Event Notification Report for September 08, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/07/2005 - 09/08/2005
General Information or Other
Event Number: 41980
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: MTGL, INC
Region: 4
City: ANAHEIM State: CA
County:
License #: 3714-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGER
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Licensee: MTGL, INC
Region: 4
City: ANAHEIM State: CA
County:
License #: 3714-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGER
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 09/12/2005
Notification Time: 14:07 [ET]
Event Date: 09/08/2005
Event Time: 13:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2005
Notification Time: 14:07 [ET]
Event Date: 09/08/2005
Event Time: 13:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MIKE RUNYAN (R4)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
MIKE RUNYAN (R4)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT ON DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE
The State provided the following information via email:
"On September 8, 2005, we received a call from the RSO that their [Troxler] gauge had been run over by a front loader. The gauge user was standing approximately 3' away from the gauge when this occurred. Although the gauge handle had originally been in the shielded position, the front loader drove the rod down into the ground when it ran over the gauge. The RSO met the gauge user at the site of the incident (Dooley Elementary in Long Beach). The RSO contacted Kent Prendergast, Senior HP for RHB-Richmond, who directed them to try to retract the source, which they were able to do. They placed the gauge in the gauge transport case and brought it directly to Maurer Technical Services (6163-30) in Laguna Hills. Maurer Technical are CPN manufacturer representatives who repair, leak test, and calibrate gauges. The gauge was a Troxler, model 3430, #35001.
"At 8:10 A.M, September 12, 2005*, Maurer reported the source rod was not able to be locked, the gauge was not repairable, but the sources appeared to be intact and was in the shielded position when it was brought in by the licensee. A leak test was performed. The gauge will be shipped to Troxler Labs once it is confirmed that the leak test is negative. There was no exposure to the workers at the site from this incident since the Cs-137 source ended up being extended into the soil and the soil shielded the source. I estimate the gauge user and RSO received from 5-10 millirem during the retrieval of the source. There are no corrective actions required because of this event.
"This event is also reportable within 24 hours by California Code of Regulations, title 17, Section 30295(b)."
The State provided the following information via email:
"On September 8, 2005, we received a call from the RSO that their [Troxler] gauge had been run over by a front loader. The gauge user was standing approximately 3' away from the gauge when this occurred. Although the gauge handle had originally been in the shielded position, the front loader drove the rod down into the ground when it ran over the gauge. The RSO met the gauge user at the site of the incident (Dooley Elementary in Long Beach). The RSO contacted Kent Prendergast, Senior HP for RHB-Richmond, who directed them to try to retract the source, which they were able to do. They placed the gauge in the gauge transport case and brought it directly to Maurer Technical Services (6163-30) in Laguna Hills. Maurer Technical are CPN manufacturer representatives who repair, leak test, and calibrate gauges. The gauge was a Troxler, model 3430, #35001.
"At 8:10 A.M, September 12, 2005*, Maurer reported the source rod was not able to be locked, the gauge was not repairable, but the sources appeared to be intact and was in the shielded position when it was brought in by the licensee. A leak test was performed. The gauge will be shipped to Troxler Labs once it is confirmed that the leak test is negative. There was no exposure to the workers at the site from this incident since the Cs-137 source ended up being extended into the soil and the soil shielded the source. I estimate the gauge user and RSO received from 5-10 millirem during the retrieval of the source. There are no corrective actions required because of this event.
"This event is also reportable within 24 hours by California Code of Regulations, title 17, Section 30295(b)."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42051
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVID HAMILTON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVID HAMILTON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/12/2005
Notification Time: 14:25 [ET]
Event Date: 09/08/2005
Event Time: 10:08 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/2005
Notification Time: 14:25 [ET]
Event Date: 09/08/2005
Event Time: 10:08 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3)
DAVE PASSEHL (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION
"This telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(1), to report an invalid actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any system listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B).' General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system is identified in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B).
"On September 8, 2005, at 1008 hours, with Unit 2 in Mode 4 'Cold Shutdown,' fuse 2-902-3-AA-F7 in the 902-3 panel blew which resulted in a partial Group 2 Primary Containment Isolation. The containment isolation signal affected containment isolation valves in more than one system. All affected containment isolation valves operated as designed.
"The fuse was successfully replaced and all affected components were restored to operable status."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(1), to report an invalid actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any system listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B).' General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system is identified in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B).
"On September 8, 2005, at 1008 hours, with Unit 2 in Mode 4 'Cold Shutdown,' fuse 2-902-3-AA-F7 in the 902-3 panel blew which resulted in a partial Group 2 Primary Containment Isolation. The containment isolation signal affected containment isolation valves in more than one system. All affected containment isolation valves operated as designed.
"The fuse was successfully replaced and all affected components were restored to operable status."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.