| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
02/23/2005 - 02/24/2005 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 41326 | Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID LANTZ
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 01/12/2005
Notification Time: 21:48 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2005
Event Time: 13:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
| Person (Organization):
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text 24 HOUR CONDITION OF LICENSE REPORT REGARDING HALON SYSTEM ACTUATOR PORT CONNECTION ERROR
"At 1330 on January 12, 2005, station personnel identified an error in connection of pilot lines to the manual-pneumatic actuator on halon bottles required for fire suppression. The vendor was contacted to confirm the configuration. The vendor indicated that the halon bottles would not properly discharge if the pilot lines were not properly connected.
"The system engineer inspected the halon systems. It was determined that five of six fire areas protected by halon systems were affected. Fire watches were implemented for the affected fire areas."
Affected areas:
A-27, Load Center/MG set Room, main - correct, reserve - 1 valve correct/1 valve incorrect
A-17, South Electrical Penetration Room, main - correct, reserve - incorrect
A-18, North Electrical Penetration Room, Main - correct, reserve - correct
C-9, ESF Switchgear room 1*, main - incorrect, reserve - incorrect
C-10, ESF Switchgear room 2*, main - incorrect, reserve - incorrect
C-27, Control room cable trenches/chases**, bottle 1 - correct, bottle 2 - incorrect
"The main bank is sufficient to suppress a fire in a fire area.
* One halon system protects both of the fire areas.
** One halon bottle will provide general area coverage. The second bottle ensures sufficient halon concentration for upper portions of the cable chases in the control room.
"The design and licensing basis for the fire protection system does not require consideration of a fire in more than one fire area at a time. No degraded fire barriers between the above fire areas were identified which would have allowed a fire to affect more than one of the fire areas at a time.
"Repairs were immediately initiated to correct the condition. As of 2010 CST, the repairs have been completed for the affected fire areas and restored to operable status."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM H. BRADLEY TO W. GOTT AT 1225 ON 2/23/05 * * *
"Investigation - Informational tests conducted by the Vendor (Chemetron) and witnessed by Wolf Creek, Callaway, and NRC personnel on January 26, 2005 determined that the Halon systems would have properly actuated in the as-found incorrect configuration (port 'A' and 'B' connections reversed). The only identified difference in the actuation sequence between the tests conducted in the incorrect configuration versus the correct configuration is a delay of less than 2 seconds from the time the solenoid received the discharge signal until the first cylinder actuated. There is no regulatory or National Fire Protection Association standard or guideline that places a time requirement on this interval. This very slight time delay would have had no effect on the designed function of the Halon suppression system to extinguish a fire. Additional details are provided in the Chemetron report, 'Report on Actuation Arrangements for Halon Extinguishing System Units,' (Correspondence ULNRC 05-121) that includes the test procedure and results. Halon system function is to establish sufficient halon concentration for sufficient time to suppress a fire. This capability was not lost with the delay in actuation.
"Regulatory Evaluation - Guidance for reporting to the criterion of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii) is provided in section 3.2.4 of NUREG 1022 rev 2, 'Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR50.72 and 50.73.' This guidance states that an LER is required for a seriously degraded principal safety barrier or an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(c) states the following:
The Operating Corporation shall maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the SNUPPS Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility through Revision 15, the Callaway site addendum through Revision 8, and as approved in the SER through Supplement 4, subject to provisions d below.
"Conclusion: - Based upon the information provided, the Halon suppression system would have operated to extinguish a fire. This condition is not considered reportable to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii), nor is it a violation of the Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(c). Consistent with this conclusion, ENS notification number 41326 for this event is to be retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 41419 | Rep Org: KENTUCKY DEPT OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: EQUITABLE PRODUCTION CO.
Region: 1
City: State: KY
County:
License #: KY 201-027-56
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GRESHAM
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 02/18/2005
Notification Time: 15:34 [ET]
Event Date: 02/18/2005
Event Time: 14:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/18/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
RAYMOND LORSON (R1)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK WELL LOGGING SOURCE
Today at 1520 EST Schlumberger out of Houston office notified Kentucky Dept. of Radiation Control of the following event.
Equitable Production Co. (main office located somewhere in Kentucky) has a stuck well logging source tool. Sometime in the last week the well logging source became stuck at which time the State of Kentucky should have been notified. When trying to retrieve the well logging source the well logging source was broken in half (located in Knott County, Eastern Kentucky). The upper portion of the well logging source containing the americium-241 portion of the well logging was retrieved, no contamination. The top of the stuck well logging tool is at an estimated depth of 3454 feet and the top the cesium-137, 1.7 curies, is at a depth of 3460 feet. According to the State of Kentucky Radiation Control Officer, the 3454 foot depth is vertical depth and there is no contamination or ruptured sources.
Plugging well: Will do a 500 foot pour on top the of the stuck well logging source and then place a wipstock on top of the plug.
