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Event Notification Report for January 10, 2005

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
01/07/2005 - 01/10/2005

** EVENT NUMBERS **


41306 41308 41315 41317 41318 41319 41320

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General Information or Other Event Number: 41306
Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: CARDINAL HEALTH
Region: 1
City: SILVER SPRING State: MD
County:
License #: MD-31-263-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY MANLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 01/04/2005
Notification Time: 10:47 [ET]
Event Date: 01/01/2005
Event Time: 05:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/04/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
SANDRA WASTLER (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT OF TRUCK CRASH RESULTING IN MINOR CONTAMINATION AND LOSS OF RADIOPHARMACEUTICAL VIALS

A truck carrying radiopharmaceuticals for Cardinal Health had an accident on Eastbound Route 50 near the Cape St. Claire exit in Annapolis MD. Police, Fire Department and an ambulance responded to the scene. The licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) also responded. Survey indicated contamination over an area of approximately 100 feet. It was determined that an 8 mCi vial of Tc99 MAA had been damaged and spilled during the accident. The Maryland Department of Environment and Hazmat were summoned. The area was decontaminated with a high-powered water spray. However, further investigation determined that an ammo can containing two vials of TC99m and TC99 MAA was missing at the accident scene. The two vials had a total activity of 566 mCi as of 0400 on 1/01/05. An extensive search of the area was unable to locate the ammo can with the two missing vials. Neither the licensee nor the Maryland Department of Environment believe that the vials pose any health risk since the Tc99m has a 6 hour half life.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 41308
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TOLUNAY-WONG ENGINEERS, INC.
Region: 4
City: Houston State: TX
County:
License #: L04848-000
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES H. OGDEN, JR.
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 01/05/2005
Notification Time: 09:26 [ET]
Event Date: 01/02/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/05/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
LINDA GERSEY (NMSS)
MEXICO (FAXED) ()
TAS DUTY OFFICER ()

Event Text

TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT: STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE


"The gauge was locked and secured to the technician's company pickup truck. The technician had taken the gauge to his residence for storage, in violation of the Licensee's written policy and procedures. The technician discovered the gauge was missing from the truck and determined that the lock securing the wire rope cable which secured the transport case had been cut. The gauge and transport case along with other tools from the vehicle are missing. A police report was filed with the Houston Police Department. The gauge is a Troxler Model 3430, Serial No. 31792, containing two sealed sources: Cs-137, nominal 8 millicuries, Serial No 750-6702, and Am-241/Be, nominal 40 millicuries, Serial No. 47-1785. The Licensee issued a memorandum on January 3, 2005 to all personnel regarding gauge storage and transport procedures.

"Company provided pickup truck, Toyota Tacoma, Texas License Plate No. IMX-R15.

"Licensee is planning to offer a reward and will publicize through the local media."

Texas Incident ID No: I-8196

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 41315
Rep Org: BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM
Licensee: BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM
Region: 1
City: RIDGEFIELD State: CT
County:
License #: 06-19183-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PATRICIA LOPEZ
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 01/07/2005
Notification Time: 11:22 [ET]
Event Date: 12/07/2004
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
GLENN MEYER (R1)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)

Event Text

REPORT OF LOST NICKEL-63 FOIL STRIP

The licensee reports that it discovered an Aerosol Technology Machine (manufactured by CH Technologies Incorporated, Westwood NJ) was missing from its inventory. The machine is used to eliminate static electricity and contains a 10 milliCurie Nickel-63 foil strip. The machine was last confirmed to be present around October 2003 when it moved out of a laboratory space into a hallway. It is possible that the machine was disposed of but the licensee is still searching for the device.

The licensee has notified NRC Region 1 (Tom Thompson).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 41317
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVE SEENEY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 01/07/2005
Notification Time: 19:18 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2005
Event Time: 17:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF A FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN SUCCESS PATH

"On January 07, 2005, conditions were discovered where a postulated fire could cause the loss of a fire safe shut down success path. Wolf Creek is in Mode 1, at 100 % power.

"During reviews associated with post fire safe shutdown reanalysis work, Wolf Creek personnel discovered that power and control cables for Boron Injection tank (BIT) inlet valve EMHV8803A could be damaged by a fire in Fire area A-1. This valve is needed because the A train is the protected train for this fire area. This does not meet our commitments to 10 CFR50 Appendix R.III.G as reflected in our approved Fire Protection Plan.

"Following a fire in the plant that requires a plant shutdown the function of the CCP and Bit Inlet valve is to inject borated water into the reactor to maintain reactor water inventory. A fire in this fire area (A-1) has the potential to cause the above-mentioned valve to not function properly and cause a loss of the capability to maintain inventory. Based on the guidance provided in NUREG 1022, Revision 2, this situation meets the criterion of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(ii)(B) for an 8 hour ENS notification, as it relates to being in an unanalyzed condition.

