Event Notification Report for February 23, 2005

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTION FOLLOWING MOMENTARY POWER INTERRUPTION

"A momentary interruption in the preferred offsite power source to Unit 2 safeguards 6.9 KV busses occurred due to adverse weather. A blackout signal was generated as a result which in turn initiated an auxiliary feedwater signal. Operators took action to reduce turbine load to 1100 MWe to ensure reactor power would remain below 100% following the reactivity effects associated with the addition of cold auxiliary feedwater.

"The event was caused by both feeder breakers to the 138 KV switchyard opening. Breaker 7050 auto-reclosed but breaker 7020 needed to be manually reclosed. The cause of the breaker operation is not fully understood and is still under investigation.

"Auxiliary feedwater has been returned to standby condition and reactor power is being restored to 100%."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

TONE ALERT RADIO NOTIFICATION SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE

"At 1030 on February 23, 2005, with the James A. Fitzpatrick (JAF) Nuclear Power Plant operating at 100% reactor power, Oswego County Emergency Management notified JAF that the National Weather Service had notified them that the Tone Alert Radios had been out of service since 0900.

"This impacts the ability to readily notify a portion of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Population for the Nine Mile Point and JAF Nuclear Power Plants. This failure meets NRC 8 hour reporting criterion 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"The failure was caused by a computer upset that required reloading of the software that initializes the Tone Alert Radio notification. The National Weather service is currently working on the software reload and estimates the Tone Alert Radios will return to Service by 1130.

"The loss of the Tone Alert Radios constitutes a significant loss of emergency off-site communications ability. Compensatory measures have been verified to be available should the Prompt Notification System be needed. This consists of utilizing Local Law Enforcement Personnel for 'Route Alerting' of the affected areas of the EPZ.

"The event has been entered into the corrective action program and the resident inspector has been briefed and the state PSC will also be notified."

* * * UPDATE FROM D. SQUIRES TO W. GOTT AT 1205 EST ON 2/23/05 * * *

The Tone Alert System was restored at 1152 EST. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (P. Henderson)

POWER LOSS AND RESTORED TO TONE ALERT RADIO NOTIFICATION SYSTEM

On February 23, 2005, the state and local officials notified Nine Mile Point that there was a loss of power to the tone alert radio notification system.

At 1152 EST, on February 23, 2005, power was restored to the tone alert radio notification system. (See EN #41433).

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.

POTENTIAL VULNERABILITY WITH ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM (ASDS) ISOLATION DESIGN.

The licensee provided via facsimile the following report:

" During an extent of condition review of the corrective actions associated (with) Event Notification #41374, the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) engineering staff made the following discovery. On February 22, 2005 at 12:00 hours, MNGP discovered a potential vulnerability with Alternate Shutdown System (ASDS) isolation design which could result in Bus 16 being locked out in the event of a Control Room or Cable Spreading Room fire. The Monticello Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis for Control Room/Cable Spreading Room fire assumes a loss of control of Division I and II equipment from the Control Room, however, safe shutdown is achieved remotely from the ASDS panel. ASDS design is such that a Control Room/Cable Spreading Room fire would not impede the ability to safely shutdown and maintain the plant in a shutdown condition.

"Contrary to the ASDS design, it was discovered that an un-isolated metering circuit from the 1AR transformer could result in Bus 16 being locked out in the event of a Control Room or Cable Spreading Room fire. The bus lockout relay from the 1AR transformer is not isolated by the ASDS transfer switches, therefore, this condition could result in failure of Bus 16 to re-energize during the implementation of the Shutdown Outside Control Room procedure. Since the Bus 16 feeder breaker from the 1AR transformer is not required at this time, it has been isolated from the safeguards bus to preclude occurrences of this event.

"The event is being reported as a potential loss of safety function (10CFR50.72(b)(v)(A,B and D) and as a degraded or unanalyzed condition (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B))."

The licensee informed NRC Resident Inspector.

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON LOW-LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL

The following information, in addition to the phone report, was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:

"While performing maintenance, [Maintenance] inadvertently opened a 125 VDC battery board [four] breaker which resulted in a reactor trip from steam generator low-low level.

"The plant is being maintained in Mode 3 at NOP/NOT [Normal Operating Pressure/Normal Operating Temperature], 547 [degrees] and 2235 psig, with auxiliary feedwater supplying the steam generators and steam dumps removing the decay heat."

All rods inserted on the trip. No relief valves lifted during the transient. The electric plant is stable with 125 VDC restored to a normal configuration. Steam generator level has been restored to normal levels. Unit 1 was not affected by the transient.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.