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Event Notification Report for April 22, 2005

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
04/21/2005 - 04/22/2005

** EVENT NUMBERS **


41613 41615 41618 41621

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General Information or Other Event Number: 41613
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: CALIFORNIA STATE POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: POMONA State: CA
County:
License #: 0496-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID LITTLE
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 04/19/2005
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 01/04/2005
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4)
MICHELE BURGESS (NMSS)
TAS (EMAIL) ()

Event Text

CALIFORNIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

The following information was provided by the State via facsimile:

"[The University] reported the loss of six generally licensed tritium exit signs. They do a quarterly inventory and noticed six were missing when they did their inventory on 01-04-05. The previous inventory had been on 06-20-04. They suspect students may have stolen the signs. The current activity estimate for all six signs is 27.6 Curies, with the highest sign having an estimated current activity of 7.5 Curies."

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General Information or Other Event Number: 41615
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: BURCAW GEOTECHNICAL GROUP
Region: 1
City: RUSKIN State: FL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE FURNACE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 04/19/2005
Notification Time: 20:06 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2005
Event Time: 19:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DAVID SILK (R1)
JOE GIITTER (NMSS)
TAS (E-MAIL) ()

Event Text

FLORIDA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT OF MISSING TROXLER GAUGE

The Florida Bureau of Radiation Control reported a missing Troxler moisture density gauge. The agreement state licensee, Burcaw Geotechnical Group, was using the gauge at a site located in Ruskin, Florida. The gauge overpack, which was thought to contain the gauge, was picked up at the end of the work day and placed into a truck. While in transit, the driver realized that he had not been verified the gauge was actually in the overpack. He checked the overpack and found it to be empty. He returned to the job site and conducted a search but could not locate the gauge.

The licensee informed the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control. The Bureau of Radiation Control requested the licensee to contact the police and report the gauge missing. The Troxler gauge (serial #34752) contained a 40 milliCurie Am-241/Be source and a 10 milliCurie Cs-137 source.

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 41618
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID NIX
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 04/20/2005
Notification Time: 22:40 [ET]
Event Date: 04/20/2005
Event Time: 16:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/21/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

BOTH PENETRATION ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM TRAINS TEMPORARILY INOPERABLE

"At 16:10 on 4-20-05, Oconee Unit 3 entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 due to [valve] 3PR-20 being failed closed for testing on the Penetration Room Ventilation System. 3PR-20 is the suction cross connect valve for the two trains of the Penetration Room Ventilation System. Technical Specification Surveillance requirement 3.7.10.5 requires that 3PR-20 be verified capable of being opened every 18 months. This surveillance cannot be met if 3PR-20 is failed closed. Therefore, both Penetration Room Ventilation System trains had to be declared inoperable since the LCO was declared not met. Entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 conservatively indicates that a loss of safety function could have occurred. Therefore, this condition warrants reporting via an eight-hour non-emergency report as a condition which could result in a loss of safety function. The Technical Specification 3.0.3 entry condition was recognized 'after the fact' by the Shift Technical Advisor. Following recognition of this condition, operating air was restored to 3PR-20 and it was returned to operable at 18:24 on 4-20-05.

"The Penetration Room Ventilation System functions to channel Reactor Building penetration leakage to a high-efficiency carbon/HEPA filtration system prior to release via a ventilation stack. The Penetration Room Ventilation System consists of two trains. Each Penetration Room Ventilation System train has a fan, ducting, suction and discharge valves, and in-line carbon and HEPA filters. The Penetration Room Ventilation System discharges to a larger high-efficiency carbon/HEPA filtration system before being released via a ventilation stack. 3PR-20 is the suction cross connect valve for the two trains of the Penetration Room Ventilation System. 3PR-20 was originally installed to provide cooling of an idle filter train if one trains of the Penetration Room Ventilation System failed. However, subsequent analyses have concluded that 3PR-20 is no longer required to provide this cooling since natural circulation around the idle train filter assembly is adequate to remove decay heat to prevent carbon bed ignition. Appropriate changes to the Technical Specification for this issue have not yet been completed. Therefore, the safety significance of this condition is LOW.

"Corrective Action(s): 1) 3PR 20 was returned to operable. 2) A Technical Specification change will be developed to address the discrepancies between design basis and Technical Specifications requirements (licensing basis)."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

**** RETRACTION from David Nix to MacKinnon at 1940 EDT on 04/21/05 *****


"Withdrawal of Event Number 41618

"On 04/20/2005 at 22:40 [ET] Oconee reported Unit 3 entry into Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 due to valve 3PR-20 being failed closed. 3PR-20 is the suction cross connect valve for the two trains of the Penetration Room Ventilation System. TS Surveillance Requirement 3.7.10.5 can not be met if 3PR-20 is failed closed. Further review concluded that it was inappropriate to enter TS 3.0.3. The appropriate TS condition was TS 3.7.10 Conditon A for one train inoperable. Therefore this event does not meet reportability requirements and is hereby retracted.

"Initial Safety Significance:

"UFSAR sections 6.5.1.3 and 9.4.7.2 clarify that 3PR-20 was originally installed to open in the event of failure of one fan to allow air flow to be maintained through that fan's filters by connecting to the other train which is assumed to be operating. This would prevent carbon bed ignition by removing decay heat of radioactive materials trapped on the filters. Analysis performed in 1990 concluded that natural circulation around the idle train filter assembly provides adequate heat transfer. Therefore there is no physical or analytical need for 3PR-20 to perform its TS function. A TS amendment was approved 6-1-2004 which will delete TS 3.7.10, and the requirement for 3PR-20, but the implementation of that TS change is awaiting completion of certain modifications.

"However, since the existing TS credits 3PR-20 with mitigating a single failure, the result of the inoperability of 3PR-20 is that it cannot mitigate that single failure. It is noted that Oconee Unit 3 is currently in TS 3.7.10 Condition A due to indicated low flow in the 3A PRVS train. While in that TS condition, it is not required to assume a single failure which would make the remaining train inoperable. Therefore 3PR-20 is not required while in Condition A."

NRC R2DO (C. Julian) notified.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 41621
Facility: FRAMATOME ANP
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU FABRICATION
                   COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 2
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County: CAMPBELL
License #: SNM-1168
Agreement: N
Docket: 07001201
NRC Notified By: CHARLIE HOLMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 04/21/2005
Notification Time: 18:12 [ET]
Event Date: 04/21/2005
Event Time: 10:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/21/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(1) - SURFACE CONTAM LEVELS > LIMITS
Person (Organization):
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)
JOSEPH GIITTER (NMSS)

Event Text

RECEIVED TWO PACKAGES EXCEEDING EXTERNAL RADIATION LIMITS.

"Framatome ANP, Mt. Athos Road, Lynchburg, VA, received seven packages of nuclear services equipment from Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. Two of the packages exceeded the surface external radiation limit of 10 CFR 71.47 (200 millirems/hr). The first package , ID # 9070108, had one hot spot on the bottom of the container that read 301 mRem/hr. The second package, ID # 9011352, had one hot spot on the bottom of the container that read 280 mRem/hr. The packages have been received and are in the Framatome secure area.

"Framatome ANP is reporting per the requirement of 10 CFR 20.1906."

The hot spots on both packages were small, less than one square inch in size. Radiation surveys taken inside the cab of the truck that delivered the packages found no elevated radiation levels. Neither package had surface contamination.

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Friday, March 30, 2012