| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
07/18/2005 - 07/19/2005 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | General Information or Other | Event Number: 41696 | Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: ENBRIDGE PIPELINE LLC
Region: 3
City: SUPERIOR State: WI
County:
License #: 031-2006-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE WELLING
HQ OPS Officer: WESLEY HELD | Notification Date: 05/13/2005
Notification Time: 10:29 [ET]
Event Date: 05/12/2005
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/18/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
ANNE MARIE STONE (R3)
CHARLES COX (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NUCLEAR GAUGE FAILS TO FUNCTION AS DESIGNED
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"The RSO contacted the DHFS, Radiation Protection Section on May 12, 2005 to report a damaged shutter on a fixed gauge at their facility. The gauge is a Berthold Model LB7400D containing 350 mCi of Cs-137, SN DW954A.
"The licensee discovered the problem when they were preparing to do some maintenance work on the gauge. The detector was giving erroneous readings. The licensee observed higher radiation levels (12 Mr/hr on contact with the source holder) with the shutter in the 'closed' position than the 'open' position, (6 Mr/hr on contact with the source holder.) The licensee assumed that the shutter had failed.
"Berthold has been contacted and will provide a service visit on May 17 or 18. The gauge is in the same configuration as in operations. Access is restricted by a fence around the area, including a lock with keypad entry. The inspector who recently visited the licensee confirms that access is restricted. The gauge is on Line 5 at the Superior Terminal, Enbridge Pipeline.
"The licensee will send the required report following the service visit."
* * * RETRACTION FROM M. WELLING TO W. GOTT AT 1515 ON 07/18/05 * * *
"Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section would like to retract event number EN41696, Enbridge Pipeline, LLC. After reviewing the in-question housing, Berthold states that there is nothing wrong with the source housing. It appears to be an error on the licensee determining if the shutter was open or closed."
Notified NMSS (M. Burgess) and R3DO (P. Louden) |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 41840 | Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: CARDINAL HEALTH
Region: 4
City: DENVER State: CO
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP EGIDI
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 07/13/2005
Notification Time: 20:37 [ET]
Event Date: 06/26/2005
Event Time: 15:20 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 07/13/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
DANIEL GILLEN (NMSS)
JIM WHITNEY (E-MAIL) (TAS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE - MEDICAL SOURCES STOLEN
"The theft occurred on June 26, 2005, at approximately 3:20 p.m. [The driver] had taken receipt of the cargo at the airport in Dallas (DFW), Texas, and he made the first delivery at a Cardinal pharmacy in Tyler, Texas. After the first delivery, he proceeded to the next stop, which was about one mile away. When he went to the back of the truck, he noticed that the canopy door had been pried open, but was still locked. When he looked inside, he noticed the box containing products for the Cardinal pharmacy was missing. The driver promptly notified [his] supervisor, who then contacted the Tyler Police and the Tyler Fire Department. The driver was personally interviewed that day by [Tradewind Enterprises - the shipper] and the Tyler Police Department. Efforts were made to locate the missing cargo, but police and the driver have been unable to locate the cargo or identify the person or persons involved in the theft.
"The materials stolen consisted of 6 boxes of sodium iodide capsules [I-123]." The activity in the missing capsules was 6.8 milliCuries."
Police Report case: 1-05-029925 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41845 | Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: KEN ALLOR
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 07/15/2005
Notification Time: 12:33 [ET]
Event Date: 07/15/2005
Event Time: 10:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/18/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text ENVIRONMENTAL EVENT - UNUSUAL FISH KILL
"Unusual fish kill on both unit's intake trash racks. Approximately 80-100 Skate (Cow Nosed Rays) dead on intake racks. The apparent cause was low oxygen levels in the bay water. This event appears to be an unusual environmental event per CCNPP's NPDES permit paragraph N, page 12 for impingement. This event is reportable per Tech Spec Appendix B Section 4.1 for significant environmental events."
The licensee contacted the Maryland Department of the Environment.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * * UPDATE AND CORRECTION FROM K. ALLOR TO M. RIPLEY 1415 EDT 07/18/05 * * * *
"Update: Unusual fish kill on both unit's intake trash racks. Approximately 80-100 Skate (Cow Nosed Rays) dead on intake racks. The apparent cause was low oxygen levels in the bay water. This event initially appeared to be an unusual environmental event per CCNPP's NPDES permit paragraph N, page 12 for impingement. Upon further review, the unusual environmental event threshold was not met since the fish kill was not substantial enough to cause a modification to plant operations. This event is reportable per Tech Spec Appendix B Section 4.1 for significant environmental events.
