Event Notification Report for February 09, 2005

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO LOSS OF NORMAL AND ALTERNATE POWER TO SAFETY BUS

"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.

"On February 9, 2005, at approximately 01:04 MST, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 1 commenced a reactor shutdown required by Technical Specification 3.8.1.

"Limiting Condition for Operability (LCO) 3.8.1 requires two independent AC sources be available. On February 6, 2005, at approximately 22:19 Mountain Standard Time (MST) a valid actuation of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 Train 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) occurred as a result of under-voltage on its respective safety bus (PBB-S04). EDG 'B' started and loaded as designed to energize PBB-S04. (Reference EN #41379 reported on 02/06/2005).

"The loss of power to the safety bus was the result of a fault associated with 13.8KV breaker NAN-SO6J which caused breakers NAN-S06H (normal power supply), NAN-S06K (alternate power supply), and NAN-S06J (EOF & TSC Bldg power supply) to all trip open on over-current. This action resulted in the de-energization of NAN-SO6, NAN-S04, and PBB-S04. PVNGS will be unable to make repairs and restore the required second independent AC power source with the allowed 72 hour required action time frame.

"The event did not result in the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

BOTH TRAINS OF THE CONTROL STRUCTURE EMERGENCY OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"At 09:20 am, on February 9th, the control room declared both trains of Control Structure Emergency Outside Air Supply System (CREOASS) inoperable. The control room was notified of an inoperable boundary door that was not closed and latched and therefore would not have allowed CREOASS to perform its safety function of maintaining the Control Structure at a positive pressure if required. The door was closed and locked [at 11:15] to restore the habitability boundary.

"The door has since been repaired [adjustment of latch mechanism].

"Initial investigation determined that the door had been unlocked at approximately 09:20 this morning by an elevator vendor to perform maintenance.

"This is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"CREOASS was not called upon to function during the period that the door was not operable."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM LICENSEE (ROBINSON) TO NRC (HUFFMAN) @ 1328 EDT ON 4/8/05 * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee (licensee text in quotes):

"On 2/9/2005, PPL Susquehanna LLC reported a loss of safety function for the Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply System (CREOASS) based on one of the Control Structure Habitability boundary doors being found partially open. Positive air pressure generated by the Control Structure HVAC System prevented the door closure mechanism from maintaining the door closed. The door was closed to restore the habitability boundary.

"The event was reported as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"The Safety Function of the CREOASS is to provide adequate radiation protection to permit occupancy of the Control Room under accident conditions for the duration of the accident. The CREOASS accomplishes this by: 1) filtering the outside make-up air supply and 2) maintaining a positive pressure in the control structure habitability boundary to limit unfiltered air in leakage into the boundary. A subsequent engineering evaluation concluded that with the door closure mechanism providing a resistive force, CREOASS would have been able to maintain a positive pressure within the boundary and perform its safety function as described above. In conclusion, the reported condition did not result in a loss of safety function under 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) and is therefore being retracted."

The NRC Resident Inspector and R1DO (Noggle) have been notified.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO REPORTABLE QUANTITY SPILL CONTAINED ON SITE

The following information was obtained from the regulatee via facsimile:

"On 2/09/05 at approximately 1025 hours [EST] , a Hazardous Material spill occurred on plant site. Utility operations was transporting a small tank (app. 320 gallon capacity) of Sodium Hypochlorite with a fork truck. The tank tipped off of the forks, hit the ground, and landed on its side causing the cap to come off. Approx. 150 gallons of Sodium Hypochlorite spilled to the ground resulting in a hazardous material spill.

"At 1203 hours, the Plant Shift Superintendent notified the National Response Center and the Ohio EPA that a Reportable Quantity (RQ) of hazardous material (Sodium Hypochlorite)) was released to the ground. No material left the immediate area and clean-up of the spill is currently in process. UE2-RA-RE1030, Appendix D, section P requires a 4-hour NRC event [notification] when other government agencies are notified."

There were no personnel injuries or plant equipment damaged as a result of the spill.

The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO UNISOLABLE PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAK

The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:

"On February 9, 2005, at 1222 hours [CST], South Texas Project Unit 2 commenced a reactor shutdown required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.6.2, 'Reactor Coolant System - Operational Leakage.'

"Following investigation into an increasing containment atmosphere particulate radiation monitor trend, primary leakage (steam plume) was discovered coming from a 3/4 inch vent line off of the 'A' Cold Leg Safety Injection line. The leak is located in an area between the Safety Injection line and the first vent line isolation valve, and is therefore considered an unisolable pressure boundary leak. TS 3.4.6.2 requires that with any Pressure Boundary Leakage, the Unit must be in at least Hot Standby within 6 hours and in Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours. At the time of discovery, the total unidentified reactor coolant system leak rate was determined to be 0.13 gpm.

"The vent line pipe and weld material is stainless steel.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(i) for commencement of a TS required shutdown, and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(A) for the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded."

There is no impact on South Texas Project Unit 1. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

CALIFORNIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was obtained from California Department of Health Services, Radiation Health Branch - Berkeley / Region 3 via facsimile:

"A CPN Model MC-1DRR-P moisture density gauge was run over at a construction site at Valencia Street between 14th and 15th Street in San Francisco, CA approximately at 9:30 am. The gamma source rod was in the extended position at the time of the incident. The source tip rod containing 10 [milliCuries of] Cs-137 was intact but was slightly bent and could not be retracted into the safe position. The 50 [milliCurie] Am-241/Be source was intact as designed. Mr. [DELETED] from CPN was at the site after the incident. A screen leak test performed by Mr. [DELETED] did not indicate any contamination. Gauge was picked up by CPN at the site and held for disposal."

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO PRESS RELEASE FOR PLANT SHUTDOWN

The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:

"STP [South Texas Project] Nuclear Operating Co. will be making a press release concerning the shut down of Unit 2. STPNOC will be sharing the press release with various locals and state government agencies and the media.

"NRC was notified of the TS [Technical Specification] required shutdown on 2/9/05 (EN# 41392)"

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1700 EST ON 2/10/05 FROM KLAY KLIMPLE TO S. SANDIN * * *

"STP Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) issued a press release at 1503 today concerning the status of the shutdown of Unit 2. STPNOC has shared the press release with various local and state government agencies and the media.

"NRC was notified of the Technical Specification required shutdown on 2/9/05 (Reference EN# 41392)."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Blair Spitzberg).