Event Notification Report for June 17, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/16/2005 - 06/17/2005
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41782
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JIM STORTZ
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JIM STORTZ
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 06/17/2005
Notification Time: 15:02 [ET]
Event Date: 06/17/2005
Event Time: 11:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/17/2005
Notification Time: 15:02 [ET]
Event Date: 06/17/2005
Event Time: 11:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/17/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 85 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO EHC MALFUNCTION
"At 1120 hours (CDT) on June 17, 2005, the Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed from 85% power due to a valid high reactor pressure signal. The maximum reactor pressure was approximately 1044 psig during the event. All control rods inserted to their full-in position. Initial indications are that the reactor pressure increase was caused by a malfunction in the Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) system, which resulted in closure of the main turbine control valves. The main turbine bypass valves (nine) opened as expected in response to the pressure increase. No reactor pressure vessel safety or relief valves were required to actuate during the event. Reactor water level decreased to approximately -20 inches, which resulted in automatic Group 2 and 3 isolations as expected. All systems responded properly to the event. Unit 1 is in Mode 3 with a cooldown in progress and reactor water level in the normal level band. An investigation into the Unit 1 scram is in progress.
"Unit 2 remains at 94% power.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1120 hours (CDT) on June 17, 2005, the Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed from 85% power due to a valid high reactor pressure signal. The maximum reactor pressure was approximately 1044 psig during the event. All control rods inserted to their full-in position. Initial indications are that the reactor pressure increase was caused by a malfunction in the Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) system, which resulted in closure of the main turbine control valves. The main turbine bypass valves (nine) opened as expected in response to the pressure increase. No reactor pressure vessel safety or relief valves were required to actuate during the event. Reactor water level decreased to approximately -20 inches, which resulted in automatic Group 2 and 3 isolations as expected. All systems responded properly to the event. Unit 1 is in Mode 3 with a cooldown in progress and reactor water level in the normal level band. An investigation into the Unit 1 scram is in progress.
"Unit 2 remains at 94% power.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41783
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DAN MARKS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DAN MARKS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 06/17/2005
Notification Time: 18:39 [ET]
Event Date: 06/17/2005
Event Time: 11:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 08/01/2005
Notification Time: 18:39 [ET]
Event Date: 06/17/2005
Event Time: 11:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 08/01/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION 21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION 21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
POTENTIAL DEGRADED CONDITION DUE TO PRESSURIZER HEATER ELEMENT NON-CONFORMANCE
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On June 15, 2005, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station was informed by Framatome that Thermocoax pressurizer heater elements provided for, and installed in Unit 3, were in non-conformance with specifications. Specifically, the active heating portion of the element was approximately 8 inches lower than design. The result of this error is that the active (heating) portion of the element extended into the nozzle area of the pressurizer heater sleeve and the heating effect on the pressurizer sleeve exceeded design, and possibly code-allowable temperature.
"Unit 3 operators entered Technical Requirements Manual LCO 3.4.103, Structural Integrity, Condition A for a ASME Code Class 1 component not conforming with requirements. The pressurizer can not be isolated and RCS temperature was already more than 50 degrees F above the minimum temperature required by NDT consideration when the condition was discovered. TLCO 3.0.100.3 is not applicable in Mode 5 and Technical Specification 3.4.9, Pressurizer, is not applicable in Mode 5. The RCS is in Mode 5 at approximately 190 degrees F and 350 psia.
"Engineering personnel are evaluating the code acceptability and potential for significant degradation resulting from the temperatures experienced by the pressurizer heater sleeves. On June 17, 2005, at approximately 11:00 AM MST, Palo Verde was informed that based on x-ray results of a PVNGS failed Thermocoax heater that revealed the active portion of the heater is longer than previously assumed, the metal temperatures exceeded ASME code allowable values. Stress levels are still under evaluation.
"This report is conservatively being placed per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) based on the potential that the RCS pressure boundary may be seriously degraded, and 10CFR21(d)(3)(i) based on a defect in the pressurizer heater, a basic component, that may affect its safety function necessary to assure the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
"An investigation of this condition will be conducted in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program."
The Thermocoax heater elements were installed in November 2004, when all heaters in the Unit 3 pressurizer were replaced. Due to the increased failure rate all Thermocoax heater elements have been replaced in the last 30 days with General Electric style pressurizer heater elements that were used previously.
The heaters, which were also provided to SONGS 2&3 and Waterford 3, had a design variance (480 VAC single phase instead of 480 VAC 3-phase) which made them unique to Palo Verde. The impact of this variance is currently being evaluated.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 8/1/05 AT 1143 EDT FROM R. BUZZARD TO P. SNYDER * * *
The licensee is retracting this event based on the following:
"This is a retraction of ENS 41783, placed with the Headquarter Operations Center on 06/17/2005 at 1839 EDT.
"On June 15, 2005, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station was informed by Framatome that the Thermocoax pressurizer heaters provided for, and installed in Unit 3, were in non-conformance with the applicable design specification. Specifically, the heating section of the heater was manufactured approximately 8 inches longer than cited in the specification. The result of this error was that the heating section extended into the pressurizer lower head.
"Engineering analysis concluded that the pressurizer lower head exceeded design and ASME Code allowable temperatures. This condition was reported on June 17, 2005 (ENS 41783).
"Further Engineering analysis concluded that the RCS pressure boundary (pressurizer lower head) was not significantly degraded. APS has requested NRC approval for a relief request (reference letter to the NRC dated June 19, 2005). The proposed alternative discussed in this relief request provided an acceptable level of quality and safety since no significant creep effects were introduced into the Unit 3 pressurizer lower head as a result of the design non-conformance. Therefore, APS has requested that the proposed alternative be authorized pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i). The NRC provided verbal approval for Unit 3 to continue operation.
"Based on the above information the "Degraded Operation" ENS notification made on June 17, is being retracted.
"The heater supplier, FRAMATOME ANP, INC, reported the defect in accordance with10CFR Part 21 on July 22, 2005 (ENS 41864)."
The licensee has retracted both the 10CFR Part 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) degraded condition notification and their 10 CFR Part 21 notification. Retraction of the 10 CFR Part 21 notification is based on the fact that the vendor reported the same condition.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector of the retraction. Notified R4DO (D. Powers).
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On June 15, 2005, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station was informed by Framatome that Thermocoax pressurizer heater elements provided for, and installed in Unit 3, were in non-conformance with specifications. Specifically, the active heating portion of the element was approximately 8 inches lower than design. The result of this error is that the active (heating) portion of the element extended into the nozzle area of the pressurizer heater sleeve and the heating effect on the pressurizer sleeve exceeded design, and possibly code-allowable temperature.
"Unit 3 operators entered Technical Requirements Manual LCO 3.4.103, Structural Integrity, Condition A for a ASME Code Class 1 component not conforming with requirements. The pressurizer can not be isolated and RCS temperature was already more than 50 degrees F above the minimum temperature required by NDT consideration when the condition was discovered. TLCO 3.0.100.3 is not applicable in Mode 5 and Technical Specification 3.4.9, Pressurizer, is not applicable in Mode 5. The RCS is in Mode 5 at approximately 190 degrees F and 350 psia.
"Engineering personnel are evaluating the code acceptability and potential for significant degradation resulting from the temperatures experienced by the pressurizer heater sleeves. On June 17, 2005, at approximately 11:00 AM MST, Palo Verde was informed that based on x-ray results of a PVNGS failed Thermocoax heater that revealed the active portion of the heater is longer than previously assumed, the metal temperatures exceeded ASME code allowable values. Stress levels are still under evaluation.