A State of Kentucky Dept. of Radiation Control person will be present when the well is plugged. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 41420 | Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: MARSHFIELD CLINIC
Region: 3
City: MARSHFIELD State: WI
County:
License #: 141-01162-001
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL SCHMIDT
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 02/18/2005
Notification Time: 17:04 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2005
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/18/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
PATRICK LOUDEN (R3)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE MEDICAL EVENT
The following information was provided by the State of Wisconsin via facsimile:
"On Thursday, February 17, 2005 at approximately 3:45p.m. [CST], the Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section (RPS) received a telephone call from the Marshfield Clinic, Marshfield, WI (license number 141-01162-001) informing the section of a medical event involving a therapeutic radiation dose from a gamma knife exposing a site outside the intended treatment volume to a level greater than 50% of the expected dose. (HFS 157.72 (1) (a) 3.)
"Preliminary Information From the Licensee:
"On Wednesday, February 16, 2005, the Marshfield Clinic had scheduled a therapeutic radiation treatment of 18 Gray (1800 Rads) using a gamma knife. During the process of manually programming the positioning system, the y and z coordinates were transposed. The error was not noticed during a double check of the treatment coordinates. As a result, a site outside the intended treatment volume received an estimated dose of 5.06 Gray (506 Rads) instead of the originally estimated 0.4 Gray (40 Rads). The volume of the unintended treatment site was 0.7 cubic centimeters. The treatment duration was 2.42 minutes. The prescribed dose of 18 Gray was delivered and the patient treatment was completed.
"The attending neurosurgeon and radiation oncologist believe there will be no medical consequences to the patient from the unintended exposure. The referring physician has been notified.
"[State of Wisconsin] is reporting this event under:
"HFS 157.72 (1) (a) 3. requires a licensee to report an event where there is 'A dose to an organ outside the intended treatment volume that exceeds the expected dose to that organ by 0.5 Sv (50 Rem) where the excess dose is greater than 50% of the expected dose to that organ. . . '
"DHFS, RPS staff have been dispatched on Friday, February 18, 2005 to investigate.
"Wisconsin Incident No: 20" |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41432 | Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TIM CLOUSER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 02/23/2005
Notification Time: 07:11 [ET]
Event Date: 02/23/2005
Event Time: 01:53 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation | Event Text AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTION FOLLOWING MOMENTARY POWER INTERRUPTION
"A momentary interruption in the preferred offsite power source to Unit 2 safeguards 6.9 KV busses occurred due to adverse weather. A blackout signal was generated as a result which in turn initiated an auxiliary feedwater signal. Operators took action to reduce turbine load to 1100 MWe to ensure reactor power would remain below 100% following the reactivity effects associated with the addition of cold auxiliary feedwater.
"The event was caused by both feeder breakers to the 138 KV switchyard opening. Breaker 7050 auto-reclosed but breaker 7020 needed to be manually reclosed. The cause of the breaker operation is not fully understood and is still under investigation.
"Auxiliary feedwater has been returned to standby condition and reactor power is being restored to 100%."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41433 | Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GENE DORMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 02/23/2005
Notification Time: 11:36 [ET]
Event Date: 02/23/2005
Event Time: 09:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TONE ALERT RADIO NOTIFICATION SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE
"At 1030 on February 23, 2005, with the James A. Fitzpatrick (JAF) Nuclear Power Plant operating at 100% reactor power, Oswego County Emergency Management notified JAF that the National Weather Service had notified them that the Tone Alert Radios had been out of service since 0900.
"This impacts the ability to readily notify a portion of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Population for the Nine Mile Point and JAF Nuclear Power Plants. This failure meets NRC 8 hour reporting criterion 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The failure was caused by a computer upset that required reloading of the software that initializes the Tone Alert Radio notification. The National Weather service is currently working on the software reload and estimates the Tone Alert Radios will return to Service by 1130.
"The loss of the Tone Alert Radios constitutes a significant loss of emergency off-site communications ability. Compensatory measures have been verified to be available should the Prompt Notification System be needed. This consists of utilizing Local Law Enforcement Personnel for 'Route Alerting' of the affected areas of the EPZ.
"The event has been entered into the corrective action program and the resident inspector has been briefed and the state PSC will also be notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM D. SQUIRES TO W. GOTT AT 1205 EST ON 2/23/05 * * *
The Tone Alert System was restored at 1152 EST. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (P. Henderson) |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41434 | Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: KEVIN BELDEN
HQ OPS Officer: JANELLE BATTISTE | Notification Date: 02/23/2005
Notification Time: 12:18 [ET]
Event Date: 02/23/2005
Event Time: 09:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POWER LOSS AND RESTORED TO TONE ALERT RADIO NOTIFICATION SYSTEM
On February 23, 2005, the state and local officials notified Nine Mile Point that there was a loss of power to the tone alert radio notification system.
At 1152 EST, on February 23, 2005, power was restored to the tone alert radio notification system. (See EN #41433).
