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Event Notification Report for November 18, 2005

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
11/17/2005 - 11/18/2005

** EVENT NUMBERS **


41962 42120 42141 42142 42148 42151 42152 42153

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 41962
Rep Org: MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
Licensee: MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
Region: 3
City: EAST LANSING State: MI
County:
License #: 210002129
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL ROSSI
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 08/30/2005
Notification Time: 13:27 [ET]
Event Date: 08/30/2005
Event Time: 10:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
ARMAND CARON (CANA)
TAS (E-MAIL) ()

Event Text

LICENSEE REPORTED AN UNACCOUNTABLE CALIFORNIUM-249 SOURCE

The licensee reported that a 0.958 microCurie (as of 02/05/83) source of Californium 249 was unaccounted for when the device was inspected prior to usage. The source is a solid electrode deposit on a platinum foil which is used to calibrate nuclear physics instrumentation. The last inventory was conducted on 07/25/05, but it was only a visual check of the container. The last activity identification of the device was on 05/11/04. They have searched and are continuing the search to find the material. No evidence of contamination has been detected in the area at this time.

This is a IAEA Category 5 material. Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury.

For some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are IAEA Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

*** UPDATE FROM ROSSI TO KNOKE AT 13:05 EDT 0N 09/07/05 ***

The licensee made a correction to the 3rd sentence in the first paragraph to read as follows: "The last inventory was conducted on 07/25/05, which was a physical inventory of the source."

Notified R3DO (Cameron) and NMSS (Hickey), and emailed TAS (Danis).

* * * UPDATE FROM K. ERICKSON TO W. GOTT AT 0855 ON 11/17/05 * * *

The licensee located the lost material on November 10, 2005. The source was in the restricted area of the facility but was not in the normal storage location. The source in now in the appropriate locked storage location. The licensee notified Regions 3 (S. Bakhsh).

Notified R3DO (Stone), NMSS (G. Morell), email Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, and TAS (Whitney).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42120
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL PLETCHER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 11/04/2005
Notification Time: 22:20 [ET]
Event Date: 11/04/2005
Event Time: 16:08 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

TEMPORARY LOSS OF THE RUNNING RHR PUMP DURING A BUS TRANSFER

"PCIS Group 4 isolated during Reactor Protection Power Supply bus transfer. The isolation was not expected by control room operators prior to the power supply transfer. The isolation resulted in the trip of the running RHR pump.

"Operators verified proper isolation and reset the power supply. Shutdown cooling was re-established. The total time out of service was 18 minutes. The time to boil was calculated to be 68 hours prior to the event."

The temperature at the RHR heat exchanger inlet at the beginning of the event was 90 degrees. The temperature at 22:20 was 92 degrees. The other RHR pump was available during this event. The plant is in refueling with the cavity flooded.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1606 EST ON 11/17/05 FROM MICHAEL PLETCHER TO S.SANDIN * * *

"This notification updates the reporting criteria for Event No. 42120. The event was determined to not be reportable per 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) since it was not due to a valid signal or the result of an intentional manual initiation. This report also satisfies the 60 day telephone notification provisions in 10CFR50.73 (a)(1).

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A) due to an invalid Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 4 actuation that impacted the availability of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) shutdown cooling system.

"On November 4, 2005, with the reactor shutdown for refueling, an invalid actuation of PCIS Group 4 occurred during transfer of 'A' RPS Bus power supply. The actuation occurred because a breaker supplying power to the 'B' logic was tagged open resulting in completing the PCIS actuation logic. The Group 4 actuation resulted in a complete isolation of the single train RHR shutdown cooling suction path by isolation of RHR-17 and RHR -18 isolation valves.

"The shutdown cooling path was isolated for approximately 18 minutes and the time to boil was approximately 68 hours at the time of the event."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Barkley).

