| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
12/01/2005 - 12/02/2005 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 42172 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: LEIGHTON AND ASSOCIATES
Region: 4
City: IRVINE State: CA
County:
License #: 3109-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONELLE KRAJEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 11/28/2005
Notification Time: 13:25 [ET]
Event Date: 11/28/2005
Event Time: 07:22 [PST]
Last Update Date: 11/28/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY GODY (R4)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
TAS via email ()
MEXICO via fax ()
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A STOLEN NUCLEAR GAUGE
"At 0830 on November 28, 2005, RHB-Brea received a call from the licensee that one of their gauges (CPN, MC1-DRP, #MD20306488 containing 10 mCi Cs-137 and 50 mCi Am-241:Be) was stolen out of their construction trailer that was located at a temporary job site (KB Homes - "The Cove" construction site, located at the corner of Warren Road and Cottonwood in San Jacinto, CA). Three of the four construction trailers at this job site had been broken into over the same time period - the security metal plates (covering the locks to the doors) had all been pried open and the locks to the doors were cut off and were removed from the site. The theft occurred sometime between 1130 on November 23, 2005 (when the gauge user secured the gauge inside the construction trailer) and 0722 on November 28, 2005 (when the gauge user returned to the job site and discovered the theft). The last leak test for this gauge was performed on January 4, 2005 and was negative for removable contamination. The licensee contacted the San Jacinto Police Department to report the theft. They will also post a $1000 reward for the gauge in the local paper."
"CA NMED #: XCA-824"
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42180 | Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRUCE PARRISH
HQ OPS Officer: RONALD HARRINGTON | Notification Date: 12/01/2005
Notification Time: 15:50 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2005
Event Time: 14:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | A/R | Y | 40 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL
While reducing power in order to enter containment, and following a manual main turbine trip due to high vibration, an automatic reactor trip on low steam generator level was received as a result of the turbine trip transient. Containment was being entered to investigate the source of an RCS identified leakage, which was less than the Technical Specification limit. In conjunction with the reactor trip, an automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System was received as expected.
All control rods fully inserted on the automatic trip. The current decay heat removal path is via the steam dumps to the main condenser. No primary or secondary relief valves lifted during the transient. There are no known primary to secondary leaks. All safety related buses are powered from offsite power. With the exception of one diesel out of service for planned maintenance, all emergency diesel generators are available and in standby. Unit 2 was not affected.
The licensee notified State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42182 | Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID SEENEY
HQ OPS Officer: RONALD HARRINGTON | Notification Date: 12/01/2005
Notification Time: 19:34 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2005
Event Time: 18:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
ANTHONY GODY (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION - EMERGENCY DIESEL CAPABILITY
"This report addresses a concern with the capability to field flash the diesel generator after the diesel engine has started in response to a fire in the Control Room. Step C9 in procedure OFN RP-017 opens NB0212 to drop power to NB02 and force an automatic start of the 'B' Train emergency diesel engine. Step C10 states to verify that the diesel engine is running and provides an RNO action to start the diesel if it is not running.
"Step C10.d in OFN RP-017 has the operator check NB02 voltage on breaker NB0201 NORMAL. There is no RNO action if the voltage is not normal.
"A fire in control room panel RL015 has the potential to cause a loss of diesel generator field flashing. For example, a short to ground on conductor 51 in cable 14KJK03AH with a simultaneous short to ground on conductor N1 in cable 14NEB11AA could blow the fuse(s) associated with the speed control relays (LSR and HSR). Loss of power to these relays will prevent field flashing, which will prevent voltage generation from the diesel generator, even though the diesel engine may be running.
"Step C10.b in OFN RP-017 has the operator place the master transfer switch (KJHS0109) in LOC/MAN. Based on drawing E-13KJ03A, this action will isolate the control room start circuit by opening the contact between G7 and H7, and effectively isolate the short circuit potential. However, the fuse may have already blown before this action is taken. The circuit is not provided with redundant fusing, so it may be necessary to replace one or both fuses (FU5 and FU6) in panel KJ122 to re-establish power to the speed relays.
"Wolf Creek has implemented the following compensatory measures:
"Staged 4 spare fuses in the emergency locker in the B Train Diesel Generator Room.
Revised OFN RP-017, Control Room Evacuation.
Continued hourly fire watch in the control room (established due to another concern). "
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42183 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RON FRY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 12/02/2005
Notification Time: 05:05 [ET]
Event Date: 12/02/2005
Event Time: 00:49 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/02/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM (SPDS) FAILURE ON UNIT TWO
"At 0049 hours on 12/2/2005 the Unit 2 [safety parameter display system] SPDS system failed. The cause of the failure is under investigation and is expected to exceed 8 hours.
"ERDS remains operable but several points are not available. For example 23 of 58 ERDS points are unavailable while SPDS is out of service, The ERDS system can transmit the remaining points.
"Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability - A review of the ability of the Emergency organization to function without SPDS was performed. Alternate sources for many of the points in SPDS were identified and are contained on an Emergency Plan format in PICSY (plant integrated computer system). Those points not available from PICSY can be obtained from the control room. With these compensatory actions and the communications in place between the facilities, there will not be a major loss of emergency assessment capability.
"Since the Unit 2 SPDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee. | |