Event Notification Report for December 17, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/16/2004 - 12/17/2004
EVENT NUMBERS
41274412684126941270
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 41274
Facility: NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES INC.
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
NRC Notified By: RANDY SHACKELFORD
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
NRC Notified By: RANDY SHACKELFORD
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 12/21/2004
Notification Time: 12:10 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2004
Event Time: 22:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2008
Notification Time: 12:10 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2004
Event Time: 22:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.74 APP. A - ADDITIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
10 CFR Section:
70.74 APP. A - ADDITIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
JAY HENSON (R2)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
CRITICALITY CONTROL
Sequence of occurrences:
On December 17, 2004, materials were transferred to a storage area without being transferred thru a particular device as required by the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). This device prevents a more reactive/incorrect material type from being transferred. Prior to the addition of materials to the system, operations personnel verify that the correct materials are added to the system. The device prevents a more reactive/incorrect material type from entering the storage area.
Remaining activities relied on:
The remaining activities relied on to prevent potential accidents are available and reliable to perform their function. Operations personnel verified that the correct material type was added to the system. Also, the addition of a more reactive/incorrect material type was specifically evaluated and determined to be subcritical.
Actions taken in response to the event:
A root cause investigation was initiated as a result of the event. Transfers were suspended until compensatory measures can be put in place.
Safety significance of event:
The safety significance was low for the event given the very low likelihood of adding a more reactive/incorrect material type to the system. A more reactive/incorrect material type was not added to the system and the addition of a more reactive/incorrect material type was specifically evaluated and determined to be subcritical.
Brief scenario of how a criticality could occur:
In order for a criticality to occur, multiple occurrences of an excessive amount of a more reactive/incorrect material type would have to be added to the system; and, the material would have to be transferred without use of the particular device.
What are the controls or control systems and the failures or deficiencies?
The controls were limitations on material types input into the system and the use of a particular device when transferring materials to a storage area. Materials were transferred to the storage area without being transferred thru the particular device as required by the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). The Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) for the area credited the device as a passive control device. The act of transferring the materials thru the device should have been credited as an administrative control since operations personnel have the ability to bypass the device if the procedure is not followed correctly.
What are the corrective actions taken and when was each implemented?
A root cause investigation was initiated on December 21, 2004 after discovery of the event. Material transfers were suspended on December 21, 2004 until compensatory measures can be implemented.
Actual or potential health and safety consequences:
There were no actual health and safety consequences to workers, the public, or the environment. There were also no personnel exposures to radiation, radioactive materials, or hazardous chemicals produced from licensed materials. The potential Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) consequences for workers were low given the actual materials involved and the very low likelihood of adding a more reactive/incorrect material type to the system. A more reactive/incorrect material type was not added to the system and the addition of a more reactive/incorrect material type was specifically evaluated and determined to be subcritical.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY J KOZAL * * *
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
CRITICALITY CONTROL
Sequence of occurrences:
On December 17, 2004, materials were transferred to a storage area without being transferred thru a particular device as required by the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). This device prevents a more reactive/incorrect material type from being transferred. Prior to the addition of materials to the system, operations personnel verify that the correct materials are added to the system. The device prevents a more reactive/incorrect material type from entering the storage area.
Remaining activities relied on:
The remaining activities relied on to prevent potential accidents are available and reliable to perform their function. Operations personnel verified that the correct material type was added to the system. Also, the addition of a more reactive/incorrect material type was specifically evaluated and determined to be subcritical.
Actions taken in response to the event:
A root cause investigation was initiated as a result of the event. Transfers were suspended until compensatory measures can be put in place.
Safety significance of event:
The safety significance was low for the event given the very low likelihood of adding a more reactive/incorrect material type to the system. A more reactive/incorrect material type was not added to the system and the addition of a more reactive/incorrect material type was specifically evaluated and determined to be subcritical.
Brief scenario of how a criticality could occur:
In order for a criticality to occur, multiple occurrences of an excessive amount of a more reactive/incorrect material type would have to be added to the system; and, the material would have to be transferred without use of the particular device.
What are the controls or control systems and the failures or deficiencies?
The controls were limitations on material types input into the system and the use of a particular device when transferring materials to a storage area. Materials were transferred to the storage area without being transferred thru the particular device as required by the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). The Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) for the area credited the device as a passive control device. The act of transferring the materials thru the device should have been credited as an administrative control since operations personnel have the ability to bypass the device if the procedure is not followed correctly.
What are the corrective actions taken and when was each implemented?
