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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
09/22/2005 - 09/23/2005
** EVENT NUMBERS **
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| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 42006 |
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: KEVIN R. BOSTON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN |
Notification Date: 09/22/2005
Notification Time: 00:50 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2005
Event Time: 18:22 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2005 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE |
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
N |
Y |
100 |
Power Operation |
100 |
Power Operation |
Event Text
PARTIAL LOSS OF EMERGENCY SIREN CAPABILITY IN HARRISON COUNTY IOWA DUE TO A TRANSFORMER FIRE
"Fort Calhoun Station was informed that 6 of the 18 emergency sirens located in Harrison County Iowa were rendered inoperable due to a fire affecting a transformer. Harrison County Sheriff department implemented the alternate notification method. Local utility responding to restore power anticipates a 4 hour outage duration. Power was reported to be restored at 2208 CST. Sirens will be verified on Thursday September 22, 2005."
There was no indication of malevolent intent reported with respect to the cause of the fire. The licensee informed local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| General Information or Other |
Event Number: 42008 |
Rep Org: FLUKE BIOMEDICAL RMS
Licensee: FLUKE BIOMEDICAL RMS
Region: 3
City: SOLON State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVE SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ |
Notification Date: 09/22/2005
Notification Time: 15:33 [ET]
Event Date: 09/07/2005
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2005 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH |
Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
TOMAS HERRERA (NMSS)
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4)
OMID TABATABAI () |
Event Text
PART 21 REPORT ON FLUKE RADIATION METER
The following information was received via facsimile:
1.0 Name and address of individual informing the Commission:
Zisimos Giatis
Quality Assurance Manager
Fluke Biomedical Radiation Management Services
6045 Cochran Road
Solon, Ohio 44139
2.0 Identification of the Basic Component supplied which fails to comply or contains a defect:
Customer Complaint 0065 identifies the inability of the customer to insert the detector into the sample volume to the depth defined in primary isotopic calibration report 958.350. The report and manual for the device state the detector is to be inserted to a depth that results in 0.125 inches of the detector body extending outside of the detector mounting flanges. This dimension was expanded to 0.25 inches for the detectors supplied with a removable rear end cap. The customer advised that when installing the detector per the above, the face of the detector would "bottom out" against the sample volume cap before being fully inserted, leaving a gap of approximately 0.3 inches in front of the detector mounting flanges.
3.0 Identification of the firm supplying the Basic Component which fails to comply or contains a defect:
Fluke Biomedical Radiation Management Services
6045 Cochran Road
Solon, Ohio 44139
(Formerly Victoreen, Inc.)
4.0 Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the Safety Hazard created:
Because the insertion depth is a critical component of the sample volume, and thus the efficiency of the detector, the detector CPM to µCi/cc conversion constant cannot be validated. The conversion constant supplied for the sample geometry will result in the detector either overstating or understating the radioactivity being monitored.
5.0 The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained:
The problem was discovered September 7, 2005.
6.0 Affective Facilities
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant, California
Jose Cabrera, Spain
KEPCO, Republic of Korea
KAERI, Republic of Korea
Con Ed, Indian Point 2
7.0 Corrective Action:
The primary calibration will be repeated and a revised insertion depth will be provided to the affected customers. The estimated time frame to complete this task is 6 months.
8.0 Advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the Basic Component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers:
At the Diablo Canyon plant, the accident range gas channel is not required for plant operation, and has been declared inoperable. International customers are being advised that the response of their accident range gas monitors may be questionable and to verify the insertion depth used in their plant. |
| Power Reactor |
Event Number: 42010 |
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE WHEELER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN |
Notification Date: 09/23/2005
Notification Time: 04:38 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2005
Event Time: 00:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2005 |
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION |
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4) |
| Unit |
SCRAM Code |
RX CRIT |
Initial PWR |
Initial RX Mode |
Current PWR |
Current RX Mode |
| 1 |
M/R |
Y |
75 |
Power Operation |
0 |
Hot Shutdown |
Event Text
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO DEGRADING MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM
"At 0040 hours Central Daylight Time, Cooper Nuclear Station was manually scrammed due to degrading main condenser vacuum. Subsequent to the scram, reactor vessel level lowered to minus 20 inches wide range which corresponds to approximately 140 inches above the top of fuel. A Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) group 2 isolation occurred as expected due to the level transient. All automatic actions occurred as expected.
"This report includes both a 4 hour and an 8 hour report. The 4 hour report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(b), Actuation of RPS when the reactor is critical. The 8 hour report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(a), Actuation of PCIS group 2 due to expected RPV low level following the scram.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of the event."
All control rods fully inserted following the scram. All safety-related equipment including Emergency Diesel Generators are operable. Offsite power is stable and available. RPV water level is currently being maintained at approximately 35 inches with feedwater supplied by the condensate pumps. The cause of the degrading main condenser vacuum is unknown and under investigation. The RWCU Heat Exchanger is in service to remove decay heat. |
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