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Event Notification Report for June 17, 2005

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
06/16/2005 - 06/17/2005

** EVENT NUMBERS **


41649 41695 41768 41780 41781

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Power Reactor Event Number: 41649
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID NIX
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/29/2005
Notification Time: 05:22 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2005
Event Time: 01:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

EMERGENCY HYDRO GENERATORS AUTO START - UNKNOWN CAUSE

"Event: At 01:05 on 4-29-05, Oconee Nuclear Station received an Emergency Start of both Keowee Hydro Unit emergency power sources. An investigation is in progress to determine the cause of the system actuation. Plant conditions currently do not indicate the need for actuation of the Keowee Hydro Unit emergency power sources. However, this system actuation is being conservatively reported until it can be positively determined whether a valid actuation occurred.

"Initial Safety Significance: Units 2 and 3 remain at 100% power with no issues following the Keowee Hydro Unit emergency start. Unit 1 remains in Mode 5 (refueling outage). No units were affected by the safety system actuation. Plant conditions currently do not indicate the need for actuation of the Keowee Hydro Unit emergency power sources. No other safety systems actuated or exhibited abnormal behavior. Therefore, the safety significance of this condition is LOW."

At the time of this notification, the Keowee units were still running unloaded.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM L. GENTRY TO M. RIPLEY 0958 EDT 06/16/05 * * *

"This report is being made under 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) INVALID SPECIFIC SYSTEM ACTUATION

"At 1:05 AM on 4/29/05 an unplanned emergency start of both Keowee Hydro Units occurred. These units are specifically called out in 50.73(a)(2)(iv) (B) (8) as " hydroelectric facilities used in lieu of EDGs at the Oconee Station." Each Keowee Hydro Unit can supply emergency power to the three Oconee Units via either of two emergency power paths (Overhead path or Underground path).

"This event was initially reported as:
- 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIFIC SYSTEM ACTUATION
- Event Number: 41649
- Notification Date: 04/29/2005
- Notification Time: 05:22 [ET]
- Event Date: 04/29/2005
- Event Time: 01:05 [EDT]

"Unit status as stated in that notification:
- Unit 1: 0% RP, Mode 5 for a refueling outage
- Unit 2: 100% RP, Mode 1
- Unit 3: 100% RP, Mode 1

"Keowee Emergency Start Channel A actuated. By design, each Emergency Start Channel starts both Keowee Hydro Unit 1 and 2. Both Keowee units did respond and came to rated speed and voltage.

"It was determined from the alarms received and from direct visual inspection that the signal for the Keowee Units to emergency start came from the actuation of the KA relay located in Emergency Start Channel A cabinet. Investigation and troubleshooting of this event was unable to identify the actual cause of the actuation of relay KA. The investigation confirmed that no valid condition existed which would or should have resulted in an automatic signal and there is no evidence of intentional or unintentional actuation using manual actuation switches. Therefore the actuation is determined to be 'invalid'.

"At the time of the event, Oconee Unit 1 was in an outage and a routine Engineered Safeguard Actuation System (ES) Channel 2 surveillance test was in progress. By design ES Channel 2 initiates Keowee Emergency Start Channel B, so DC control power was removed from Keowee Emergency Start Channel B during that test to prevent an unnecessary Keowee Emergency Start signal. Troubleshooting confirmed that the start which occurred was not due to this test in progress. However, the test affected the event slightly in that ES channel 2 also provides a permissive signal which allows Breaker SK-2 to close to connect the underground path to Standby Bus 2. Following the unintentional start, breaker SK-2 closed as designed, which energized Standby Bus 2, as soon as the Keowee Unit connected to the Underground Path achieved adequate voltage. Because there was no actual loss of power on any of the Oconee Units, there was no demand signal to connect Standby Bus 2 to any unit's Main Feeder Bus.

"50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) requires the following information:

(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated - Keowee Emergency Start Channel A actuated. By design, each Emergency Start Channel starts both Keowee Hydro Unit 1 and 2. Both Keowee units responded and came to rated speed and voltage.
Each Keowee Hydro Unit can supply emergency power to the three Oconee Units via either of two emergency power paths (Overhead path or Underground path). They are aligned so that one unit will supply the overhead path and the other unit will supply the underground path.

(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial - Other systems, such as the Emergency Power Switching Logic system, must also actuate to automatically connect an emergency power path to a Main Feeder Bus and power Oconee loads. Since this was not a valid event, conditions did not require connection of emergency power to any loads. No complete power train/path alignment was established, therefore the actuation was considered partial.

(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully - The Keowee Hydro Units both started and functioned successfully. As stated above, due to the existence of a signal during an unrelated test, one additional component, breaker SK2, was challenged and operated as designed. Therefore, all challenged components functioned successfully.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Revised the 10 CFR Section designation in the report header according to the update, and notified R2 DO (T. Decker)

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General Information or Other Event Number: 41695
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: MIDWEST INSPECTIONS
Region: 4
City: BRIGHTON State: CO
County:
License #: 902-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ED STROUD
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 05/12/2005
Notification Time: 17:23 [ET]
Event Date: 05/11/2005
Event Time: [MDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE - RADIOGRAPHY EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"The Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment received notification on 5/12/05 of a radiography equipment malfunction resulting in a stuck radiography source.

