| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
07/28/2005 - 07/29/2005 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 41867 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: LAKE CHARLES State: LA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DIRENE ALLEN
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 07/25/2005
Notification Time: 13:30 [ET]
Event Date: 07/25/2005
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/25/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
MICHELE BURGESS (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING FIRE DAMAGED GAUGES
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"Fire broke out in the Coker 1 unit at Citgo. The FA201A and 201B vessel structures (24,000 cu. Ft.) holding Coker feed (heavy black oil) product were impacted by the fire / heat from fire. Each of the above-mentioned vessels have three nuclear gauges (Am-241 / Be, 500mCi activity) attached in linear formation to them. The gauges are used for product level measurements. Three of the six total number of gauges sustained fire / heat from fire that impacted the functioning of the housing of devices, specifically the shutters. According to Citgo licensee:
"1) Of the three shutters impacted, two cannot be closed (and therefore, unlocked) and remain open as they usually are during regular production, the third could be closed but not locked.
"2) All six gauges are scheduled to be removed by the manufacturer for maintenance, repair, etc. as needed.
"3) The gauges are Kay-Ray (Thermo Measure Tech) brands.
"4) The three gauges with functional impact are: Gauge Housing - all are model number 7100B; Sealed Source model number MRL2723C and serial numbers -- 17235, 26053, and S95M2201." |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 41873 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: SCHLUMBERGER
Region:
City: State:
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 07/26/2005
Notification Time: 18:50 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2005
Event Time: 16:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/28/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
JOSEPH GIITTER (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POSSIBLE LOST TRITIUM GENERATORS
Schlumberger called the State of Louisiana to report a missing shipment of four tritium generators. Each unit contains 3 to 5 Ci (curies) of tritium. The shipment was picked up by Federal Express on July 15, 2005 in Shreveport, LA. It was to arrive at its destination on July 17, 2005 at Princeton, NJ. Federal Express notified Schlumberger yesterday that as of that date the shipment had not arrived at its Memphis transportation hub.
The units are sealed in the sense that they need software to be used.
The State of Louisiana is following up.
* * * UPDATE TO NRC (HUFFMAN) FROM STATE REP (NOBLE) @ 12:12 EDT ON 7/28/05 * * *
Federal Express has located the shipment of tritium generators and redirected the shipment to the final destination in New Jersey. The State was told that the shipment was misdirected due to a package labeling problem. The State considers this report closed.
R4DO (Graves) and NMSS EO (Essig) notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41877 | Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: HOPE BARDLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 07/28/2005
Notification Time: 05:57 [ET]
Event Date: 07/27/2005
Event Time: 21:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/28/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TWO TRAINS OF CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEMS (CREVS) INOPERABLE AND NOT RESTORED WITHIN 24 HOURS
"At 2125 on 7/27/05, Door 33021 (B Engineering Safety Feature Switchgear to B Emergency Diesel Generator) (B ESF Switchgear to B EDG) was found not to be latched. Reviewing history; the door was first discovered not to latch at 1215 on 7/26/05, by Security. The Control Room was notified at 2125 on 7/27/05 by an Equipment Operator, who found the door unlatched. Door was subsequently latched closed at 2155 on 7/27/05.
"Due to this door not being able to be verified latched, T/S LCO 3.7.10.B should have been entered at 1215 on 7/26/05. This renders 2 trains of Control Room Emergency Ventilation Systems (CREVS) inoperable, and if not restored within 24 hours, a plant shutdown is required; being in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) in 6 hours and Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) in 36 hours. The plant should have been in Mode 3 at 1815 on 7/27/05. This time was not met. As stated previously, the door was verified to be latched at 2155 on 7/27/05. A plant shutdown is not being made due to the LCO 3.7.10.B being satisfied at 2155 on 7/27/05.
"Door 33021 (B ESF Switchgear to B Emergency Diesel Generator) was repaired at 0022 on 7/28/05.