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General Information or Other Event Number: 42141
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TERRA-MAR INC.
Region: 4
City: IRVING State: TX
County:
License #: L03157
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LATISCHA HANSON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 11/15/2005
Notification Time: 12:00 [ET]
Event Date: 11/14/2005
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/15/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
MEXICO (VIA E-MAIL) ()
JIM WHITNEY (E-MAIL) (TAS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE

The State provided the following information via email:

The State of Texas received a call from the Radiation Safety Officer for Terra-Mar Inc. on Tuesday, November 15, 2005, reporting the theft of a moisture/density gauge, Troxler Model # 3430, Serial # 32220, with a 40 milliCurie AmBe source, Serial # 47-28552 and an 8 milliCurie Cs-137, Serial # 750-7360. The licensee went to the gauge storage area of the site on Monday, November 14, 2005, and discovered that the gauge was missing. The licensee checked with personnel to see if any one had removed it from the storage area. When no one acknowledged removing the gauge, the licensee contacted Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS), Dallas-Ft Worth Department of Public Safety, and the Irving Police Department that the gauge was possibly stolen. The licensee will send in the police report and a written statement to DSHS. The last leak test performed on the missing gauge was performed on July 9, 2005.

Texas Report Number: I-8277

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 42142
Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: SHELL LUBRICANTS
Region: 1
City: VICKSBURG State: MS
County:
License #: GL-154
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOBBY SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 11/15/2005
Notification Time: 16:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2005
Event Time: 12:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/15/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
TAS (e-mailed) ()

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT FROM MISSISSIPPI

"During routine inspection of general licensed devices at Shell Lubricants, it was discovered that the company could not account for two (2) Metorex X-Ray Fluorescence Analyzers. The facility has changed ownership since the last inspection and records were not well maintained of receipt/transfer and leak tests. The licensee conducted a search of the facility after the inspection and did not locate the devices. They also contacted personnel that had been previously employed in the facility as well as the maintenance supervisor, who had no information of the location or disposal of the devices. The Metorex Models were a HEPS X-ray Fluorescence Analyzer, containing a 60 millicurie Curium-244 source, Serial No. 206734, and a LEPS X-ray Fluorescence Analyzer, containing a 40 millicurie Iron-55 source, Serial No. 206777.

"Describe clean-up actions taken by DRH: After determining all other radioactive devices were accounted for, DRH helped search for the lost devices, but could not locate them.

"Case Closed: No

"Enforcement action taken: Investigation ongoing. Licensee cited violations for lost devices and failure to maintain records of receipt/transfer. Also require to send DRH a report about lost devices and corrective actions."

Mississippi Report Number: MS-05-004

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42148
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [4] [ ]
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM SPEICHER
HQ OPS Officer: RONALD HARRINGTON
Notification Date: 11/17/2005
Notification Time: 08:55 [ET]
Event Date: 11/17/2005
Event Time: 00:47 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
CAROLYN EVANS (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
4 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS AND SUBSEQUENT RECOVERY OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM

Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) was unavailable from 00:47 until 01:51 due to an Emergency Response Data Acquisition and Display System (ERDADS) failure. The problem has been corrected and ERDADS is currently able to supply data to ERDS.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42151
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: M. A. REIDMEYER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 11/17/2005
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 11/17/2005
Event Time: 08:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
OMID TABATABAI (NRR)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Hot Standby 0 Startup

Event Text

INITIAL PART 21 NOTIFICATION - PRIME MEASUREMENT PRODUCTS, MODELS 763 & 763A PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS AND MODEL 764 DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS

The following information was received via facsimile:

"On 11/2/05 SGT LLC, primary contractor for Steam Generator replacements at Callaway Plant, received notification from PRIME Measurement Products, (formerly ITT Barton) of a manufacturing defect in Model 763, 763A, and 764 pressure transmitters involving use of Zener diodes that were not in compliance with purchase specifications. Subsequently, on 11/3/05 SGT LLC notified AmerenUE Callaway Plant of the potential manufacturing defects involving the aforementioned transmitters. These transmitters provide input to steam generator level indication and control functions.