A root cause investigation was initiated on December 21, 2004 after discovery of the event. Material transfers were suspended on December 21, 2004 until compensatory measures can be implemented.
Actual or potential health and safety consequences:
There were no actual health and safety consequences to workers, the public, or the environment. There were also no personnel exposures to radiation, radioactive materials, or hazardous chemicals produced from licensed materials. The potential Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) consequences for workers were low given the actual materials involved and the very low likelihood of adding a more reactive/incorrect material type to the system. A more reactive/incorrect material type was not added to the system and the addition of a more reactive/incorrect material type was specifically evaluated and determined to be subcritical.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY J KOZAL * * *
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41268
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DAN MARKS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DAN MARKS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 12/17/2004
Notification Time: 14:54 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2004
Event Time: 10:53 [MST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2004
Notification Time: 14:54 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2004
Event Time: 10:53 [MST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
KRISS KENNEDY (R4)
KRISS KENNEDY (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATIONS MADE DUE TO SPILL OF APPROXIMATELY 1400 POUNDS OF SULFURIC ACID
"On 12/17/2004 at approximately 10:53 MST, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) notified the Department of Transportation/US. Coast Guard National Response Center of a sulfuric acid spill to the ground at the Water Reclamation Facility. The source of cooling water for PVNGS is treated sewage effluent. The effluent is conveyed to the site through approximately 35 miles of pipeline, and treated in the onsite water reclamation facility to meet plant water quality requirements. The acid spill has no impact to the radiological health and safety of the workers or the public.
"The spill is estimated at 1400 pounds. The reportable quantity is 1000 pounds. The sulfuric acid is classified as a CERCLA Hazardous Substance and EPCRA Extremely Hazardous Substance. The release has been isolated and the apparent cause is a leak in an underground section of pipe. There were no injuries and no known or anticipated acute or chronic health risks. The National Response Center report number is 744571. The Arizona Department of Environmental Quality was also informed at 10:51 MST.
"There was no impact to the three generating units from the spill at the Water Reclamation Facility which is located at a separate part of the Owner Controller Area. All 3 PVNGS Units are operating at approximately 100% in Mode 1.
"The NRC Resident has been notified of the event and this notification."
"On 12/17/2004 at approximately 10:53 MST, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) notified the Department of Transportation/US. Coast Guard National Response Center of a sulfuric acid spill to the ground at the Water Reclamation Facility. The source of cooling water for PVNGS is treated sewage effluent. The effluent is conveyed to the site through approximately 35 miles of pipeline, and treated in the onsite water reclamation facility to meet plant water quality requirements. The acid spill has no impact to the radiological health and safety of the workers or the public.
"The spill is estimated at 1400 pounds. The reportable quantity is 1000 pounds. The sulfuric acid is classified as a CERCLA Hazardous Substance and EPCRA Extremely Hazardous Substance. The release has been isolated and the apparent cause is a leak in an underground section of pipe. There were no injuries and no known or anticipated acute or chronic health risks. The National Response Center report number is 744571. The Arizona Department of Environmental Quality was also informed at 10:51 MST.
"There was no impact to the three generating units from the spill at the Water Reclamation Facility which is located at a separate part of the Owner Controller Area. All 3 PVNGS Units are operating at approximately 100% in Mode 1.
"The NRC Resident has been notified of the event and this notification."
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41269
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: STEVEN BENEDICT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: STEVEN BENEDICT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 12/17/2004
Notification Time: 16:40 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2004
Event Time: 11:09 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/05/2005
Notification Time: 16:40 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2004
Event Time: 11:09 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/05/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
WATERLEG PUMP DISCHARGE CHECK VALVE IN HPCS SYSTEM FAILED TO OPEN
"During the performance of the High Pressure Core Spray system (HPCS) quarterly pump and valve operability test, the waterleg pump discharge low pressure alarm was unable to be cleared. It was determined that the waterleg pump discharge check valve had failed to open to provide keepfill flow.
"The HPCS system had been declared [inoperable at 0818 for a planned surveillance activity. At 1109, the low pressure alarm came in as expected, but was not able to be cleared. Subsequent mechanical agitation of the waterleg pump discharge check valve caused the valve to open and the low pressure condition to clear.
"Tech Spec 3.5.1 is applicable. Entry time 0818 on 12/17/04.
"Action is to restore HPCS to Operable within 14 days."
NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 01/05/05 @1211 BY KEN MEADE TO CHAUNCEY GOULD * * * RETRACTION
"An 8 hour notification was made on December 17, 2004, in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The report was made due to a potential loss of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system safety function as a result of the loss of keep-fill pressure."