"This report is conservatively being placed per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) based on the potential that the RCS pressure boundary may be seriously degraded, and 10CFR21(d)(3)(i) based on a defect in the pressurizer heater, a basic component, that may affect its safety function necessary to assure the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
"An investigation of this condition will be conducted in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program."
The Thermocoax heater elements were installed in November 2004, when all heaters in the Unit 3 pressurizer were replaced. Due to the increased failure rate all Thermocoax heater elements have been replaced in the last 30 days with General Electric style pressurizer heater elements that were used previously.
The heaters, which were also provided to SONGS 2&3 and Waterford 3, had a design variance (480 VAC single phase instead of 480 VAC 3-phase) which made them unique to Palo Verde. The impact of this variance is currently being evaluated.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 8/1/05 AT 1143 EDT FROM R. BUZZARD TO P. SNYDER * * *
The licensee is retracting this event based on the following:
"This is a retraction of ENS 41783, placed with the Headquarter Operations Center on 06/17/2005 at 1839 EDT.
"On June 15, 2005, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station was informed by Framatome that the Thermocoax pressurizer heaters provided for, and installed in Unit 3, were in non-conformance with the applicable design specification. Specifically, the heating section of the heater was manufactured approximately 8 inches longer than cited in the specification. The result of this error was that the heating section extended into the pressurizer lower head.
"Engineering analysis concluded that the pressurizer lower head exceeded design and ASME Code allowable temperatures. This condition was reported on June 17, 2005 (ENS 41783).
"Further Engineering analysis concluded that the RCS pressure boundary (pressurizer lower head) was not significantly degraded. APS has requested NRC approval for a relief request (reference letter to the NRC dated June 19, 2005). The proposed alternative discussed in this relief request provided an acceptable level of quality and safety since no significant creep effects were introduced into the Unit 3 pressurizer lower head as a result of the design non-conformance. Therefore, APS has requested that the proposed alternative be authorized pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i). The NRC provided verbal approval for Unit 3 to continue operation.
"Based on the above information the "Degraded Operation" ENS notification made on June 17, is being retracted.
"The heater supplier, FRAMATOME ANP, INC, reported the defect in accordance with10CFR Part 21 on July 22, 2005 (ENS 41864)."
The licensee has retracted both the 10CFR Part 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) degraded condition notification and their 10 CFR Part 21 notification. Retraction of the 10 CFR Part 21 notification is based on the fact that the vendor reported the same condition.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector of the retraction. Notified R4DO (D. Powers).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41784
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KEITH MERIWETHER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KEITH MERIWETHER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 06/17/2005
Notification Time: 19:25 [ET]
Event Date: 06/17/2005
Event Time: 16:54 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/17/2005
Notification Time: 19:25 [ET]
Event Date: 06/17/2005
Event Time: 16:54 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/17/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM
"On 6/17/2005, at 08:54 am CDT, the Wolf Creek Generating Station experienced an unexpected loss of the safety parameter display system (SPDS). Troubleshooting efforts have been, at this time, unsuccessful in restoring functionality of the SPDS. Because SPDS has been lost for longer than a short period of time, the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation is making this ENS notification pursuant to the criteria within 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). There is no other loss of emergency assessment capability concurrent with the ongoing loss of SPDS. Plant personnel have entered the applicable off-normal procedure and are taking local readings of equipment normally monitored by SPDS.
"It is unknown at this time when SPDS is expected to be restored."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On 6/17/2005, at 08:54 am CDT, the Wolf Creek Generating Station experienced an unexpected loss of the safety parameter display system (SPDS). Troubleshooting efforts have been, at this time, unsuccessful in restoring functionality of the SPDS. Because SPDS has been lost for longer than a short period of time, the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation is making this ENS notification pursuant to the criteria within 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). There is no other loss of emergency assessment capability concurrent with the ongoing loss of SPDS. Plant personnel have entered the applicable off-normal procedure and are taking local readings of equipment normally monitored by SPDS.
"It is unknown at this time when SPDS is expected to be restored."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.