"The licensee has implemented a 1-hour fire watch in this fire area.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

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General Information or Other Event Number: 41318
Rep Org: WHITING CORPORATION
Licensee: WHITING CORPORATION
Region: 3
City: MONEE State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK KWASNY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 01/07/2005
Notification Time: 14:47 [ET]
Event Date: 01/05/2005
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
GLENN MEYER (R1)
MARK LESSER (R2)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
VERN HODGE (NRR)

Event Text

OVERSTRESS CONDITION ON SINGLE FAILURE PROOF CRANE TROLLEYS

"On January 5, 2005 as a part of a crane re-rate analyses and study Whiting Corporation identified an overstress condition on some hoist equalizer plates and welds. This condition is limited to the hoists of some redundant (single failure proof) cranes.

"Whiting Corporation has performed a preliminary review and have isolated the problem to the family of redundant trolleys also known as single failure proof trolleys. No other types of cranes are affected. It has not been established at this time which specific redundant trolleys are impacted. This assessment will require a cases by case review.

"Whiting Corporation have or are attempting to contact these customers directly to notify them of this circumstance. These are the only potentially impacted customers.

"The hoist units identified above, are to be inspected as follows and then limited to 50% of rated capacity until such time as the units can be evaluated and/or upgraded. The following specific serial numbers can be operated at 100 Tons (SN 10403, 10388, 10389, 10510). SN 10698 is currently being evaluated and is limited in capacity by other factors being addressed with the customer. The area to visually inspect, for cracks in the plates or welds, is the assembly, adjacent to the rope termination, at each end of the equalizer arm, that the nut on the rope fitting bears against. Suspicious visual indications of potential cracks can be further examined by Magnetic Particle testing if warranted. A lack of any visible cracks during visual examination will allow the unit to be placed in operation at the 50% reduced capacity. Please note no reports of field failures or cracks have been reported as of the issuance of this notice.

"The following is a list of the family of redundant (single failure proof) cranes that will require a detailed evaluation.

Niagara Mohawk Power - Nine Mile Point -125 Ton
Exelon Corporation (Commonwealth Edison) - Dresden Station -125 Ton
Exelon Corporation (Commonwealth Edison) - Quad Cities Station -125 Ton
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut-North East Utilities-Millstone (Believed to be Unit 1 in Waterford)-Reactor Room
Entergy Nuclear (Vermont Yankee) - Vernon Station - Reactor Room-110 Ton
Neb. Public Power - Cooper Nuclear Station - Reactor Room -100 Ton
Exelon Corporation (Philadelphia Electric) - Peach Bottom -125 Ton (2)
(AEP) (Indiana Michigan power) - D. C. Cook Station -150 Ton
Carolina Power & Light - Brunswick Station -125 Ton
Southern Nuclear (Alabama Power) - Farley Plant - 125 Ton
Energy Northwest (WPPSS) -Hanford Unit # 2 - Reactor Room -125 Ton
Progress Energy (PGN) (Carolina Power & Light) - Robinson Station -125 Ton
Mississippi Power & Light - Grand Gulf Station -150 Ton (2)
Long Island Lighting - Shoreham Station -125 Ton
Constellation Nuclear (Niagara Mohawk Power) - Nine Mile Point Station -125 Ton
AEP (Indiana Michigan power) - D. C. Cook Station -150 Ton
Indiana Michigan power - D. C. Cook Station - 20 Ton"

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Power Reactor Event Number: 41319
Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVID VANDEWALLE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 01/09/2005
Notification Time: 13:42 [ET]
Event Date: 01/09/2005
Event Time: 11:27 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/09/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
SONIA BURGESS (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 75 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOWERING MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM

"The Palisades reactor was manually tripped from approximately 75% power at 1127 hours EST due to lowering main condenser vacuum. Prior to the reactor trip, power was lowered from 100% to 75% in accordance with off-normal procedures in an effort to restore condenser vacuum. The reason for the loss of condenser vacuum is not understood and is being investigated. At 1135 hours an automatic actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system occurred, as designed, to maintain steam generator levels. The atmospheric steam dump valves opened per design on reactor trip, however one dump valve did not fully re-close until instrument air was manually isolated to it. Reactor decay heat is being removed via steaming through the turbine bypass valve to the main condenser. Reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and (b)(3)(iv)(A)."

After the reactor trip, Main Condenser vacuum rose to 25 inches - sufficient for using the Turbine Bypass valves for removing decay heat. All rods inserted on the manual reactor trip. The electric grid is stable.

Licensee notified NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 41320
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: CLAY WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 01/10/2005
Notification Time: 00:56 [ET]
Event Date: 01/09/2005
Event Time: 19:45 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/10/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Decommissioned 0 Decommissioned
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N Y 65 Power Operation 65 Power Operation

Event Text

SAN ONOFRE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS (EOF) INACCESSIBLE DUE TO ROAD FLOODING

The following information was received from the licensee via e-mail:

"On January 9, 2005, at about 1945 PST, the access road to the SONGS MESA facilities became flooded after several days of rain. The San Onofre Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is located at the MESA and because of the flooding, is inaccessible to passenger vehicles. While the EOF itself is operable, in the event of an Emergency at San Onofre, SCE would direct EOF emergency responders to the alternate EOF located in Irvine, California. SCE is reporting this occurrence to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"At the time of this occurrence, Unit 2 was operating at about 100% power and Unit 3 was operating at about 65% power. SCE will notify the NRC resident inspectors about this occurrence and will provide them with a copy of this report."

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