| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
10/27/2005 - 10/28/2005 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 42084 | Facility: ROBINSON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CURTIS CASTELL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 10/27/2005
Notification Time: 09:39 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2005
Event Time: 18:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INVALID ACTUATION OF AN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR
"This telephone notification to report an invalid actuation is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), which states, 'In the case of an invalid actuation reported under Sec. 50.73(a)(2)(iv), other than actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER.' The specific reporting requirement in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), states, 'Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B).' For this report, the affected system was the emergency AC electrical power systems as listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(8). Specifically, the Train A emergency diesel generator (EDG) automatically started due to an invalid system actuation.
"On August 31, 2005, at approximately 1805 hours (EDT), with H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant (HBRSEP), Unit No. 2, operating in MODE 1 at approximately 100% power, the Train A EDG automatically started from the standby condition. The EDG did not automatically connect to the associated emergency bus (E-1), because no E-1 bus undervoltage (UV) signal was present. The automatic start was caused by a failed solenoid-operated valve (SOV) in the air start system for the EDG (valve number DA-23A). The SOV failed-open, which is the designed failure-mode condition for this valve. This admitted air to the EDG air-start distributor, which started the Train A EDG. No additional failures or abnormalities were noted. The Train A EDG successfully started and achieved the required speed and voltage, but as stated previously, the EDG did not load because no UV signal was present on the associated bus.
"The Train B EDG remained operable during this event. Also, the EDGs each have two starting SOVs that are in parallel in the starting air system. A start signal or a loss of power to either valve is sufficient to start the associated EDG.
"The failed SOV was replaced. The Train A EDG was tested after replacement of the SOV and returned to service at 1016 hours on September 1, 2005.
"The invalid EDG start was entered into the corrective action program for HBRSEP, Unit No. 2. The investigation of this event has been completed. The results of the investigation determined that the EDG start was caused by a short-circuit failure of the coil for the SOV. Additional corrective actions for this condition, beyond replacement of the failed SOV, are in progress and are being tracked via the corrective action program."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 42087 | Rep Org: CONAM INSPECTION
Licensee: MISTRAS HOLDING GROUP
Region: 3
City: CHICAGO State: IL
County:
License #: 12-16559-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOB SLACK
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 10/27/2005
Notification Time: 17:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2005
Event Time: 15:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(a)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 25 REM
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
DAVID SILK (R1)
JOHN MADERA (R3)
GARY JANOSKO (NMSS)
| Event Text POTENTIAL EXTREMETY DOSE IN EXCESS OF 250 RAD
At about 3 PM on 10/27/05 following industrial radiography at the Sunoco Refinery in Philadelphia, PA, a radiographer approached the front of the radiography camera to disassemble the guide tube from the camera body. The radiographer thought that he had fully retracted the source but noticed that the source was exposed during the disassembly. The source was a 21.8 curie Iridium 192 source.
The radiographer contacted the radiation safety officer after he realized he had been overexposed. The radiographer received a calculated dose to his extremities of between 330 and 360 Rad. The licensee stated that the individual's self indicating dosimeter was off scale. The individual's thermo-luminescent dosimeter will be sent for a whole body exposure reading. Whole body calculated dose was less than 5 Rem. The radiographer was being sent for medical treatment.
The licensee has removed the radiographer from his duties pending further investigation. The licensee will determine corrective actions and perform stand-down training for the employees in the Trainer, PA field office concerning the occurrence. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42088 | Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: EDWARD HARRISON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 10/27/2005
Notification Time: 17:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2005
Event Time: 13:28 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/27/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 96 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION
"As part of an ongoing Appendix R assessment, it has been determined that Operator actions credited in the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) potential would not be met in fire zones credited for post fire safe shutdown per 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. Specifically, the FHA credited the availability of two in plant operators to conduct two separate series of operator actions are required to be performed simultaneously within the first 20 minutes. However, the site Fire Plan requires one of these in plant operators to respond to a plant fire as a Fire Brigade member. Since no barrier was put in place to compensate for the lack of the credited operator; this event is reportable as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |