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Event Notification Report for April 21, 2005

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
04/20/2005 - 04/21/2005

** EVENT NUMBERS **


41602 41603 41618

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Power Reactor Event Number: 41602
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KEN PETERSEN
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 04/15/2005
Notification Time: 10:02 [ET]
Event Date: 04/15/2005
Event Time: 05:17 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/20/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

STEAM GENERATOR BOWL DRAIN LINE WELD LEAK DISCOVERED DURING VISUAL EXAM

"During the performance of Alloy 600 bare metal visual examinations, the presence of boric acid deposits indicated a leak in a weld in the steam generator D (EBB01D) bowl drain line.

"This condition is being reported as a degraded condition on the primary coolant system under 10 CFR 50.72 (B)(3)(ii)(A).

"During investigation the defect was characterized as a 1/16" rounded indication in the drain line to boss weld.

"This condition cannot be found acceptable under ASME Section XI, IWB-3600, 'Analytical Evaluation of Flaws' or ASME Section XI, Table IWB-3410-1, 'Acceptable Standards.'

"The [NRC] Resident Inspector has been notified."


* * * UPDATE FROM S. GIFFORD TO J. KNOKE AT 15:10 EDT ON 04/20/05 * *

"On 04/20/05 at 12:10 CDT, during the performance of Alloy 600 Bare Metal Visual Examinations, the presence of boric acid deposits indicated a leak in a weld in the Steam Generator C (EBB01C) bowl drain line."

The inspection of Steam Generators A & B showed no presence of boric acid deposits.

The licensee notified NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Shannon).

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General Information or Other Event Number: 41603
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: ALBUS-KEEFE & ASSOCIATES
Region: 4
City: LAKE ELSINORE State: CA
County:
License #: 6756-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DELL AQUINO
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 04/15/2005
Notification Time: 12:11 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2005
Event Time: 08:30 [PST]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R4)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
MEXICO CNSNS ()
TAS ()

Event Text

CALIFORNIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was provided by the State via facsimile:

"On 4/12/05 at about 8:30 am, the RSO [Name Deleted] of Albus-Keefe & Associates, Inc., reported that a Campbell nuclear gauge (Model MC3, S/N M340907583) was stolen from a pickup truck parked at Circle K Store in Lake Elsinore, CA at about 7:00 am. The gauge was in its transportation case, which was chained to the floor of the truck. The chain was cut and the gauge and its transportation case were stolen. According to [the RSO], the local Sheriffs Department was notified. A newspaper ad will be placed as soon as possible offering a reward for the return of the gauge."

* * * UPDATE FROM STATE (D. AQUINO) TO M. RIPLEY 1840 EDT 04/15/05 * * *

The State received a call from the gauge manufacturer (Campbell-Pacific Nuclear of California) that a citizen brought in the gauge to them and was claiming the reward for its return. The manufacturer stated that the gauge appeared intact and will be performing leak testing and other tests prior to returning the gauge to the licensee. The licensee RSO also contacted the State, confirming that the gauge was in fact the one stolen.

Notified R4 DO (R. Nease), NMSS EO (S. Flanders), TAS and Mexico CNSNS (via fax)

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Power Reactor Event Number: 41618
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID NIX
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 04/20/2005
Notification Time: 22:40 [ET]
Event Date: 04/20/2005
Event Time: 16:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/20/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
CAUDLE JULIAN (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

BOTH PENETRATION ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM TRAINS TEMPORARILY INOPERABLE

"At 16:10 on 4-20-05, Oconee Unit 3 entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 due to [valve] 3PR-20 being failed closed for testing on the Penetration Room Ventilation System. 3PR-20 is the suction cross connect valve for the two trains of the Penetration Room Ventilation System. Technical Specification Surveillance requirement 3.7.10.5 requires that 3PR-20 be verified capable of being opened every 18 months. This surveillance cannot be met if 3PR-20 is failed closed. Therefore, both Penetration Room Ventilation System trains had to be declared inoperable since the LCO was declared not met. Entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 conservatively indicates that a loss of safety function could have occurred. Therefore, this condition warrants reporting via an eight-hour non-emergency report as a condition which could result in a loss of safety function. The Technical Specification 3.0.3 entry condition was recognized 'after the fact' by the Shift Technical Advisor. Following recognition of this condition, operating air was restored to 3PR-20 and it was returned to operable at 18:24 on 4-20-05.

"The Penetration Room Ventilation System functions to channel Reactor Building penetration leakage to a high-efficiency carbon/HEPA filtration system prior to release via a ventilation stack. The Penetration Room Ventilation System consists of two trains. Each Penetration Room Ventilation System train has a fan, ducting, suction and discharge valves, and in-line carbon and HEPA filters. The Penetration Room Ventilation System discharges to a larger high-efficiency carbon/HEPA filtration system before being released via a ventilation stack. 3PR-20 is the suction cross connect valve for the two trains of the Penetration Room Ventilation System. 3PR-20 was originally installed to provide cooling of an idle filter train if one trains of the Penetration Room Ventilation System failed. However, subsequent analyses have concluded that 3PR-20 is no longer required to provide this cooling since natural circulation around the idle train filter assembly is adequate to remove decay heat to prevent carbon bed ignition. Appropriate changes to the Technical Specification for this issue have not yet been completed. Therefore, the safety significance of this condition is LOW.

"Corrective Action(s): 1) 3PR 20 was returned to operable. 2) A Technical Specification change will be developed to address the discrepancies between design basis and Technical Specifications requirements (licensing basis)."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Friday, March 30, 2012