Event Notification Report for September 30, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/29/2005 - 09/30/2005
EVENT NUMBERS
42027420294203042031
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42027
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHHN BRADY
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHHN BRADY
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 09/30/2005
Notification Time: 11:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2005
Event Time: 05:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2005
Notification Time: 11:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2005
Event Time: 05:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY INOPERABLE FOR GREATER THAN ONE HOUR
"On 9/30/2005, an unplanned loss of the Emergency Response Data Acquisition and Display System (ERDADS) output to the Unit 2 control room occurred for greater than one hour. This event is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with the guidance provided in St. Lucie Plant procedures. Maintenance activity is ongoing to restore ERDADS capability to the Unit 2 Control Room. This non-emergency notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On 9/30/2005, an unplanned loss of the Emergency Response Data Acquisition and Display System (ERDADS) output to the Unit 2 control room occurred for greater than one hour. This event is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with the guidance provided in St. Lucie Plant procedures. Maintenance activity is ongoing to restore ERDADS capability to the Unit 2 Control Room. This non-emergency notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42029
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES KURAS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES KURAS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 09/30/2005
Notification Time: 13:08 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2005
Event Time: 09:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2005
Notification Time: 13:08 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2005
Event Time: 09:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POTENTIAL VULNERABILITIES DISCOVERED DURING DESIGN BASIS FIRE REVIEW
"During a design basis fire in area A-8 (2000 level auxiliary building), [the licensee determined that] a number of Train A components, including the Train A motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump (control and power cables), are affected. Also, the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (control cables) may not be available. In addition, the following spurious actuations could occur:
"1.Pressurizer PORV BBPCV0455A opens and block valve BBHV8000A fails to close (Train A).
2. Steam Generator A ARV ABPV0001 spuriously opens and cannot be controlled from the control room (Train A).
3. Steam Generator C ARV ABPV0003 spuriously opens and cannot be closed from the control room (Train A).
4. Both VCT outlet valves BGLCV0112B and BGLCVO112C fail to close and normal letdown isolates, causing a reducing inventory in the VCT and possible hydrogen intrusion into the charging pump suction (Trains A & B).
5. Normal charging pump power cables pass through this fire area and may be damaged, causing the NCP to trip.
6. RHR suction valve from the RWST, BNHV8812A, loses power and containment sump valve EJHV8811A opens, causing the RWST to drain to the containment sump (Train A).
7. BIT inlet valve EMHV8803B fails to open from the control room hand switch (Train B).
"Actions taken or planned:
1) Detection / Suppression systems available in area A-8 are functional.
2) Hourly fire watch established IAW AP 10-104, Breech procedure."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"During a design basis fire in area A-8 (2000 level auxiliary building), [the licensee determined that] a number of Train A components, including the Train A motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump (control and power cables), are affected. Also, the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (control cables) may not be available. In addition, the following spurious actuations could occur:
"1.Pressurizer PORV BBPCV0455A opens and block valve BBHV8000A fails to close (Train A).
2. Steam Generator A ARV ABPV0001 spuriously opens and cannot be controlled from the control room (Train A).
3. Steam Generator C ARV ABPV0003 spuriously opens and cannot be closed from the control room (Train A).
4. Both VCT outlet valves BGLCV0112B and BGLCVO112C fail to close and normal letdown isolates, causing a reducing inventory in the VCT and possible hydrogen intrusion into the charging pump suction (Trains A & B).
5. Normal charging pump power cables pass through this fire area and may be damaged, causing the NCP to trip.
6. RHR suction valve from the RWST, BNHV8812A, loses power and containment sump valve EJHV8811A opens, causing the RWST to drain to the containment sump (Train A).
7. BIT inlet valve EMHV8803B fails to open from the control room hand switch (Train B).
"Actions taken or planned:
1) Detection / Suppression systems available in area A-8 are functional.
2) Hourly fire watch established IAW AP 10-104, Breech procedure."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42030
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLES STALZER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLES STALZER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 09/30/2005
Notification Time: 14:59 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2005
Event Time: 06:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2005
Notification Time: 14:59 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2005
Event Time: 06:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a "for-cause" test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a "for-cause" test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 42031
Rep Org: WHITE SANDS MISSLE RANGE
Licensee: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Region: 4
City: LAS CRUCES State: NM
County:
License #: 30-02405-10
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DOUGLAS McDONALD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Region: 4
City: LAS CRUCES State: NM
County:
License #: 30-02405-10
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DOUGLAS McDONALD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 10/01/2005
Notification Time: 14:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2005
Event Time: 15:30 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 10/01/2005
Notification Time: 14:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2005
Event Time: 15:30 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 10/01/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
36.83(a)(1) - UNSHIELD STUCK SOURCE
10 CFR Section:
36.83(a)(1) - UNSHIELD STUCK SOURCE
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
MELVYN LEACH (IRD)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
MELVYN LEACH (IRD)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
STUCK SOURCE IN PANORAMIC DRY-SOURCE IRRADIATOR
The licensee reported their irradiator had a 13 kCi Co-60 source stuck in the exposure cell. The remote area monitor registered a reading of 70 mR/hr for the area near the source. No personnel radiation exposure occurred. The irradiator building was vacated and an exterior barrier was positioned so personnel exposure would be limited to <2mR/hr. The source is from MDS Nordion, C132 - Type 72.
The irradiator is a panoramic, dry-source storage which uses pneumatic air as the driving force. The licensee, who had just completed maintenance on the device, was conducting operational tests when the source stuck. The source, which is lodged in the exposure head inside the exposure cell, is prevented from being retracted by a piece of metal called a "head switch". The licensee unsuccessfully tried to free the source by applying high pressure air. The next step the licensee is considering is the possible use of a robot.
The licensee reported their irradiator had a 13 kCi Co-60 source stuck in the exposure cell. The remote area monitor registered a reading of 70 mR/hr for the area near the source. No personnel radiation exposure occurred. The irradiator building was vacated and an exterior barrier was positioned so personnel exposure would be limited to <2mR/hr. The source is from MDS Nordion, C132 - Type 72.
The irradiator is a panoramic, dry-source storage which uses pneumatic air as the driving force. The licensee, who had just completed maintenance on the device, was conducting operational tests when the source stuck. The source, which is lodged in the exposure head inside the exposure cell, is prevented from being retracted by a piece of metal called a "head switch". The licensee unsuccessfully tried to free the source by applying high pressure air. The next step the licensee is considering is the possible use of a robot.