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 41435 | Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
Comments: UF6 CONVERSION (DRY PROCESS)
Region: 2
City: METROPOLIS State: IL
County: MASSAC
License #: SUB-526
Agreement: Y
Docket: 04003392
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL GINZEL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 02/23/2005
Notification Time: 16:53 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2005
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
| Event Text PART 21 INVOLVING A DEFECT OF A DESCOTE BRAND VALVE USED ON UF6 14 TON CYLINDERS
The licensee faxed over the following information for their Part 21 report:
"Metropolis Works, Metropolis, Illinois (Uranium Conversion Facility) is reporting a potential deviation and defect of a Descote brand valve used in UF6 14 Ton Cylinders.
"While preparing to fill a new UF6 14 Ton Cylinder from Urenco (Supplier/Customer), a potential deviation was recognized during the plant procedural pre-fill 60 lb. pressure check that identified improper torque of the Descote brand valve's packing nut. Torque inspections of all new Urenco cylinders on site were initiated when the deviation became apparent in four cylinders. A total of 57 cylinders at the plant were found to be outside the required torque specifications for these new 14 Ton UF6 cylinders. All of these valves on-site have been properly torqued as of 2/23/05.
"Secondly, one of the valves noted above was re-torqued and passed the procedural pressure check after which the filling process proceeded. Upon filling the cylinder, a small, localized seepage occurred that was controlled immediately per procedure. The cylinder was isolated and allowed to cool (liquid to solid phase) to facilitate valve replacement and further investigation of the valve. During the investigation on 2/22/05, two issues were apparent including improper seating of the valve (though no obvious signs were recognized) and a potential minor crack/imperfection was recognized on this 613 packing nut under magnification. This valve is being prepared to send off site for detailed metallurgical analysis. MTW personnel have communicated this inconsistency with the certifying organization (Urenco) and determined this is a reportable event as a defect per 10 CFR 21.21 requirements and plant procedures.
"No workers have received a chemical exposure from this issue and no material release from the facility occurred.
"Marking on the valve are as follows (comments):
"Descote Valve
Type 51.1 valve (revision # /size)
N-1000 (in casting)
11 246 (valve #/type:)
"Opposite side of valve (manufacture information)
0011068173
557 R05
204250
636 made in France
"Packing Nut Information
613
579 R08
51.1 Type"
Licensee notified NRC personnel Dave Hartland, Region 2 and Michael Raddatz NRC HQ. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41436 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM STANG
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 02/23/2005
Notification Time: 19:20 [ET]
Event Date: 02/23/2005
Event Time: 12:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
| Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 90 | Power Operation | 90 | Power Operation | Event Text POTENTIAL VULNERABILITY WITH ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM (ASDS) ISOLATION DESIGN.
The licensee provided via facsimile the following report:
" During an extent of condition review of the corrective actions associated (with) Event Notification #41374, the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) engineering staff made the following discovery. On February 22, 2005 at 12:00 hours, MNGP discovered a potential vulnerability with Alternate Shutdown System (ASDS) isolation design which could result in Bus 16 being locked out in the event of a Control Room or Cable Spreading Room fire. The Monticello Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis for Control Room/Cable Spreading Room fire assumes a loss of control of Division I and II equipment from the Control Room, however, safe shutdown is achieved remotely from the ASDS panel. ASDS design is such that a Control Room/Cable Spreading Room fire would not impede the ability to safely shutdown and maintain the plant in a shutdown condition.
"Contrary to the ASDS design, it was discovered that an un-isolated metering circuit from the 1AR transformer could result in Bus 16 being locked out in the event of a Control Room or Cable Spreading Room fire. The bus lockout relay from the 1AR transformer is not isolated by the ASDS transfer switches, therefore, this condition could result in failure of Bus 16 to re-energize during the implementation of the Shutdown Outside Control Room procedure. Since the Bus 16 feeder breaker from the 1AR transformer is not required at this time, it has been isolated from the safeguards bus to preclude occurrences of this event.
"The event is being reported as a potential loss of safety function (10CFR50.72(b)(v)(A,B and D) and as a degraded or unanalyzed condition (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B))."
The licensee informed NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41437 | Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY GARNER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 02/24/2005
Notification Time: 00:35 [ET]
Event Date: 02/23/2005
Event Time: 21:06 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/24/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON LOW-LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL
The following information, in addition to the phone report, was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"While performing maintenance, [Maintenance] inadvertently opened a 125 VDC battery board [four] breaker which resulted in a reactor trip from steam generator low-low level.
"The plant is being maintained in Mode 3 at NOP/NOT [Normal Operating Pressure/Normal Operating Temperature], 547 [degrees] and 2235 psig, with auxiliary feedwater supplying the steam generators and steam dumps removing the decay heat."
All rods inserted on the trip. No relief valves lifted during the transient. The electric plant is stable with 125 VDC restored to a normal configuration. Steam generator level has been restored to normal levels. Unit 1 was not affected by the transient.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |