Event Notification Report for June 27, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/26/2005 - 06/27/2005
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41800
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM SPEICHER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM SPEICHER
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 06/27/2005
Notification Time: 04:19 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2005
Event Time: 03:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2005
Notification Time: 04:19 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2005
Event Time: 03:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2005
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
CAROLYN EVANS (R2)
MICHAEL CASE (NRR)
SUSAN FRANT (IRD)
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
TODD KUZIA (FEMA)
CAROLYN EVANS (R2)
MICHAEL CASE (NRR)
SUSAN FRANT (IRD)
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
TODD KUZIA (FEMA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
DECLARATION OF AN UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TRANSFORMER FIRE >10 MINUTES
UNUSUAL EVENT (EAL #16 - Fire) declared at 0327 on 6/27/05 due to uncontrolled fire in the Unit 4 Main Transformer lasting longer than 10 minutes. Unit 4 experienced an automatic reactor trip from 100% on a turbine trip due to a fire in the Main Transformer. The fire was extinguished after approximately 25 minutes. On-site fire brigade and Miami-Dade fire department responded. The cause of the fire is under investigation.
The reactor is stable in Mode 3. No safety systems were affected. All rods fully inserted, no ECCS actuations, no relief valves lifted and no personnel injuries occurred. Offsite power is still available and no emergency diesels auto started, however, there was an auxiliary feedwater actuation.
Hazardous Material response is being implemented due to discharge of transformer oil. There may be a possible press release on this event.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified along with State and local agencies.
* * * UPDATE ON 06/27/05 @ 05:13 BY SPEICHER TO GOULD * * *
The NOUE was terminated at 05:00 due to the fire being extinguished and the emergency no longer existing.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Notified RDO 3 (Evans), EDO (Case), IRO (Frant), FEMA (Bagwell), DHS (Reed)
* * * UPDATE 0915 EDT ON 6/27/05 BY S. SANDIN * * *
Received a call from a member of the Turkey Point Communications Group. The licensee does not plan on issuing a press release at this time.
Notified R2DO (Evans).
UNUSUAL EVENT (EAL #16 - Fire) declared at 0327 on 6/27/05 due to uncontrolled fire in the Unit 4 Main Transformer lasting longer than 10 minutes. Unit 4 experienced an automatic reactor trip from 100% on a turbine trip due to a fire in the Main Transformer. The fire was extinguished after approximately 25 minutes. On-site fire brigade and Miami-Dade fire department responded. The cause of the fire is under investigation.
The reactor is stable in Mode 3. No safety systems were affected. All rods fully inserted, no ECCS actuations, no relief valves lifted and no personnel injuries occurred. Offsite power is still available and no emergency diesels auto started, however, there was an auxiliary feedwater actuation.
Hazardous Material response is being implemented due to discharge of transformer oil. There may be a possible press release on this event.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified along with State and local agencies.
* * * UPDATE ON 06/27/05 @ 05:13 BY SPEICHER TO GOULD * * *
The NOUE was terminated at 05:00 due to the fire being extinguished and the emergency no longer existing.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Notified RDO 3 (Evans), EDO (Case), IRO (Frant), FEMA (Bagwell), DHS (Reed)
* * * UPDATE 0915 EDT ON 6/27/05 BY S. SANDIN * * *
Received a call from a member of the Turkey Point Communications Group. The licensee does not plan on issuing a press release at this time.
Notified R2DO (Evans).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41801
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: D. CLARK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: D. CLARK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 06/27/2005
Notification Time: 16:41 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2005
Event Time: 11:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/09/2005
Notification Time: 16:41 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2005
Event Time: 11:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/09/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 85 | Power Operation | 85 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation |
MINIMUM SWITCHYARD VOLTAGE REQUIREMENTS NOT MET
"At 1150 on June 27, 2005 Quad Cities Station was notified that the calculated post-LOCA switchyard voltage is below the minimum acceptable value required to ensure offsite power will remain available following a design basis accident. The appropriate Technical Specification Actions have been taken for both Units. The ability of the Emergency Diesel Generators to fulfill their design function is not affected by this condition. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function given the predicted post-LOCA switchyard voltage.
