U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 06/20/2005 - 06/21/2005 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** | General Information or Other | Event Number: 41778 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH Licensee: NDS SOLUTIONS/LAMCO & ASSOCIATES Region: 4 City: BRYAN State: TX County: License #: L05879/L05152 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: ROBERT FREE HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD | Notification Date: 06/15/2005 Notification Time: 18:21 [ET] Event Date: 06/08/2005 Event Time: [CDT] Last Update Date: 06/15/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): JACK WHITTEN (R4) C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS) | Event Text RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE DISCONNECT/ RETRIEVAL AND POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE "Consultant for Lamco was conducting a source retrieval on June 8, 2005 and personnel monitor fell near the 70 Curie radiography source. She picked it up when she realized it and had it returned to the supplier for processing. After receiving the results on June 13, 2005, she called to report the results. The personnel monitor received 9.477 rem, deep dose equivalent. The consultant estimated she received 1.5 rem based on her direct reading dosimeter after the source recovery was completed." Texas Incident # I-8236 | Power Reactor | Event Number: 41785 | Facility: DUANE ARNOLD Region: 3 State: IA Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4 NRC Notified By: EDWARD E. HARRISON HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 06/20/2005 Notification Time: 05:41 [ET] Event Date: 06/20/2005 Event Time: 03:08 [CDT] Last Update Date: 06/20/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL | Person (Organization): THOMAS KOZAK (R3) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 96 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation | Event Text BOTH STANDBY GAS TREATMENT TRAINS BRIEFLY INOPERABLE DURING TESTING "During the performance of the monthly 10-hour run testing of the 'B' Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) train it was discovered that the flow-indicating controller was not controlling flow at the required setpoint. The 'B' SBGT train was declared inoperable at 0308 on 20 June 2005. As part of the testing, the 'A' SBGT train Mode Select switch was in Manual with the inlet damper closed rendering the 'A' SBGT train inoperable. During the short period of time (approximately 4 minutes) between the discovery of the 'B' SBGT controller failure and the return of the 'A' SBGT train to an operable condition, both SBGT trains were inoperable which is a condition that could prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of the SBGT system to control the release of radioactive material. This is an 8-hour reportable event per 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). "The 'A' SBGT train was restored to operable status at 0312 when its inlet damper was reopened and its Mode Select switch was returned to AUTO per the surveillance test." The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. | |