"The water-leg pump discharge check valve was determined to be the most likely cause of the loss of keep-fill pressure and was replaced. A preliminary investigation has determined that the water-leg pump discharge check valve had sufficient corrosion products (on the rising stem) to cause the valve disk to stick. With the check valve not able to fully open, the system low pressure alarm was activated."
"The lowest system pressure, about 24 psig, was determined to be just below the alarm setpoint of 27 psig. The alarm setpoint includes a 10 psig margin between receipt of the alarm and the pressure at which the piping would start to void. The pressure, 24 psig, was equivalent to the static head provided by the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) to the HPCS system. This alignment is the method used to maintain the system filled when the water-leg pump is unavailable."
"The 24 psig system pressure was adequate to maintain the system full. Since the system pressure was adequate and the HPCS system was maintained full, the safety function of the system was not adversely affected. Since the safety function was not affected, there is no reportable condition and Event Notification 41269 is retracted."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
"During the performance of the High Pressure Core Spray system (HPCS) quarterly pump and valve operability test, the waterleg pump discharge low pressure alarm was unable to be cleared. It was determined that the waterleg pump discharge check valve had failed to open to provide keepfill flow.
"The HPCS system had been declared [inoperable at 0818 for a planned surveillance activity. At 1109, the low pressure alarm came in as expected, but was not able to be cleared. Subsequent mechanical agitation of the waterleg pump discharge check valve caused the valve to open and the low pressure condition to clear.
"Tech Spec 3.5.1 is applicable. Entry time 0818 on 12/17/04.
"Action is to restore HPCS to Operable within 14 days."
NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 01/05/05 @1211 BY KEN MEADE TO CHAUNCEY GOULD * * * RETRACTION
"An 8 hour notification was made on December 17, 2004, in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The report was made due to a potential loss of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system safety function as a result of the loss of keep-fill pressure."
"The water-leg pump discharge check valve was determined to be the most likely cause of the loss of keep-fill pressure and was replaced. A preliminary investigation has determined that the water-leg pump discharge check valve had sufficient corrosion products (on the rising stem) to cause the valve disk to stick. With the check valve not able to fully open, the system low pressure alarm was activated."
"The lowest system pressure, about 24 psig, was determined to be just below the alarm setpoint of 27 psig. The alarm setpoint includes a 10 psig margin between receipt of the alarm and the pressure at which the piping would start to void. The pressure, 24 psig, was equivalent to the static head provided by the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) to the HPCS system. This alignment is the method used to maintain the system filled when the water-leg pump is unavailable."
"The 24 psig system pressure was adequate to maintain the system full. Since the system pressure was adequate and the HPCS system was maintained full, the safety function of the system was not adversely affected. Since the safety function was not affected, there is no reportable condition and Event Notification 41269 is retracted."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 41270
Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Region: 2 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: M. GINZEL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: M. GINZEL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 12/17/2004
Notification Time: 20:12 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2004
Event Time: 12:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2004
Notification Time: 20:12 [ET]
Event Date: 12/17/2004
Event Time: 12:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/17/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2)
MELVYN LEACH (NMSS)
JAY HENSON (R2)
MELVYN LEACH (NMSS)
STANDBY EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DECLARED INOPERABLE.
A work request identified a local trouble alarm on the standby generator (standby emergency diesel generator). Maintenance investigation of the trouble alarm was in progress when the control card for the standby generator failed (card controlled the frequency and voltage of the generator). Failure of this card disabled the generator from operating properly. The standby generator was declared inoperable and production personnel immediately stopped production of licensed material that was supported by the standby generator. At 1800 CST the standby generator was repaired and tested. The standby generator is considered fully operable at the time of this report. An investigation has been initiated to find why the control card failed. A 30 day reported will be released. NRC Region 2 (Jay Henson) was notified of this event by the licensee.
A work request identified a local trouble alarm on the standby generator (standby emergency diesel generator). Maintenance investigation of the trouble alarm was in progress when the control card for the standby generator failed (card controlled the frequency and voltage of the generator). Failure of this card disabled the generator from operating properly. The standby generator was declared inoperable and production personnel immediately stopped production of licensed material that was supported by the standby generator. At 1800 CST the standby generator was repaired and tested. The standby generator is considered fully operable at the time of this report. An investigation has been initiated to find why the control card failed. A 30 day reported will be released. NRC Region 2 (Jay Henson) was notified of this event by the licensee.