"Actual Switchyard voltage at the time of this notification is 356 Kv. The required minimum post-accident switchyard voltage for current conditions is 352.9 Kv for Unit-1 and 351 Kv for Unit-2, while the projected post-accident voltage which prompted this notification is 349.8 Kv. At 1320 hrs on June 27, the projected post-accident voltage was 351.3kV. This prediction satisfies the minimum Unit 2 voltage requirement, but is still below the minimum voltage for Unit 1.
"This notification is similar to the condition reported on April 29, 2005 (EN #41652) and June 11, 2005 (EN #41766)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM J. COX TO W. GOTT 1906 ET 08/09/05 * * *
"The purpose of this report is to retract ENS report #41652 (April 29, 2005), ENS report 41766 (June 11, 2005), and ENS report #41801 (June 27, 2005). The reports were made following notification that the switchyard predicted voltage was below the required value necessary to ensure that offsite power would remain available following a design basis accident. For each event, both sources of offsite power were declared inoperable, the appropriate Technical Specification required actions were taken for the units, and an ENS notification was made for a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"Each Quad Cities unit has two sources of off-site power. For a specific unit, one source is from the switchyard through the unit's Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) and the second source is from the switchyard through the opposite unit's RAT. Following further analysis of the loading on the RATs during an accident, it was determined that only one source of offsite power to each unit should have been considered inoperable. The analysis determined that because the RAT for the non-accident unit (i.e., the offsite source supplied through the opposite unit) would be carrying a much smaller load, it would not be subject to a degraded voltage condition and resultant isolation from the grid. Therefore, an accident on one unit would not affect the operability of the source of offsite power supplied through the opposite unit's RAT. As a result, only the source of offsite power supplied through the unit's RAT was inoperable. With one source of offsite power available at all times, there was no condition present that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, and therefore, these events are not reportable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3 DO (R. Lanksbury)
"At 1150 on June 27, 2005 Quad Cities Station was notified that the calculated post-LOCA switchyard voltage is below the minimum acceptable value required to ensure offsite power will remain available following a design basis accident. The appropriate Technical Specification Actions have been taken for both Units. The ability of the Emergency Diesel Generators to fulfill their design function is not affected by this condition. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function given the predicted post-LOCA switchyard voltage.
"Actual Switchyard voltage at the time of this notification is 356 Kv. The required minimum post-accident switchyard voltage for current conditions is 352.9 Kv for Unit-1 and 351 Kv for Unit-2, while the projected post-accident voltage which prompted this notification is 349.8 Kv. At 1320 hrs on June 27, the projected post-accident voltage was 351.3kV. This prediction satisfies the minimum Unit 2 voltage requirement, but is still below the minimum voltage for Unit 1.
"This notification is similar to the condition reported on April 29, 2005 (EN #41652) and June 11, 2005 (EN #41766)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM J. COX TO W. GOTT 1906 ET 08/09/05 * * *
"The purpose of this report is to retract ENS report #41652 (April 29, 2005), ENS report 41766 (June 11, 2005), and ENS report #41801 (June 27, 2005). The reports were made following notification that the switchyard predicted voltage was below the required value necessary to ensure that offsite power would remain available following a design basis accident. For each event, both sources of offsite power were declared inoperable, the appropriate Technical Specification required actions were taken for the units, and an ENS notification was made for a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"Each Quad Cities unit has two sources of off-site power. For a specific unit, one source is from the switchyard through the unit's Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) and the second source is from the switchyard through the opposite unit's RAT. Following further analysis of the loading on the RATs during an accident, it was determined that only one source of offsite power to each unit should have been considered inoperable. The analysis determined that because the RAT for the non-accident unit (i.e., the offsite source supplied through the opposite unit) would be carrying a much smaller load, it would not be subject to a degraded voltage condition and resultant isolation from the grid. Therefore, an accident on one unit would not affect the operability of the source of offsite power supplied through the opposite unit's RAT. As a result, only the source of offsite power supplied through the unit's RAT was inoperable. With one source of offsite power available at all times, there was no condition present that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, and therefore, these events are not reportable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3 DO (R. Lanksbury)