"The notification provided by PRIME stated the purchasing specifications required JANTX components, but in some cases commercial variations of the required parts were used to manufacture some transmitters. This condition was potentially reportable under 10 CFR 21, depending on the specific application at facilities using these instruments manufactured by PRIME Measurement Products. The following is a summary of the information obtained from PRIME Measurement Products:

1. This notification involves 76 specific transmitters manufactured between 2/10/04 and 9/19/05.

2. Each transmitter contains two Zener diodes which may not comply with purchase specifications.

3. The JANTX Zener diodes are different in appearance with respect to the commercial variations. Some JANTX Zener diodes used in the recent past have bodies that are solid orange or light blue in color or clear glass. The commercial Zener diodes in question have a clear glass body. The commercial Zener diode is larger (0.095" diameter X 0.275" long) than the smaller JANTX Zener diode (0.072" diameter X .155" long).

4. The existence of the commercial Zener diode can be confirmed by removal of the transmitter electronics cover and observing the Zener diodes at locations CR2 and CR3, as shown on manufacturer supplied circuit board drawings.

5. The Zener diodes are not field replaceable, as it is necessary to electronically reestablish the calibration zero which will likely necessitate replacement of a calibration resistor. This calibration resistor is located in a temperature sensitive portion of the electronic circuit and requires thermal performance validation.

6. PRIME believes that transmitters with commercial Zener diodes that are currently installed in a plant can be relied upon to continue to operate and perform their safety-related function in the event of an accident. This belief is based on the facts that the commercial Zener diodes installed in any transmitter have been shown to be functional at the accident maximum sustained temperature and because the radiation effects on commercial Zener diodes are known to be within the margin of the original Barton qualification.

"SGT LLC purchased 22 of the suspect transmitters for use in the Callaway Plant Steam Generator replacement project. Additionally, 6 suspect transmitters had been supplied directly to Callaway Plant. Physical inspections by SGT LLC and Callaway Plant staff determined 21 of the transmitters had the commercial Zener diodes installed. These transmitters were returned to PRIME where the commercial Zener diodes were replaced with qualified Zener diodes and proper transmitter operation was verified. The affected transmitters have since been returned to Callaway as fully qualified for safety related use in nuclear applications.

"On 11 /16/05, Callaway Plant personnel completed evaluations and determined the use of commercial Zener diodes constituted a defect per 10 CPR 21, requiring initial notification to the NRC within two days. Per the information provided by PRIME, all other affected customers have been notified.

"The concern was identified while Callaway Plant was shutdown for a refueling outage when the transmitters were installed, and prior to being returned to service. Therefore, no other reporting criteria apply.

"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified of this issue."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42152
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: SCOTT CIESLEWICZ
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 11/17/2005
Notification Time: 20:53 [ET]
Event Date: 11/17/2005
Event Time: 16:51 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

BOTH TRAINS OF SHIELD BUILDING VENTILATION DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO MISSING CLAMPS

"At 1651 on 11/17/2005 both trains of Shield Building Ventilation were declared out-of-service because it was identified that Shield Building penetrations 31 and 36NW flexible boot seals were not clamped per the design drawing. Since there is no documentation to show that Shield Building Ventilation would be able to perform its function during a design basis event with no clamps installed, Shield Building Vent was declared inoperable. Clamps have been installed and the penetrations were returned to the design configuration. At 1810 CST Shield Building Ventilation was declared Operable."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42153
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: STEVE FULLER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 11/18/2005
Notification Time: 01:16 [ET]
Event Date: 11/17/2005
Event Time: 23:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS AND RECOVERY OF COMMUNICATIONS

The Emergency Notification System (ENS) was lost due to the loss of offsite telephone communications. Troubleshooting to determine the cause is in progress. Offsite telephone communications were restored at 0040 EST on 11/18/05.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021