"The radiography company, Midwest Inspections, located at 325 Walnut Street, Brighton, Colorado, with the Colorado license number 902-01, reported that a radiography crew was unable to retract a radiography source back into the shielded position while working at a temporary job site near Byers, Colorado on 5/11/05. Per the company's RSO, the crew secured the area and contacted him for assistance when they were unable to fully retract the source. He traveled to the site with shielding equipment and was able to free the source and return it to the shielded position. The cause of the problem is reported to be a dent in the guide tube under the 'bend restrictor' where it was not easily visible to the crew. The RSO reported no excessive exposures to the crew, the public or himself (he estimated an exposure of 50 millirem to himself). Initial corrective action was to remove the defective guide tube from service."

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY STROUD TO GOULD AT 1738 EDT ON 06/13/05 * * *

This update provides information that was originally contained in EN 41769 which has been deleted and provided as an update to the original report.

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

The exposure device involved was INC Model IR-100 s/n 4035 with a 38 curie Ir-192 source s/n G862. The RSO attempted to retract the source and encountered the same problem as the crew. The source assembly seemed to hang up as it entered the exit port of the camera. The RSO attached a 0-500 millirem pocket dosimeter to his wrist watch on his left hand to measure any exposure to the hands during the following process. He cranked the source into the collimator and placed (2) 25# lead shot bags over the collimator for shielding. Using a pair of 12 inch channel lock pliers, he disconnected the source tube from the collimator. Keeping the source assembly in the collimator and shot bag shielding, he exposed the drive cable and source pigtail connector. After disconnecting the source pigtail connector and drive cable, he disconnected the exit port end of the source tube from the camera and slid the source tube off of the drive cable. The source tube was replaced with a new one and reconnected to the source assembly. The RSO then retracted the source into the camera. The crew x-rayed the remaining welds while RSO remained on site. The RSO's total whole body exposure was 50 millirem and the dosimeter on his wrist indicated an exposure of 220 millirem. Inspection of the source tube showed a kinked area next to the exit port fitting which apparently would not allow the locking ball on the pigtail assembly to pass back through it.

Notified R4DO (Whitten) and NMSSEO (Holahan)

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General Information or Other Event Number: 41768
Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: FORSYTH MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 1
City: WINSTON-SALEM State: NC
County:
License #: 034-0878-3
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CLIFFTON R. HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 06/13/2005
Notification Time: 17:20 [ET]
Event Date: 05/27/2005
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1)
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
TAS (Email) ()

Event Text

NC AGREEMENT STATE REPORT ON HDR SOURCE MISSING IN TRANSIT

A Varian Medical Systems technician replaced a source from a high dose rate (HDR) brachytherapy unit at the Forsyth Memorial Medical Center on 5/26/05. The technician then shipped the replaced source on 5/27/05 in a type A package via Federal Express to Excel Logistics (Freight Forwarder for Varian) in Sterling, Virginia. The shipped source contains 3.3 Curies of Iridium-192. The source was not received at Excel Logistics Sterling, VA. The Varian Radiation Safety Officer contacted the Federal Express on 6/10/05. The package was reported missing with its last known location at the Federal Express hub in Memphis, Tennessee. The search for the package is ongoing.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 41780
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MIKE HIMEBAUCH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 06/16/2005
Notification Time: 13:44 [ET]
Event Date: 06/16/2005
Event Time: 09:23 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

BOTH RHR LPCI DIVISIONS INOPERABLE DUE TO VALVE FAILURE

"On June 16, 2005 at 0923 EDT, with the plant in Mode 1 at 100% reactor power, both divisions of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) were declared inoperable for the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) mode of operation due to a failure of E1150-F017B, Division 2 LPCI Outboard Injection Valve. While performing the Division 2 RHR Pump & Valve Operability Surveillance following a planned Division 2 RHR system outage, E1150-F017B closed properly but failed to open during its required stroke time test. With this valve closed and unable to automatically open, LPCI injection into the RPV from both divisions of RHR would be prevented if LPCI Loop Select Logic selected the Division 2 loop for injection. Therefore, this failure rendered both divisions of RHR inoperable for the LPCI function. LCO 3.5.1.J was entered, which requires immediate entry into LCO 3.0.3. The cause of the failure was subsequently identified and E1150-F017B was returned to its normally open position. At 1146 EDT, Division 1 RHR was declared operable for the LPCI function, and LCO 3.5.1.J and LCO 3.0.3 were exited. The plant remained at 100% power throughout the event.

"The NRC resident inspector has been notified. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 41781
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY OLMSTEAD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 06/16/2005
Notification Time: 22:16 [ET]
Event Date: 06/16/2005
Event Time: 19:02 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 67 Power Operation

Event Text

UNIT COMMENCED A TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO AN ELECTRICAL PROBLEM AFFECTING A SAFETY RELATED BATTERY

"At 1302 [CDT], 6/16/05, during investigation of an electrical ground affecting safety related battery NK04, a channel failure alarm actuated for SA075B, Main Steam and Feedwater Isolation Actuation control panel. Work at KJ122, 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator [EDG] local control panel, was suspended and troubleshooting efforts commenced to determine the cause of the SA075B alarm. Concurrently, SA075B was declared Inoperable at 1302 [CDT] and Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Technical Specification Action statement 3.3.2.S was entered which allowed 6 hours to restore the train to Operable status, or be in Mode 3 within the following 6 hours. As of 1902 [CDT], all repairs and retests had not been completed. A reactor shutdown was commenced at 1902 [CDT] in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.2.S, which is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i)."

The licensee is continuing their investigation to identify cause of the electrical ground but does not anticipate exiting the LCO Action Statement before completing the Unit shutdown. Safety related battery NK04 is currently operable with the faulted loads isolated. The "B" EDG remains Inoperable at this time for troubleshooting.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Friday, March 30, 2012