"This issue has been entered in the licensee corrective action program."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41878 | Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TIM PAGE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 07/28/2005
Notification Time: 10:21 [ET]
Event Date: 06/03/2005
Event Time: 17:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/28/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
GLENN MEYER (R1)
BRIAN MCDERMOTT (R1)
LEN CLINE (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HALF SCRAM ON VOLTAGE REGULATOR FAILURE
"On June 3, 2005 at approximately 1705, with the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) operating at 100% reactor power, a failure of the 'A' Reactor Protection System (RPS) motor generator voltage regulator occurred, resulting in a loss of power to the 'A' RPS bus, a half scram and multiple system isolations. The voltage transient caused by Technical Specification required RPS testing revealed the voltage regulator failure. Appropriate actions were taken in accordance with Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP)-59, Loss of RPS Bus. All equipment operated as designed as a result of the loss of power to the RPS bus.
"At 1744, the 'A' RPS bus was placed on the alternate power supply and the half scram was reset. The Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) isolation signal was reset at 1805 and restoration of the various isolated systems commenced shortly thereafter. The reactor remained at 100% reactor power throughout the event and Limiting Conditions for Operation were entered for the affected equipment as required.
"The above event meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(a) since the loss of RPS bus resulted in general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. The following systems or components isolated as a result of the loss of RPS bus:
"Reactor Water Cleanup, Reactor Building Ventilation, 'A' Containment Atmosphere Dilution, Torus Vent and Purge, Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain Sumps, 'A' Drywell Containment Atmospheric Monitors, Recirculation System Sample Line, Main Steam Line Drains, Residual Heat Removal drain valve to radwaste, Standby Gas Treatment (auto Initiated).
"Since the signal was invalid (the result of loss of power vs, an actual containment isolation condition), this event meets the criteria in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) for being reported as a 60 day telephone notification In lieu of a written LER.
"The event was entered into the corrective action program. The loss of the 'A' RPS bus was caused by the failure of a uni-junction transistor (UJT) in the voltage regulator of the 'A' RPS motor generator, which resulted in an overvoltage condition and resultant protective trip. The voltage regulator was replaced with a spare from stock with a UJT from a different manufacturer. Other corrective actions include changing manufacturer's of the UJT (the former vendor no longer makes this UJT), and replacing the 'B' motor generator and alternate power supply voltage regulators with ones having new UJTs."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the state Public Service Commission. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 41879 | Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
Comments: UF6 CONVERSION (DRY PROCESS)
Region: 2
City: METROPOLIS State: IL
County: MASSAC
License #: SUB-526
Agreement: Y
Docket: 04003392
NRC Notified By: DARREN MAYS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 07/28/2005
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 07/25/2005
Event Time: 09:18 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/28/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
| Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2)
JOSEPH GIITTER (NMSS)
| Event Text UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION EVENT DUE TO FILTER FAILURE
"An unplanned contamination event occurred on 25 July 2005. This is a reportable event in accordance with 10 CFR 40.60 sub paragraph (1) based on additional radiological controls being required for more than 24 hours. The additional control imposed was the requirement to wear air purifying respirators in the Feed Materials Building. The location of the event was the Feed Materials Building. The Feed Materials Building is where milled uranium oxide material is converted to uranium hexafluoride. Located on the sixth floor, the Ash Vacuum Cleaner filters failed which allowed spar and dust filter fines containing uranium to exit the discharge from the Ash Vacuum Cleaner. Due to the proximity of the Ash Vacuum Cleaner discharge and the inlet to the building ventilation, some the material was picked up by the ventilation system and distributed throughout the Feed Materials Building. A dust plume was noted coming from the discharge line of the Ash Vacuum Cleaner at approximately 0918. At approximately the same time, personnel in the building noted dust being emitted from the building ventilation system registers. The Ash Vacuum Cleaner was secured at approximately 0920. Personnel recognized the potential for airborne radioactivity and immediately required respiratory protection for all personnel in the building. Special bioassay samples were required for 19 people who were present in the building during the occurrence. The results of the special bioassays indicated no uptake of radioactivity by the personnel sampled. Fixed air samplers analyzed after the event on all floor indicated air activity in the range of 5x10 E-11microcuries/ml to 60x10 E-11microcuries/ml. Air samples and contamination surveys performed downwind were background levels. Cleanup of the granular material in the Feed Material Building commenced immediately.
"The isotope release was U-238, the chemical form is UF4, and the physical form is granular."
The Feed Materials Building has now been cleaned of contamination that was due to this event. The licensee has notified NRC Region 2 (Hartland), NRC HQ (Raddatz) and NRC Regional Inspector (Gibson). | |