"Correction: The Maryland Department of the Environment notification will follow within 30 days per the NPDES permit [and therefore being reported per 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Offsite Notification, by the licensee]."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this update. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41847 | Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DEREK DROCKELMAN
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 07/18/2005
Notification Time: 00:18 [ET]
Event Date: 07/17/2005
Event Time: 22:31 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/18/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 74 | Power Operation | 74 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION OF MAINTENANCE BUS TIE BREAKERS
"During review of 10CFR50 Appendix R, III.G.2 compliance, it was discovered that a fire in a divisional switchgear room affecting maintenance tie breakers 64T or 65T, may result in the opposite division diesels [tripping]. The postulated fire could affect cables associated with a maintenance tie breaker which could in turn cause associated bus tie breakers in the opposite division to close (B9, C9, E9, F9). The III.G.2 scenario would also include a Loss of Offsite Power event which would require the [Emergency Diesel Generators] (EDG's) to be running. Postulating multiple hot shorts could result in both 9 breakers in a single division closing and paralleling the EDG's out of synch resulting in potential damage to the EDG's.
"Compensatory action: Eliminated this failure mechanism by racking out the four tie breakers (B9, C9, E9, F9) that could be affected. This does not affect operability of the EDG's."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41848 | Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM BRITAIN
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 07/18/2005
Notification Time: 11:15 [ET]
Event Date: 07/18/2005
Event Time: 09:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/18/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM
"Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed at 09:52 as a result of an RPS Actuation following a main turbine trip caused by unit protection relaying. All control rods inserted. The plant is stable. No ECCS or SRV actuations occurred. This report is made pursuant to 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). An investigation into the cause is currently in progress."
The plant is currently stable in mode 3. No safety relief valves actuated. The current decay heat removal path is normal feedwater to the reactor steaming through the turbine bypass valves to the condenser. No other safety systems actuated. Electric power to the safety busses was supplied via normal offsite power. No bad weather conditions are present. Current reactor pressure is 900 psi with temperature at about 540 degrees. Currently troubleshooting is ongoing to investigate the cause of the trip. The licensee currently plans to stay in mode 3 until the investigation is complete. No safety related systems are currently out of service. There was no estimated restart date.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41850 | Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY TODD
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 07/18/2005
Notification Time: 15:53 [ET]
Event Date: 07/18/2005
Event Time: 11:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/18/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text ELECTRICAL ALIGNMENT RESULTS IN SINGLE FAILURE VULNERABILITY
"Event: Keowee Hydro Station provides emergency power to the three Oconee units via two independent emergency power paths designated as the Overhead Path and the Underground Path. Either of the two Keowee Hydro Units (KHU) can be dedicated to either path, and Keowee Operations rotates which unit is aligned to which path, nominally on a monthly basis. On 7-18-05, as part of a corrective action from a previous event, Oconee reviewed power configurations for Keowee components/circuits with alternate power sources and discovered an alignment which presented a single failure vulnerability which could impact both paths.
"A review of Keowee Operating Procedures revealed that KHU-1 was designated as the normal source for control relays associated with the overhead path regardless of which unit was aligned to the underground path. KHU-1 was currently aligned to the underground path. It was determined that a postulated single failure of that DC power source would prevent KHU-1 from starting (which would affect the underground path) and would also prevent the main output Air Circuit Breakers from closing in the overhead path.
"As a result, Operations declared entry at 1130 hours [EDT] into Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1 condition C for the Overhead power path being inoperable (a 72 hour allowed completion time). A review of available information indicates that this condition has existed whenever KHU-1 was dedicated to the underground path. This condition is being reported as an unanalyzed condition per guidance in NUREG 1022 section 3.2.4.
"Initial Safety Significance: The postulated single failure has not occurred. If the postulated single failure occurred during a design basis event, it is expected that, without credit for Operator intervention, both KHUs would fail. Operations would have been able to realign the KHU-2 to the Underground path and/or to have started and aligned a combustion turbine at Lee Steam Station. Such actions would be adequate for LOOP and station blackout scenarios, but would not be adequate for LOCA/LOOP scenarios. Therefore, the potential single failure condition being reported could have potentially resulted in a loss of safety function.
"Corrective Action(s): The immediate corrective action was to realign the affected DC control circuit power source to KHU-2, which was aligned to the overhead Path. The TS condition was exited at 1200 hours [EDT] when this realignment was complete."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |