary. An environmental monitoring program at the Braidwood Generating Station has found higher than normal concentrations of tritium close to an underground pipe inside the plant's northern boundary, and the station has begun a remediation program. An Exelon Nuclear environmental team is drilling test wells on and just beyond the Braidwood property line in order to determine how much tritium may have moved beyond the plant boundaries and ultimately to clean up the tritium. Exelon Nuclear has notified NRC regional personnel, appropriate state agencies, local and state elected officials and four property owners who are potentially affected.
"The tritium was found in shallow groundwater 8 to 15 feet deep on company property. It poses no health or safety risk to the public and does not threaten drinking water wells in the area. Tritium is a naturally occurring isotope of hydrogen that emits a very low level of radiation and is a natural part of water. It is found in more concentrated levels in water used in nuclear reactors. The closest private residential wells to the site showed no tritium above natural background levels. A sample of water from a pond 50 yards north of the plant property line showed tritium levels of about 2,400 picocuries per liter, above background levels but less than one-eighth of the federal drinking water limit. The residential and pond test samples were taken with the consent of property owners and the results received on Dec. 1.
"The underground pipe that passes near the monitored site in the past has carried water containing tritium from the plant to the Kankakee River, where it was periodically discharged under federal guidelines as part of normal plant operations. No tritiated water is currently in the pipe and no tritium is currently being introduced into the ground. Braidwood has not released levels of tritium that exceeded federal limits."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State and local agencies and has issued a press release. |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 42185 |
Rep Org: FRAMATOME ANP RICHLAND
Licensee: FRAMATOME ANP RICHLAND
Region: 4
City: RICHLAND State: WA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JERALD HOLM
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY |
Notification Date: 12/02/2005
Notification Time: 12:50 [ET]
Event Date: 11/15/2005
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/02/2005 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH |
Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1)
ANTHONY GODY (R4)
OMID TABATABAI (NRR) |
Event Text
PART 21 NOTIFICATION - SAFETY LIMIT MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO CALCULATION
"(i) Name and address of the individual informing the Commission:
Jerald S. Holm, Framatome ANP, 2101 Horn Rapids Road, Richland, WA 99354
"(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect:
The Safety Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio (SLMCPR) for Susquehanna Unit 1 Cycle 14.
"(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect:
Framatome ANP
"(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such a defect or failure to comply:
The mean bow and standard deviation from recent channel measurements during a Susquehanna Unit 1 Cycle 14 (SQ1C14) mid-cycle outage exceed the values in the current database used in licensing analyses for Susquehanna Unit 1.
"The majority of data acquired at Susquehanna Unit 1 during the mid-cycle outage were in the exposure range of 35 to 45 MWd/kgU. In that range, the new measurements exceed both the mean and the standard deviation of bow from the existing database. Preliminary results from the measurements indicate that the mean from the new data is approximately 60% higher and the standard deviation is approximately 50% higher.
"The SLMCPR Technical Specification limit for Susquehanna Unit 1 Cycle 14 was too low (by about .01) when calculated with the channel bow values from the Framatome ANP channel bow database, since channel bows measured for Cycle 14 exceeded those in the channel bow database. Therefore a safety limit could have been violated.
"(v) The date on which the information of such a defect or failure to comply was obtained:
This issue was determined to be a deviation on November 15, 2005.
"(vi) In the case of a basic component which fails to comply, the number and the location of all such components in use at, supplied for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part:
Susquehanna Unit 1 Cycle 14.
"The other plants supported by Framatome ANP analyses, or using Framatome ANP supplied channels, are not impacted.
"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for this action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action:
A new SLMCPR for the remainder of the Susquehanna Unit 1 Cycle 14 (denoted Cycle 14a) operation has been provided by Framatome ANP which bounds channel bow experienced during Susquehanna Unit 1 Cycle 14.
"Susquehanna Unit 1 also applied a conservative interim CPR penalty (.04) during Cycle 14 operation when slow settling of the control blades was encountered.
"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees:
In order to assure that other plants are not impacted in the future by unanticipated channel bow, recommended surveillance actions will be provided in January 2006 to all customers using Framatome ANP channels. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 42187 |
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE DeBOARD
HQ OPS Officer: RONALD HARRINGTON |
Notification Date: 12/03/2005
Notification Time: 12:25 [ET]
Event Date: 12/02/2005
Event Time: 17:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/03/2005 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT |
Person (Organization):
PATRICK LOUDEN (R3) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
REACTOR POWER OPERATION IN EXCESS OF OPERATING LICENSE CONDITION
"This notification is being made pursuant to Braidwood Station Unit 1, Operating License Condition 2.G, which requires a 24 hour notification to the NRC Operations Center for reactor power operation in excess of 3586.6 megawatts thermal (100 percent rated power), i.e., a violation of Operating License Condition 2.C (1)- Braidwood Station will, following this notification, provide a written report within thirty days in accordance with the procedures described in 10 CFR 50.73(b), (c), and (e).
"Braidwood Station, Unit 1 experienced a Feedwater temperature transient on November 18, 2004, which caused reactor power to momentarily increase and peak at approximately 101.2% as indicated on the excore nuclear instrumentation system. The duration that reactor power remained above 100% was approximately one minute. Subsequent to the event, a number of peer reviews were conducted to validate that power did not exceed 102%. The results of these reviews questioned the methodology used to determine the power level at the time of the transient. Industry was consulted regarding methodologies appropriate for power level measurement during transient conditions. At 1700 on December 2, 2005, an independent Exelon task force concluded, using a conservative methodology, that reactor power level during this transient did exceed 100% for approximately one minute and was limited to a peak of approximately 103.5% and that the appropriate reports, as specified in the Operating License, should be initiated.
"This overpower transient, caused by the loss of a Feedwater heater string, is bounded by the Feedwater design basis transient described and analyzed in UFSAR, Section 15.1.1, "Feedwater System Malfunctions Causing a Reduction in Feedwater Temperature, therefore, the event did not place Braidwood Unit 1 in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. No safety limits were exceeded and there was no impact on the health and safety of the public. The licensee has notified the Resident Inspector."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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